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Abstract  
 
Understanding the politics and policymaking processes in sustainability transitions remains a crucially 
important challenge (Köhler et al., 2019). A number of recent contributions in the sustainability 
transitions literature have started to explore these themes, drawing from various disciplines and 
approaches. These include theories of the policy process (for a review Kern & Rogge, 2017); power 
relations and agency (Flor Avelino, 2011) and institutional literatures (Andrews-Speed, 2016; 
Lockwood, Kuzemko, Mitchell, & Hoggett, 2017). Authors have pointed to insights which are useful 
for conceptualising certain aspects of the overarching multi-faceted processes of policymaking, but 
there is less attention to linking these ideas or approaches to processes of socio-technical change in a 
co-evolutionary manner. Developing such a co-evolutionary perspective can help better explain policy 
outputs as a result of socio-technical change, and how these outputs then stimulate subsequent socio-
technical change. Understanding this dynamic relationship can also help explain policy change or 
stability over time.  
Perhaps more importantly, many of the aforementioned contributions have only focussed on single 
policy instruments and their revisions over time. However, due to the scale, complexity and urgency of 
sustainability transitions, scholars and practitioners have increasingly recognised the need to implement 
combinations of multiple policy instruments, coordinated to meet an overall transition strategy (Rogge, 
Kern, & Howlett, 2017). Accordingly, the policymaking processes for such ‘policy mixes’ are more 
complex, and both their design and analysis are more challenging. However, despite several calls for 
more attention to processes underpinning the development of policy mixes over time, there remains 
little substantive conceptual development. While it is beyond the scope of a single doctoral thesis to 
synthesise the aforementioned multitude of insights, ideas and approaches related to policy-mix-making 
processes, the thesis takes a step forward in this regard. It links policymaking processes, socio-technical 
change, and political and policymaking institutions, to better conceptualise the development of policy 
mixes aimed at fostering socio-technical change towards sustainability.  
The thesis first develops (paper 1) and applies (paper 2) a co-evolutionary framework to conceptualise 
interactions of policy-mix-change and socio-technical change over time. The framework is mostly 
endogenously orientated in its explanation of change, drawing ideas from policy feedback theory. The 
central focus is how policy design choices alter actor behaviour to induce change in the socio-technical 
system, and generate incentives for actors to participate in subsequent policymaking. The core idea of 
policy feedback is that new policy can stimulate change in ways which helps stabilise it (making it 
increasingly locked-in over time), or which undermine it. The thesis then turns to institutional literature 
(paper 3) to help explain how the interests of actors are translated into policy outputs by paying attention 
to the institutional structure in which the policymaking process plays out. While this approach also 
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contains endogenous elements, it also looks exogenously at the influence of political and policymaking 
institutional arrangements to analyse their influence on decision-making and policy outputs.   
The thesis utilises these analytical approaches to help explain the failed transition of domestic housing 
in the UK, specifically focussing on the Zero Carbon Homes policy mix between 2006 and 2016.  The 
analysis of a failed attempt of a transition not only generates case-specific insights, but also helps 
identify more generic implications for policymaking about negative dynamics and makes 
recommendations to avoid their reoccurrence. Paper 2 generate insights about: i) how a virtuous cycle 
can be offset, and how this could be avoided; ii) what limitations may prevent a policy mix from 
producing more positive feedback; and iii) how perceptions of policy mix credibility are formed and 
how these affect socio-technical change. Paper 3 builds upon these insights, paying attention to 
institutional factors which may limit positive feedbacks and affect policy mix credibility.  
The main contributions of the thesis are that it develops a novel co-evolutionary framework (paper 1), 
produces novel insights by applying this empirically (paper 2), before zooming-in on the policy 
subsystem and developing three heuristic forms of institutional arrangements which contributed to the 
failure of the zero carbon homes policy mix (paper 3). The thesis therefore links policy design literatures 
with policy-process theory and political science. By linking these more explicitly, it makes a 
contribution to the literature on the politics of transitions by generating insights about the influence of 
politics in policy-mix-making processes and the co-evolutionary relationship with socio-technical 
change. Ultimately, the thesis derives insights which may help practitioners and analysts make more 
informed policy design choices by ‘thinking-through’ the potential implications of policy-mix-making 
decisions. Accordingly, this may enable them to make choices which are not only more likely to achieve 
their respective policy objectives, but may also help to maintain political support over time.  
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Preface 
 
Politics is pervasive, affecting all areas of life. The earliest recorded thinkers engaged in the role of 
political institutions, and their influence on decision-making processes. Now, more than ever it seems, 
that in an age of ‘fake news’, the role of politics is paramount.   
Seemingly, knowledge, which was regarded as “justified true belief” by Plato, is highly subjective. 
Consequently, the idea that policymaking is based on actual evidence, or technocratic principles, 
appears somewhat redundant. Politicians can apparently, even eclipse and disregard such justifiable 
knowledge, making outlandish claims such as Michael Gove’s annunciation that people in the UK 
“have had enough of experts”.   
Consequently, evidence-based policymaking is being replaced by a paradigm of who is the most 
convincing for largely uninformed masses. This phenomena was captured succinctly in Russell’s ‘The 
Triumph of Stupidity’(1933), stating “the fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world 
the stupid are cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt”.  
Even when political support for a given area is high, and when policies and even laws are passed, 
these can be symbolic in nature, their intention to give re-election minded politicians an opportunity 
to display support for momentary popular causes. The principle is to tread as lightly as possible on 
existing power arrangements while giving the appearance of action. 
While politics and policymaking are commonly used language, and are at face value something we 
instinctively know, on closer inspection it is hard to define for the uninitiated, or to hold policymakers 
accountable for their choices. Consequently, a personal motivation which led to the resultant 
production of this thesis, was to ‘look behind the curtain’ of relatively hidden processes which 
seemingly set the course of our collective development. Ultimately, given the current challenges 
facing us, these processes have significant implications for my own and future generations. 
What started as a personal interest motivated by an aspiration to be able to engage with what were 
seemingly esoteric processes, has developed into a journey of discovery which has both deepened and 
broadened my personal perception of the world in equal measures, in ways I could not have 
anticipated.  
What I hope is this thesis offers an approachable, yet simultaneously nuanced, understanding of the 
ways in which politics affects political decision-making. More specifically, it aims to explore ways in 
which policymaking processes for achieving sustainability transitions can be improved in order to 
achieve favourable societal outcomes. Accordingly, the core motivation of this thesis is the pursuit of, 
and contribution to knowledge. A guiding principle in order to achieve that aim is the creation of 
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clearly defined concepts and mechanisms which are falsifiable, allowing further refinement and 
advancement.  
This approach is captured, somewhat more eloquently than myself, by the late Paul Sabatier, who’s 
own personal pursuit of knowledge, and the lasting contributions that he has made to the study of 
policymaking, is a remarkable achievement that will undoubtedly continue to inspire generations of 
scholars, as it did me.  
 
“Given that we have little choice but to look at the world through a lens consisting of a set of 
simplifying presuppositions, at least two quite different strategies exist for developing such a 
lens.  
On the one hand, the analyst can approach the world in an implicit, ad hoc fashion, using 
whatever categories and assumptions that have arisen from his or her experience. This is 
essentially the method of common sense. It may be reasonably accurate for situations important 
to the analyst’s welfare in which she or he has considerable experience. In such situations, the 
analyst has both the incentive and the experience to eliminate clearly invalid propositions. 
Beyond that limited scope, the common sense strategy is likely to be beset by internal 
inconsistencies, ambiguities, erroneous assumptions, and invalid propositions, precisely 
because the strategy does not contain any explicit methods of error correction. Since its 
assumptions and propositions remain implicit and largely unknown, they are unlikely to be 
subjected to serious scrutiny. The analyst simply assumes they are, by and large, correct—
insofar as he or she is even cognizant of their content.  
An alternative strategy is that of science. Its fundamental ontological assumption is that a 
smaller set of critical relationships underlies the bewildering complexity of phenomena…. The 
critical characteristics of science are that (1) its methods of data acquisition and analysis 
should be presented in a sufficiently public manner that they can be replicated by others; (2) its 
concepts and propositions should be clearly defined and logically consistent and should give 
rise to empirically falsifiable hypotheses; (3) those propositions should be as general as 
possible and should explicitly address relevant uncertainties; and (4) both the methods and 
concepts should be self-consciously subjected to criticism and evaluation by experts in that 
field... The over-riding strategy can be summarized in the injunction: Be clear enough to be 
proven wrong.” 
 (Sabatier, 2007; 5) 
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Chapter 1.  Introduction – Data analysis Background and motivation 
Chapter 1.  Introduction  
 
 
This chapter proceeds by outlining the background and motivation of the thesis, before situating the 
work in the literature to which it is contributing, and introducing the general context of the empirical 
focus. The chapter concludes by introducing the research aims and questions, and outlines the 
structure of the remaining chapters.  
 
1.1.Background and motivation  
 
“χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά - Nothing beautiful without struggle.” (Plato, the Republic, 380BC) 
 
Climate change policy is, inherently, a deeply political matter. At COP 21 in Paris, world leaders 
reached a landmark agreement, aiming to limit the amount of warming associated with climate change 
to under 2 ºC. Whilst a difficult enough task in its own right, a special report by the UN stated that 
2015 levels of temperate change were already causing impacts beyond the current adaptive capacity 
of many people, and that reducing the limit to 1.5 ºC would be needed to avoid the serious residual 
effects of warming (UN, 2015). Efforts to mitigate these detrimental effects will require both 
domestic action and international cooperation. In a manner reminiscent of the prisoner’s dilemma, 
individuals and nations alike need to move beyond acting in self-interest in order to avoid these 
(disastrous) collective outcomes. Already, we have seen the US withdraw from the Paris agreement, 
seemingly a historical re-enactment of their previous abandonment of the Kyoto Protocol. Despite 
which, decentralised initiatives have meant that action is being taken in various states (e.g. 
California). Moreover, climate change and the actions needed to mitigate it, are currently receiving 
increasing international public attention and support, including recent global climate strikes, 
extinction rebellion, flygskam, and a growing youth movement championed by Greta Thunberg. 
The challenge of achieving unprecedented levels of climate change mitigation in the next few decades 
ties into the broader debate on the politics of sustainable development (Meadowcroft, 2007; Scrase & 
Smith, 2009). At the core of this debate lies the tensions between the radical steps deemed necessary 
for sustainable development and democratic governance (Stirling, 2011). Taking serious action on 
climate change will involve the decarbonisation of many sectors deeply embedded in society, 
including energy generation, agriculture, housing, transport. Each of these areas are dominated by 
large industries with established relationships with states, making change difficult and often 
contested. For example, energy industries directly contributed 2.9% to GDP in the UK in 2017, 
making up 6.3% of industrial employment with 181,000 people directly employed (BEIS, 2018).  
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Transforming these deeply locked-in societal structures (Unruh, 2000) will require high investment 
and in new technologies. Therefore, the credibility of political commitments towards achieving these 
goals is needed in order to reduce the risk of investment. Stability of climate policies is also needed 
for a re-orientation of the economy to a low carbon trajectory (Rosenbloom, Meadowcroft, & 
Cashore, 2019). Business leaders, public officials, and environmental advocates have all highlighted 
policy stability as a crucial precondition for mobilising finances needed to achieve structural 
transformation (Figueres et al., 2017). Similarity to political commitment, stable climate policy offers 
a credible signal to redirect individual behaviour and business models toward low-carbon alternatives 
(Bassi, Carvalho, Doda, & Fankhauser, 2017). However, despite the need to provide stable and 
credible signals, climate policy continues to undergo significant and unpredictable change, seemingly 
particularly susceptible to reversal as political administrations change (Aklin & Urpelainen, 2013; 
Lockwood, 2013). Complete reversal is, however, not the only way in which climate policy instability 
manifests (Rosenbloom et al., 2019). Defunding critical programs, failing to move to implementation, 
and not enforcing rules, among other issues, may also erode policy signals and objectives (E. M. 
Patashnik, 2008). 
With these issues in mind, the next section introduces the theoretical underpinnings of the thesis and 
the ways in which it contributes to these areas. 
 
1.2. Theoretical focus  
 
This section introduces the main area of literature that the thesis will contribute to, sustainability 
transitions. After introducing the general concept, the following subsections will introduce how policy 
and policy mixes affect transitions, and then politics and policymaking in sustainability transitions.  
 
1.2.1. Sustainability transitions  
 
The “linkages between elements necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels, 2004 p.900), such as 
energy, transport, housing and food production, are commonly understood as ‘socio-technical 
systems’ (Geels, 2001, 2002, 2004). Socio-technical systems consist of multi-faceted combinations of 
actors, networks, institutions, artefacts, infrastructure, markets and practices along with cultural and 
symbolic views and representations (Geels, 2004). The underlying motivation of research on 
sustainability transitions is that environmental issues comprise grand societal challenges, brought 
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about by unsustainable consumption and production patterns within such socio-technical systems 
(Köhler et al. 2019).  
A sustainability transition is a combination of processes leading to a fundamental shift of a socio-
technical system, towards a more sustainable way of fulfilling a societal need (Geels and Schot, 
2010). Such transition does not occur through incremental improvements and technological fixes, but 
radical shifts to new types of socio technical systems (Köhler et al. 2019; Grin et al. 2010). 
Consequently, sustainability transitions consist of technological, organisational, institutional, political, 
and socio-cultural changes whereby elements of the existing socio-technical system are occasionally 
complemented, but more commonly replaced, with novel emergent features (Markard, 2014). 
Historical examples of socio-technical transitions would be the shift from sailing ships to steamboats 
(Geels, 2002), and from horse-driven carriages to automobiles (Geels, 2005).  
With over 20,000 journal articles and books published in this field (Köhler et al. 2019), the wide-
ranging transitions literature has theoretical roots drawing from institutional theory, evolutionary 
economics and the sociology of technology (Rip and Kemp1998; Geels and Schot 2007). Several 
conceptual approaches and analytical frameworks have been developed in this body of literature (see 
Markard et al., 2012), including Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) approach (Bergek et al. 
2008; Hekkert et al. 2007) and the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) (Geels, 2002, 2004, 2011; Geels 
and Schot, 2007). Conceptually there are similarities across these two approaches, and policy makers 
who have sought to accelerate the process of socio-technical transition have utilised both (Markard et 
al., 2014). The MLP suggests that the existing socio-technical system, termed the incumbent regime, 
is very resistant to change due to a high degree of structuration, and close relationships of incumbent 
actors and policy makers. The framework adopts a layered conceptualization whereby the regime 
level, the existing socio technical configuration, is put under pressure by both the landscape level2 and 
novel technologies developing in niches, which may be integrated into the regime, or can disrupt and 
eventually overthrow it.  
The sustainability transitions literature is broader and more interdisciplinary than other approaches 
including industrial ecology, eco-innovation or environmental economics (Köhler et al. 2019). These 
approaches tend to focus on single dimensions or particular social groups, have a relatively short-term 
orientation, fail to acknowledge the systemic dimension, or are overly managerial and technocratic 
(Köhler et al. 2019). In contrast, sustainability transition perspectives tends to ask ‘big-picture’ 
questions, and have several characteristics which make them a distinct and challenging topic. They 
involve multi-dimensionality and co-evolution, occurring over long time frames, and are interested in 
processes of stability and change (Unruh 2000). Inevitably, this means that they are non-linear 
processes, which due to their long-time frames, make them inherently uncertain (Geels and Schot 
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2007). In addition, they are multi-actor processes, which leads to differing values, contention, 
disagreement and power struggles over which direction they should take (Avelino 2011).  
Accordingly, due to the complex and contested nature of sustainability transitions, a key consideration 
is that public policy has to play a central role in shaping the directionality of the transition through 
regulation, standards, taxes, innovation policy etc. (Köhler et al. 2019). Related to this central notion 
is two current research themes in the sustainability transitions literature (see Köhler et al. 2019), 
which this thesis builds on and brings together: the governance of transitions, and the politics of 
transitions. The following subsections introduce how policy and policy mixes can be used to govern 
transition processes, before introducing the role of politics in transitions.  
 
1.2.2. Policy (mixes) in sustainability transitions 
 
Often in the transitions literature policy refers to the content dimension of policymaking, often 
formalised, and can refer to objectives, programs, regulations, laws and resource allocation (Markard 
et al., 2014). Policy is an integral part of sustainability transitions, exemplified in the case of the 
German energy transition with renewable energy innovations receiving public support (e.g. 
Hoppmann et al., 2013; Jacobsson and Lauber, 2006; van den Bergh, 2013). Scholars have argued that 
targeted policy interventions can be used to steer or direct transitions, and accelerate the rate of socio-
technical change (Kern & Rogge, 2016). Policy is particularly relevant to sustainability transitions 
where the transition is often an intentional pursuit of policy makers and advocates, requiring 
significant structural changes, often instigated by policy to reconfigure market section environments, 
user preferences and cultural cognitions in order to instigate the desired change.  
Innovation is a key process in socio-technical transitions, as a number of novel technologies are often 
needed alongside the cultural and institutional changes (Alkemade et al., 2011). Innovation policy 
stimulates a range of both complementary and competing technologies to develop outside of normal 
market selection pressures, and promote social innovations and new business models. Policies can 
direct resources to particular technologies through research grants, subsidies and tax exemptions. 
Policy intervention can be directed to purposely promote niche technologies, allowing technologies to 
be competitive in the current regime in an unchanged selection environment, or by making the 
selection environment favourable to niche innovation (Smith and Raven, 2012).  
A key challenge for policymakers seeking to stimulate sustainability transitions regards moving 
beyond considering individual policy instruments, towards more comprehensive ‘policy mixes’ 
(Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 2011). The policy mix literature seeks to capture the real world 
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interactions of multiple policy instruments implemented over time to achieve an overall policy 
strategy. The need for establishing a strategy is needed to help guide sustainability transitions due to 
their complex nature, non-linearity, and need for establishing a normative directionality. Policy mixes 
are a key tools that policymakers can use to help establish this, and to help guide the transition 
process, which is contested by multiple competing actors with their own ideas and interests.  
Moreover, taking a policy mix approach acknowledges that there no ‘silver bullets’ which can solve 
complex challenges of structural change with a single instrument, and also that policymakers are 
rarely (if ever) presented with a blank slate from which to implement new policy, leading to layering 
(Howlett & Rayner, 2007) of new policies alongside the pre-existing ones. As such, taking an 
approach which aims to anticipate the interactions of multiple policies implemented over time can 
allow for a greater level of coordination in the policymaking process, which (in theory) should lead to 
more better policy design choices, increasing the possibility of achieving the overall strategy. It also 
allows the analyst to consider how design choices for one aspect of the policy mix may have 
unintended outcomes for other instruments, which may be overlooked without taking a 
comprehensive view of the complexity of real-world policy mixes (Rogge and Reichhardt 2016).  
However, while a growing number of contributions within the transitions literature have started to 
consider policy mixes (for a review Rogge et al., 2017), there has been little attention paid to 
conceptualising the politics and policy processes which underpin their development over time.  
 
1.2.3. Politics and policymaking in transitions  
Decisions around the direction and rate of how transitions unfold are inherently political (Lawhon and 
Murphy, 2012), and political support for policies aimed to foster transitions needs to be maintained 
(Lockwood, 2015). Transitions often involve supporting relatively high cost technologies, with high 
upfront capital costs with long payback periods (Geels et al., 2016). Consequently, firms often prefer 
stable policy conditions for investment decisions (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011. Such policy stability is 
beneficial in creating positive expectations of a path to commercialization for early stage technologies 
(Foxon et al., 2005). Similarly, policy needs to be designed in a manner that can account for the 
changing conditions of the socio technical system, incorporating enough flexibility or ‘degrees of 
freedom’ to allow for change and revision without deterring investor confidence (Howlett and Rayner, 
2007, 2013, 2014). Finally, due to the long timeframes involved, the types of policies aimed to foster 
transitions may change significantly over time to address changing objectives and stages of innovation 
in the socio-technical system (Turnheim et al., 2015). Over time, political support for the guiding 
principles and core ideas of sustainability transitions needs to be maintained (Kern and Howlett, 2009; 
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Kern et al., 2014; Geels et al., 2016), which is influenced by changes in the socio-technical system 
(Hoppmann, 2014), and the perceived benefits or losses of policy makers, interest groups and mass 
public of supporting policies aimed to foster sustainability transitions (Pierson, 1993;Oberlander and 
Weaver, 2015). 
As policies play such an integral role in sustainability transitions, policymaking and policy change are 
a key process in socio-technical transitions. Policy change is understood as the design, 
implementation, adaptation and discontinuation of public policies (Hoppmann et al., 2014; Markard et 
al., 2014). Policy change can influence the socio-technical change in various ways, ranging from 
innovation policies promoting knowledge generation and diffusion to market based tax and regulation 
policies allowing technology diffusion and up scaling of socio-technical system (Markard et al., 
2014). Policy change is also a necessary constituent of transitions, requiring constant realignment of 
policies consistent with the changes occurring in the socio-technical system. Hoppmann et al., (2014) 
show how PV policy in Germany underwent a series of reconfigurations to respond to the changing 
conditions of the socio-technical system, finding that endogenous conditions of the socio-technical 
system play a more significant role to that of the exogenous political conditions. Hekkert et al., 
(2007), show how policy change can lead to virtuous or vicious cycles of causation influencing the 
rate and direction of TIS.  
Despite policymaking and politics being a fundamental aspect of sustainability transitions, 
understanding its influence and better conceptualising its role in processes of socio-technical change 
remains a key challenge (Köhler et al., 2019). While there have been numerous contributions within 
the transitions literature in recent years (see section 2.1), there remains a fundamental challenge 
regarding better linking politics and policy to processes of socio-technical change in a co-evolutionary 
manner. The most notable example of such is Hoppmann, Huenteler, & Girod, (2014), who follow the 
co-evolution of the German FiT for solar PV with policy change over time.  
Having introduced the main literature to which this thesis makes an overall contribution, the next 
section introduces the empirical focus: the growing attention to housing within the sustainability 
transitions literature.  
 
1.3.  Empirical focus: the UK building sector  
 
As outlined previously this is the area the thesis contributes towards the literature on sustainability 
transitions. As a whole there has been a disproportionate focus within this literature on energy 
transitions (mainly electricity), over other sectors (Markard, Raven, & Truffer, 2012). Buildings, 
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however, have significant potential to contribute to reduction of GHG emissions and contribute to 
climate mitigation strategies. CO2e emissions from buildings are primarily a result of emissions 
associated with space and water heating, in addition to the emissions associated with electricity 
consumption for lighting, appliances, and ventilation. The emissions from buildings constitute for 
example approximately 30% of the UK’s CO2e emissions (CCC, 2018) and around 53% of its final 
energy consumption (Palmer et al., 2017). Adjusting for annual temperature changes, emissions from 
buildings actually increased by 1% in both 2016 and 2017 in the UK (CCC, 2018).  
There has been in recent years a growing research agenda around buildings, and more specifically 
housing within the literature on sustainability transitions. These contributions have focussed on: the 
role of niche governance for eco-housing (Smith, 2006), multiple niche interactions (Baker & Lester, 
2017), interaction dynamics between niche and regime (Berry, Davidson, & Saman, 2013; Smith, 
2007), the role of intermediaries (Martiskainen & Kivimaa, 2018), and the retrofit of the existing 
housing stock (De Laurentis, Eames, & Hunt, 2017). In addition to these insights, there have been 
several contributions focussing attention to transition dynamics in the UK (Bergman, Whitmarsh, & 
Köhler, 2007, 2008; Gibbs & O’Neill, 2015), as well as housing innovation in other countries such as 
Australia (Foong, Mitchell, Wagstaff, Duncan, & McManus, 2017; Moore & Doyon, 2018) as well as 
cross-country comparisons of zero/near-zero policies (Moore, Horne, & Morrissey, 2014).  
In these contributions, while there is attention to governance and policy as a driver of change, the role 
of politics and policymaking is often underplayed. Perhaps more importantly, is that within this 
emerging literature, the role of policy mixes is not conceptualised in these accounts of transition 
dynamics. To date, the most effective implementation of policy mix literature applied to buildings or 
housing comes from Rosenow et al. (2016). However, application and contribution of this thesis is 
both different and complimentary to this work for two main reasons. First, is that Rosenow et al. 
(2016) use a more basic conceptualisation of policy mixes, what Rogge & Reichardt (2016) would 
call the ‘instrument mix’. This is important, as the case analysed in this thesis is an example of a 
policy mix specifically designed to achieve an overall strategy through several instruments. 
Importantly, the overarching strategy itself continued to interact and co-evolving with the instrument 
mix over time. Therefore, excluding the overarching strategy from the analysis, would miss a key 
component of the case. The second reason this work differs is that it is qualitative research, which 
develops, tests and refines theory, where the work by (Rosenow et al., 2016) quantitatively assesses 
instrument interactions.  
Finally, the empirical focus in this thesis is on an example of a failed transition which is less common 
in transitions literature as a whole, and more so for buildings. As will be explained in more detail in 
chapter 3, the thesis looks at the Zero Carbon Homes policy mix in the UK, which was abandoned 
prior to achieving its overall objectives. While there has already been several publications on zero 
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carbon homes, there is a gap in evaluating the policy mix ex post in a prescriptive manner trying to 
learn from the reasons why it was ultimately unsuccessful, and to make policy recommendations 
based on these1.  
Having explained the empirical focus of the thesis, the next section concludes chapter 1 by stating the 
research questions and outlining the structure of the remainder of the thesis.  
 
1.4.  Research aim, research questions and structure of the thesis 
 
This section outlines the overall research aim of this thesis, and the corresponding research questions 
attributed to the respective articles this thesis is constituted of. The section then concludes the 
introductory chapter by outlining the structure for the remainder of the thesis.  
 
1.4.1. Research aim and research questions  
 
The aim of the thesis is to engage with the policymaking processes of policy mixes in socio-technical 
systems. Given the lack of a conceptual framework in order to analyse these processes in the existing 
literature the thesis develops and then tests a novel co-evolutionary framework for policy mixes and 
socio-technical systems. The thesis then pays attention to the institutional setting in which these 
policy mix making processes occur and develops heuristic forms of institutional arrangement 
affecting policymaking processes for housing policy in the UK, which is used to help explain the 
failure of ZCH.  
In doing so, the thesis addresses the overarching research question: 
How can conceptualising the role and influence of policy-mix-making processes in 
sustainability transitions help explain the failure of Zero Carbon Homes? 
To do so, it poses five sub-questions, which are answered across the three articles.   
Article 1 
The first paper develops a novel co-evolutionary framework for the dynamic analysis of the co-
evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical systems. In doing so, it answers two questions 
regarding:  
i) How do policy mixes stimulate changes in socio-technical systems through policy effects? 
ii) How can these changes subsequently generate feedback mechanisms influencing the 
evolution of the policy mix? 
 
1 Notably, Walker et al. (2015) comment on the denouncement of zero carbon homes, but the authors do not 
consider in detail the reasons for its failure, nor do they consider it as a policy mix consisting of a strategy and 
interacting instruments.  
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Article 2 
Article 2 applies the conceptual framework developed in the first paper to the case of the UK zero 
carbon homes policy mix. In doing so, it answers the following two research questions:    
 
i)  How did policy effects and feedback mechanisms influence the coevolution of the zero 
carbon homes policy mix and the socio-technical system? 
ii) How does this help explain why the zero carbon homes target was abandoned? 
 
Article 3 
Article 3 builds on the empirical findings of the second paper, thereby following an iterative research 
design to ‘deep-dive’ empirically and develop heuristic forms of institutional arrangements which 
help explain failutre of ZCH. In doing so, it answers the research question: 
i) How did the institutional arrangements in which policymaking processes occur contribute 
to the failure of the UK zero carbon homes policy mix? 
 
1.4.2. Thesis structure  
 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
PART I - introduces the thesis, the theoretical and empirical areas it contributes to, and the research 
aims  
Chapter 2 reviews the respective literatures drawn on in the conceptual development of the thesis. 
Chapter 3 outlines the empirical case of the UK Zero Carbon Homes policy mix.  
Chapter 4 explains the research design, including the methods and data.  
 
PART II - contains three journal articles which make up the main contributions of the thesis 
Chapter 5 is a conceptual paper (Article 1) synthesising literature on politics of transitions, policy 
mixes and policy feedback to develop a novel analytical framework for the co-evolution of 
policy mixes and socio-technical systems. 
Chapter 6 is an empirical paper which applies the co-evolutionary framework developed in Article 1 
to the case of the Zero Carbon Homes policy mix in the UK. In doing so it tests and 
refines the analytical framework, as well as generating analytical insights about the case.  
Chapter 7 is a second empirical paper which builds on the findings of Article 2. The paper focusses on 
one aspect in particular, the institutional context in which the policymaking processes of 
the zero carbon homes policy mix occurred. In doing so, the paper develops three heuristic 
forms for policymaking processes for UK housing, and uses these to help explain the 
failure of ZCH.  
 
PART III - discusses and concludes thesis, acknowledging limitations and suggesting avenues for 
further work and the main policy implications of the thesis.  
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Chapter 8 discusses the contributions the thesis makes to literature, reflects on the methodology and 
limitations, and makes policy recommendations. 
Chapter 9 concludes, reviews how the thesis answers its research questions, and suggests avenues for 
further work.  
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Chapter 2. Theory and literature review  
 
This chapter reviews four areas of literature drawn upon in this thesis, and which contribute to the 
theoretical development in the papers contained in PART II. As previously outlined in the introductory 
chapter, the thesis contributes to the literature on sustainability transitions. More specifically, the 
politics of transitions, and the role of policy and policy mixes in such transitions. In doing so, it 
addresses a conceptual gap regarding the policymaking processes which underpin the development of 
sustainability-orientated policy mixes, and the influence of these processes on the rate and direction of 
transition.  
Accordingly, this chapter first reviews: i) the recent developments in the literature on the politics of 
transitions, ii) the growing literature focussing on policy mixes for sustainability transitions, and iii) 
theories of the policy process, before explaining why policy feedback theory is considered as a good 
fit for both the aforementioned strands of literature. Building on the review within this chapter, paper 
1 (Part II - chapter 5) combines insights from these literatures to develop a co-evolutionary analytical 
framework which conceptualises policy-mix-processes, and their co-evolution with the rest of the 
socio-technical system.  
Finally, iv) the chapter introduces institutionalist literatures, neo-institutionalist approached and 
Historical Institutionalism (HI). This literature is draw upon in paper 3 while developing an analytical 
for institutional arrangements affecting policymaking processes in the UK housebuilding sector.  
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2.1. Politics of transitions  
 
‘Behind policy there is always politics’ (Meadowcroft, 2011; 73).  
Sustainability transitions are inherently value laden and political, leading to different interpretations 
and normative struggles over the pace and direction of transitions (Lawhon & Murphy, 2012; Smith & 
Stirling, 2010), and can become interwoven with conflicts over equity, fairness, and justice (Hess & 
Brown, 2018). States are dependent on prevailing economic structures and industries, creating vested 
interests as political and economic actors become entangled, resulting in a high level of influence of 
incumbent actors on policy decisions (Meadowcroft, 2011). For example, such dependencies and 
vested interests were found to be highly significant in the failure of the Dutch transitions management 
experiment (Kern & Howlett, 2009).   
Given the intrinsically prevalent nature of politics in sustainability transitions, there have been 
multiple successive calls from scholars for increased attention (Hendriks & Grin, 2007; Meadowcroft, 
2009; Shove & Walker, 2007; Smith & Stirling, 2010; Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005). In 
response, there is an emerging body of literature on the politics of transitions (F. Avelino & Rotmans, 
2009; Fuenfschilling & Truffer, 2014; F. W. Geels, 2014; Hess, 2014, 2015; Kern, 2011; Smith, Voß, 
& Grin, 2010; Späth & Rohracher, 2010). Scholars have developed theoretical frameworks for the 
analysis of power and agency (F. Avelino & Rotmans, 2009; Hess, 2016), reflexive and democratic 
governance (Voß, Smith, & Grin, 2009); industry and the state dynamics (Fünfschilling & Truffer, 
2014, 2016; Turnheim & Geels, 2013) and structuration processes (Grin, 2012). Others have 
investigated the language used in political discourse (Lawhon and Murphy, 2012), and how alliances 
form and accumulate around specific transition paths (Grin, 2012; Lawhon and Murphy, 2012; Smith 
and Raven 2012).  
The empirical work on the politics of transitions can be aggregated into three general categories: i) 
actor relations between incumbents and innovative new entrants; ii) actor strategies of new entrants 
and transition coalition formation; and iii) how tensions between incumbents and new entrants can 
become overlaid with political contestation originating from party politics within government.  
The first area concerns how incumbent actors can incorporate and transform innovations to make 
them compatible with the existing socio-technical configuration, or alternatively, resist policy 
initiatives that appear threatening to their interests. Strategies include: mobilizing resources, shaping 
political discourse through appropriate framings in the media, innovation of system-compatible 
technologies, and shaping the structure of institutional power (Geels, 2014). Regime actors may also 
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attempt to reverse policies already in place that favour emerging innovations (Lauber & Jacobsson, 
2016; Hess, 2016a). Another important area is instances where dominant incumbent actors have 
dominated policymaking processes attempting to stimulate sustainability transitions (e.g. Hendriks, 
2008; Kern & Smith, 2008).  
The second strand of research draws attentions to the strategies of emergent new entrants and the 
formation of transition coalitions. Smith and Raven (2012) for instance describe three conditions 
needed in order to protect them from mainstream selection pressures; shielding, nurturing and 
empowerment. In order for transition coalitions to gain policy support in favour of emergent 
innovations, they must successfully place normative pressure on incumbent actors and states, but also 
be sufficiently developed (both technologically and economically) in order to seize political and 
economic windows of opportunity (Elzen, Geels, Leeuwis, & Van Mierlo, 2011).  
The third strand of research explores how conflicts between incumbents and transition coalitions can 
become aggravated by conflicts between political parties in governments. In general, when 
conservative governments have come into power, they have tended to weaken or reverse the pro-
environmental initiatives of labor-left-green coalitions (Hess & Brown, 2018). These divisions are 
especially polarized in the developed majoritarian political systems, but have also had significant 
effects in other political systems (Lauber & Jacobsson, 2016a; Markard, Suter, & Ingold, 2016). Other 
contributions foregrounding policy development and retrenchment often go beyond this basic left-
right alignment. For example, Markard et al., (2016) show how divisions within conservative 
coalitions due to heterogeneity of beliefs among incumbent actors can weaken efforts to reverse 
sustainability policies (Markard et al., 2016). Finally, transition coalitions can sometimes draw on 
support from countervailing industrial groups, which may form alliances with transition coalitions 
(Hess, 2016b). 
Despite the considerable amount of research and conceptual development, it is still argued that 
transitions literature “has fallen short in its understanding of power” and that “the conceptualisation of 
power and politics, and their relations with questions of knowledge and social justice, require further 
elaboration” (Scoones, Leach, & Newell, 2015, pp. 3–5). In that vein, this thesis argues that linking 
political influence and power to policymaking outcomes, the rate and direction of socio-technical 
change, and the interests and participation of key innovative stakeholders in the socio-technical 
system, in a dynamic and recursive way, remains under-conceptualised. Moreover, linking politics to 
policy mixes, rather than single policies within the literature on sustainability transitions, is under-
explored. Accordingly, having reviewed the key conceptual advances in the three themes of empirical 
research in the literature on the politics of transitions, the next section turns to the literature on policy 
mixes in sustainability transitions. 
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2.2. Policy mixes for sustainability transitions  
 
“Just as there are no technology silver bullets, there are no single policy bullets either.” (Gallagher, 
Grübler, Kuhl, Nemet, & Wilson, 2012; 151) 
The need for considering policy mixes has been increasingly stressed by scholars in literatures on 
climate, environment and innovation policy (for a review, see Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). Similarly, 
scholars and analysts of policy effects on sustainability transitions need to extend the scope of 
analysis from that of individual policy instruments and their interactions to that of comprehensive 
policy mixes. Primarily this is necessary due to multiple and interrelated market and system failures 
that need a range of complementary policy interventions to be overcome (Foxon et al., 2005; 
Lehmann, 2010; Weber and Rohracher, 2012), along with the need for long term agenda setting 
strategies and objectives to guide transitions (Foxon and Pearson, 2007, 2008; Quitzow 2015; Weber, 
Rohracher 2012) complemented with various policies as a means of achieving these strategies 
(Alkemade et al., 2011). Kern and Howlett, (2009) highlighted that transitions policies are often 
implemented alongside those which reinforce the existing regime, impeding their transformative 
potential. Policy mix conceptualisations have contributed in emergent areas of transitions literatures 
(Kern and Howlett, 2009; Kern et al., 2016, Kivimaa and Kern, 2015; Reichardt et al., 2015a, 2015b), 
but how the resultant effects of policy mixes on the functioning of the socio-technical system can re- 
shape and restructure the politics and policy processes determining the rate and direction of STs is 
under conceptualized.  
The term policy mix has recently been incorporated by scholars in various scientific disciplines, 
including policy analysis and design (Howlett, 2014; Howlett and Rayner, 2007, 2013), innovation 
studies (Nauwelaers et al. 2009), political science and policy process theories (see Sabatier and 
Weible, 2014) and economic policy and environmental policy (see Flanagan, Uyarra, & Laranja, 
2011). Within the policy literature emergent strands have sought to explain several aspects of policy 
mixes; the design features of individual instruments in the mix (Kemp and Pontoglio, 2011), 
instrument interactions (del Río González 2006; Nauwelaers et al. 2009) and the elements of the mix 
(Borrás and Edquist, 2013). Scholars have conceptualized the characteristics of the mix (Rogge & 
Reichardt, 2016) and how policy mixes can be designed in order to enhance these characteristics 
(Howlett & Rayner, 2007, 2013), along with the temporal and dynamic nature of the evolution of 
elements in the mix (Kern and Howlett, 2009), and finally how process dynamics can influence the 
evolution of policy mixes (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). 
Theoretical contributions from Rogge & Reichardt (2016) have sought to identify common 
terminologies of these related but slightly divergent conceptual lines and to propose an exploratory 
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framework of how these aspects can be linked to give a comprehensive, holistic view of policy mixes. 
This conceptualisation of policy mixes includes strategies2, the dimensions (e.g. temporal and 
geographical aspects), the instrument mix consisting of the interacting policy instruments 
implemented towards meeting the overall strategy, and the underlying processes. Rogge and 
Reichhardt, (2016) see processes as determining the evolution of the mix and influenced by policy 
outcomes3 in a recursive dynamic way. Despite this advancement of policy mix thinking, a focus on 
policy processes and the influence on the coevolution of the mix, and consequently the influence of 
processes on socio technical change, is still under researched and scholars have called for increased 
attention to these underlying processes (Kern, Kivimaa, et al 2016; Rosenow, 2015, 2016).  
Following the suggestion of (Rogge & Reichardt, 2016), conceptualisations of these processes can be 
developed by drawing on theories of the policy process (Sabatier and Weible, 2014). This thesis will 
contribute to this conceptual line, and by ‘zooming in’ on these processes, aims to help explain how 
politics and process dynamics influence why policy mixes are designed in particular ways, 
specifically due to the effects of previous policy decisions. This contribution will help develop the 
conceptual understanding of policy processes within the policy mix literature in line with the 
advancements from the contemporary process theories. Through contributing to this area we can 
analyse why certain policy instrument combinations are particularly prevalent and explain how and 
why any identified synergies, conflicts and gaps may have come about, by looking at what the 
political dynamics are behind these decisions (Kern, Kivimaa, et al 2015; Rosenow et al, 2015, 2016). 
Accordingly, this thesis contributes to the research agenda by investigating the coevolution of policy 
mixes and socio technical change by focusing on how policy processes mediate this dynamic 
relationship.  
The next section turns to policy processes theory, in order to help conceptualise the role of 
policymaking in this dynamic relationship.  
 
2.3. Theories of the policy process and policy feedback  
 
“Given the staggering complexity of the policy process, the analyst must find some way of simplifying the 
situation in order to have any chance of understanding it.” (Sabatier, 2007; 4) 
 
2 Important for sustainability transitions due to the need of guiding visions and on term strategies and for long 
term socio technical change 
3 Conceptualized in their work as ‘technological change’. 
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This section introduces theories of the policy process and explains key concepts, and gives an overview of how 
these theories have started to be applied by transition scholars.  
After giving an overview the second sub-section reviews the literature on policy feedback in more detail, which 
is the approach used in developing the co-evolutionary framework in paper 1 (chapter 5).  
 
2.3.1. Overview of theories of the policy process  
Several approaches to study policymaking have been developed within the literature on policy process 
theories and can offer insight into the conceptualisation of policy processes. Some important insights 
from these literatures include considering: (1) a wide range of actors influencing policy at many levels 
of government; (2) a proliferation of rules and norms followed by different levels or types of 
government; (3) close relationships between policymakers and powerful actors; (4) a tendency for 
certain beliefs or ‘paradigms’ to dominate discussion; (5) shifting policy conditions and events that 
can prompt policymakers attention to lurch at short notice (Cairney, 2015; Cairney, Oliver, & 
Wellstead, 2015).  
The theories and frameworks of the policy process seek to analyse and explain policy change 
(Sabatier and Weible 2014). The prevailing policy theories aim to include certain aspects of this 
process in their conceptualisations to help enrich the understanding of a complex process4 (Table 1). 
Each of these theories describes key components (actors making choices, institutions, networks or 
subsystems, ideas or beliefs, policy context and events. - Table 2) of an overarching policymaking 
system and explains their interactions to provide an explanation of the policy process (Cairney and 
Heikkila, 2014 p.364).  
Arguably, some of these theories offer more insight than others into processes of policymaking and 
change. For example, Sabatier, when referring to Kingdon’s Multiple Streams, remarked that many of 
the concepts and mechanisms are loosely defined. While making the theory versatile and easily 
applicable, it means the concepts are not readily falsifiable, and consequently there has been little (if 
any) theoretical development since its initial conceptualisation. Similarly, Cairney and Jones in a 
more recent assessment of multiple streams, comment that while it has been widely applied and 
remains a prominent ‘universal theory’, much of the research represents isolated cases, calling for 
“new ways to make sure the results are coherent and comparable with each other” (Cairney & Jones, 
2016; 53).  
 
4 Consequently, there are aspects which are prominent in some conceptualisations, but underplayed in others. 
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“The multiple-streams framework has no explicit hypotheses and is so fluid in its structure and 
operationalization that falsification is difficult. Given the paucity of tests by other scholars, it is 
not surprising that Kingdon (1996) has found no need to make revisions.” (Sabatier, 2007; 
327) 
Table 1- Theories of the policy process 
Theories of the Policy Process  
 
Multiple Streams Analysis (MSA) (Kingdon, 
1984) 
 
Focus on the interaction between two kinds of ideas: the 
type of policy solution that could draw attention and 
catch on quickly and the established set of beliefs in a 
policy community that would slow its progress. 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) (Sabatier 
and Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier and Weible, 
2007) 
According to the ACF, people engage in politics to 
translate their beliefs into action (Jenkins-Smith, 
Nohrstedt, and Weible 2014). There are three main types 
of beliefs: core, policy core, and secondary. Actors with 
similar beliefs become part of the same advocacy 
coalition, and coalitions compete with each other. 
Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework (IAD) (Ostrom, 1990; Scharpf, 1997) 
The IAD focuses on the ways in which actors make 
choices within institutional environments that structure 
(or at least help explain) their behaviour. 
Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) (Jones and 
Baumgartner, 1993; True et al., 2007) 
The PET emphasizes the interaction between two types 
of ideas: (1) the “monopoly of understandings” 
underpinning established subsystem relationships, and 
(2) the new solutions that could “catch fire” following 
successful venue shopping or prompt endogenous 
change (when attention shifts and issues are reframed). 
Policy Feedback (PF) (Skopkol 1992, Pierson 
1993, Mettler and SoRelle 2014) 
PF suggests that policy commitments made in the past 
produce increasing returns and make it costly to choose 
a different path (Pierson 2000; Cairney 2012b, 76). 
When a policy becomes established and resources are 
devoted to programs, it helps structure current activity 
and provides advantages for some groups more than 
others (Mettler and SoRelle 2014). 
Policy Networks (PN) (Marsh and Rhodes 
1992, Marsh 1998) 
PN aims to reformulate analysis of policy networks by a 
new way of understanding the relationship between 
structure and agency. Policy networks are understood as 
sets of formal institutional and informal linkages between 
governmental and other actors structured around shared if 
endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policy 
making and implementation 
 
 
Source: Compiled from Cairney and Heikkila (2014, p.375-380) 
Transition scholars have started to integrate insights from prominent policy process theories (Table 1), 
including Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (Markard et al., 2015), Kingdon’s Multiple 
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Streams (Normann, 2015), and Marsh’s Policy Networks Approach (Normann, 2017)5. From these 
contributions, we know that during transition processes windows of opportunity can allow actors to 
advocate certain technologies and gain favourable policy outputs. Yet, over time, changing conditions 
can cause these windows to close and policy support to be withdrawn (Normann, 2015). Similarly, 
beliefs of actors can change over time, which may influence participation in coalitions (Markard et al., 
2015) and the formation of policy networks (Normann, 2017). 
Table 2 - Key components of theories of the policy process 
Key components of theories of the policy process 
 
Actors making 
choices 
 
The policymaking world may include thousands of people. To simplify, policy theories often 
categorize and describe key actors. Actors can be individuals or collectives, and collectives 
can range from private companies to interest groups to governments bodies (Weible 2014). 
Institutions Rules, norms, practices, and relationships that influence individual and collective behaviour. 
The choices of actors are explained partly by their understanding of and adherence to rules. 
Networks or 
subsystems 
These are the relationships between actors responsible for policy decisions and the 
“pressure participants”, such as interest groups with which they consult and negotiate. 
Ideas or beliefs This broad category captures how theories deal with ways of thinking or the knowledge 
that plays a role in the policy process. 
Policy context Describes the wide array of features of the policymaking environment that can influence 
policy decisions. 
Events Events can be routine and anticipated, such as elections that produce limited change or 
introduce new actors with different ideas. Or they can be unanticipated incidents, including 
social or natural crises or major scientific breakthroughs and technological changes (Weible 
2014). 
  
Source: compiled from Cairney and Heikkila (2014, p.364-366) 
For this thesis, the insights from Policy Feedback (PF) theory will be the basis for the 
conceptualization of the policy processes that underpin policy mix evolution in sustainability 
transitions. As will be further explored in the following subsection, PF is considered to contribute 
useful insights for the study of policymaking and politics. As a meso-level concept, PF shares 
similarities with transitions literature. Each draw heavily from concepts of path dependency and lock-
in, and each concern how policy can restructure linkages of networks, actor groups, and ideas. PF 
seeks to explain mechanisms through which public policies reshape social and state actors’ interests 
and capacities over long periods of time in ways that change the prospects for the policies’ future 
maintenance, expansion, or reversal (Skocpol, 1992). PF seeks to explain long term trends in 
 
5 For a review see (Kern & Rogge, 2017) 
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policymaking by linking materialist and cognitive ideas to account for actor preferences, explaining 
why groups seek policy change when they do (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015).  
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2.3.3.  Policy feedback  
 
“Policies, once enacted, restructure subsequent political processes” (Skocpol, 1992). 
The study of policy feedback was first introduced by Skocpol (1992: 58) suggesting that researchers 
must make policies the starting points as well as the end points of analysis. PF has roots in historical 
institutionalism (see section 2.4), and is based around the fundamental idea that policy shapes 
subsequent politics and policy making. Policy feedback has been very widely debated (Beland 2010: 
569), and its precise role for understanding policy change is still only partially understood (Jordan and 
Matt, 2014).  
The theory has an emphasis on policy design, drawing attention to continuous interactions between 
public policy, the outcomes on society, how these outcomes affect policy actors in a way that 
influences politics (Weible 2014: p.13). When a policy becomes established and resources are devoted 
to programs, it helps structure current activity and provides advantages for some groups more than 
others (Mettler and SoRelle 2014). In Pierson’s (1993) seminal work, he identified a number of ways 
in which the feedbacks of previous policy can influence the policymaking process by shaping the 
political conditions. Following Pierson (1993), scholars using the PF seek to explain the influence of 
policy through two explanatory factors, the ‘resource’ effects (policies as packages of resources that 
affect interest groups, state capacities and mass publics), and the ‘interpretive’ effects (policies as new 
sources of information that affect patterns of cognition, understanding and meaning) (Mettler and 
Soss 2004: 60). However, a criticism common for much of the existing PF literature, and as Pierson 
observes in a recent assessment, while scholars have made major strides in providing 
“demonstrations” of the significance of feedback, there has been limited progress in translating such 
work into a “coherent and cumulative research program” focused on the evaluation of propositions 
about when we should expect to see what kinds of effects (Patashnik and Zelizer, 2013 p.1075).  
The recent contribution of Oberlander and Weaver (2015), is considered here to be a comprehensive 
conceptualization in this regard, which follows a line of PF scholarship highlighting the need to more 
comprehensively include the existence of negative feedbacks (Jacobs and Weaver, 2015; Jordan and 
Matt, 2014; Patashnik and Zelizer, 2009, 2013; Weaver, 2010; Oberlander and Weaver, 2015).  
The most politically consequential feedbacks may not necessarily be positive (Jordan and Matt 
(2014), and evidence for negative and positive feedback processes should be looked for (Weaver 
2010: 158). This is of particular relevance for energy transitions which are highly political, and often 
involving high costs financed from public sources (Schmitz et al 2013). Oberlander and Weaver 
(2015), categorize feedback mechanisms in three main categories as the socio political, the fiscal and 
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the administrate effects, along with the conditions that would amplify the occurrence of negative 
feedback mechanisms (see Table 1).  
Socio-political policy feedback effects concern whether public and elite support for a policy regime is 
reinforced or undermined over time. Socio-political feedbacks include three typologies of effects, 
which contribute to the level of mass cognition, for example, if the policy is perceived to be 
successful or disastrous in achieving its objectives, and does it lead predominantly to the mobilization 
of supporters or opponents (Oberlander and Weaver, 2015 p.43). The socio political feedback relates 
to state actors, interest groups (niche and regime actors) and mass publics. The cognitions can be 
influenced by changes of the STS directly influencing actor groups, and by conditions (such as the 
cost of technology) caused by system innovation in the STS. Fiscal effects relate to if the policy raises 
budget strains raising concerns among finical ministers or treasury, weakening the autonomy of 
groups dominating the policy regime (Oberlander and Weaver, 2015 p.43). We suggest that such 
fiscal effects relate not only to individual policies, but also a policy mix or administrative government 
department tasked with policy decisions and implementation. Administrative feedback effects 
influences actors’ (in charge of policy implementation) capacities to implement the program in a way 
which is perceived as successful by constituencies (internal/policymakers and external/social actors).  
Various components (Appendix B) of the policy process underlie or inform PFT, which can be 
observed by identifying its conceptual elements (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014). Actors are present 
when policies assign different citizen rights to groups, influencing their ability and incentive to 
mobilise and engage. Networks are implied when government agencies mobilise support, or when 
groups mobilise, in order to protect policy. Ideas appear in PFT as policies and rules represent 
institutionalised beliefs or dominant policy framings.  
Lock-in underlies PFT, and occurs when policy commitments made in the past produce increasing 
returns, making it costly to choose a different path (Pierson 2000). The conceptualisation of lock-in 
draws heavily from rational-choice theory, as the constraints of choosing a different route is 
contrasted against the rational considerations of what the alternate path may offer (Pierson 1993). To 
help develop the notion of increasing returns, Pierson (2000) identifies two aspects. First is how the 
cost of switching from one policy alternative to another will, in certain social circumstances, increase 
markedly over time. Second is the issues of timing and sequence, distinguishing formative moments 
or conjunctures from the moments that reinforce divergent paths. Temporality is at the heart of the 
analysis, as it is central to look at not only what happens but also when it happens Pierson, 2000).  
Finally, external events need to be considered in the analysis to give context to how policy is 
developed in light of exogenous conditions. In approaches based on historical institutionalism, 
“sensitivity to initial conditions” describes a particular sequence of past decisions that sets the broad 
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context for current policy. “Critical juncture” highlights a major event that may be required to prompt 
institutional change when policies are locked in (Cairney and Heikkila, 2014).  
Of interest here is the effect that policy design and implementation has on actors in the dominant 
socio-technical system, and how policy can influence actors in a way that motivates them to 
participate in politics influencing the subsequent policy making. Policies do not automatically 
generate feedbacks, and require coalitions to take political action for the effect of a given policy to 
influence the policy process6 (Pierson 1993, 2000). The focus of the analysis will be that of positive 
(reinforcing) and negative (undermining) feedback effects that are generated over time due to 
motivated political actors to support policies leading to policy stability, or the impetus for others to 
mobilise resistance to a policy program which may result in policy reform. Reinforcing effects are 
most prominent where policies direct or encourage investment over long timeframes, especially those 
with high risk (Arrow, 2000). Positive feedbacks are also generated when policies create effects that 
are visible, traceable to government action (Arnold 1990), and create beneficiaries in the wider public 
(Campbell, 2012). Social policy benefits delivered through the tax code as tax breaks, tax 
expenditures, are not recognized by recipients as government benefits and do not generate the same 
kind of attention to government action as direct spending programs (Mettler, 2001). Self-undermining 
effects are most prevalent where policies have causal complexity (Jacobs and Weaver 2015), and seek 
to address multiple objectives, particularly when their success depends on the support of broad publics 
(Skogstad, 2016). Current acting policy makers often inherit an existing set of policies7, and due to the 
political complexity of terminating existing arrangements, additional policy and revisions are often 
layered on top of the existing policies (Howlett and Rayner, 2013). In these cases negative feedbacks 
are expected to arise due to causal complexity, multiple objectives, and unintended outcomes (Jacobs 
and Weaver, 2015). 
 
2.4. Institutional literature and Historical Institutionalism  
 
“It is almost impossible to remove the effects of political institutions from [policy] success or 
failure” (Peters 2015, pp. 265) 
 
This section explores the institutional literatures, then historical intuitionalism in more depth. These 
are used in developing and testing an analytical heuristic in paper 3 (chapter 7). The focus on 
institutions acknowledges the fact that while policymaking processes and policy design are important, 
it is also important to consider the institutional setting in which policymaking processes take place. 
 
6 The resource effects and interpretive effects give coalitions the incentives to mobilize 
7 An acting coalition rarely has a blank slate allowing freedom to design a policy mix 
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The general argument is that different institutional arrangements can affect the ability of policy mixes 
to produce feedback, and the impact that feedback mechanisms may have on the policy stability of the 
policy subsystem due to the institutional arrangements which make it up.  
 
2.4.1. Overview institutional literature 
 
"The beginning of wisdom in approaching institutional theory is to recognize that there is not 
one but several variants." Scott (1987: 493). 
The examination of political institutions in structuring behaviour; and shaping incentives and 
normative values, dates back as far as Plato and Aristotle (Steinmo, 2008). Institutional literatures 
purport that behaviours are the product of ideas, values, and beliefs that originate in the institutional 
context (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer, Scott, & Deal, 1983; Zucker, 1983). Institutional theory 
therefore suggests that organisations must accommodate institutional expectations (D'Aunno, Sutton, 
& Price, 1991; DiMaggio & Powell, 1991; Scott, 1987), and how organisational behaviours respond 
to institutional pressures (e.g., pressures from regulatory agencies, such as the state).  
Institutionalist literature, at its core, raises the fundamental question ‘Do institutions matter?’ (Weaver 
& Rockman, 1993). For the purpose of this thesis, and to understand the role of institutions in more 
detail, two further questions are of relevance: i) what do we mean by institutions?; and ii) how do 
institutions affect policymaking? In response to the first question, the most common definition for 
institutions is: rules (Steinmo, 2008). Some authors focus on formal rules and organizations (Streeck 
and Thelen 2005), while others address informal rules and norms (Marcussen 2000; Hall 1989). 
Whether we mean formal institutions or informal rules and norms, they are important for politics 
because they shape who participates in a given decision and, simultaneously, their strategic behaviour. 
The second question regards how institutions affect policymaking. Policy, in of itself,  forms a 
component of institutions, as the formal arrangements that structure the activities of actors. Policy 
change in and of itself, the purposeful change to formal institutions (and sometimes informal 
institutions) by state actors, usually involves institutional change (Needham and Louw, 2006) and is 
overwhelmingly incremental (North, 1990). Policy change can therefore be considered as a form of 
institutional design (Alexander, 2005) and should be informed by an understanding of how 
institutions and their constituent actors change and can be changed. Authors including McLeod (1997) 
and Payne (2013) have suggested that significant institutional change is likely to be the result of a 
sense of partnership and common enterprise between the state and market-based actors. Therefore, 
although institutions may be ‘sticky’ in nature, policy may achieve its intended aims if it 
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acknowledges the presence of institutional pathways (Needham and Louw, 2006; Smith and Lewis, 
2011). Therefore, a key question then to ask which is relevant for effective policy design is whether 
the  policy failure is related to its own design or if the failure is a symptom of being embedded in a 
more systematic pattern of failure emerging from institutional arrangements (B. G. Peters, 2015). 
 
2.4.2. Neo-institutionalist literature  
 
This section will focus primarily on neo-institutionalist literature and briefly summarise and compare 
the main approaches within this discipline. Neo-institutionalist literatures are primarily concerned 
with how the interests of actors shape outcomes. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss 
the relative merits of these different approached in detail, an important consideration when comparing 
and choosing which is most suited to the application here involves the model of the individual and 
how these disciplines bases its assumptions of people’s interests.  
Of the three approaches the main distinction is that of structure vs. agency (B Guy Peters, 2012). 
Functional approaches focus more on the interaction of individuals with institutions (Thelen, 1999). 
Functional approaches are Rational Choice institutionalism, drawing on the work of North8 (1990) 
and (Williamson, 2000), and assumes that people are rational self-serving individuals, in a manner 
roughly synonymous to game theory. The main difference between this and the other functional 
approach, Sociological institutionalism (Scott, 1995), is in its assumption of the individual, which 
argues that individual choice is socially constructed. The third form of neo-institutionalism is 
Historical Institutionalism, considered as a structural approach (Thelen, 1999). This approach is 
agnostic in its model of the individual. Rather than ascribing a particular model of individual 
behaviour it assumes both rational choice and social constructivism are important. The approach is 
however, much more heavily orientated towards structure, and its comparatively downplayed 
attention to linking individuals to institutional change can be considered a weakness of the approach 
(B Guy Peters, 2012).  
While institutions are a core concept in the transitions literature, the conceptualisation used has almost 
exclusively drawn on the work of Scott (1995). For example, transitions scholars have made use of 
institutional concepts like rules, culture or legitimacy in order to account for the embeddedness of 
actors or the persistence of systems (Geels and Verhees, 2011; Geels, 2004, 2010); and Geels and 
Schot (2007) point out that socio-technical systems are situated at the level of organizational fields.  
 
8 Another institutional approach based up the work of Peter North is new institutional economics (for a review 
see Perry, 2019), but is considered here less useful for the study of politics and policymaking. 
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In a recent review, Andrews-Speed (2016) suggests the potential value that drawing on the 
institutional literatures could contribute to the transitions literature. Of these approaches HI is argued 
to be the most useful approach for understanding power distribution, which is most suited to 
deepening our understanding of policymaking processes.  This approach will be reviewed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
2.4.3. Historical institutionalism and transitions  
 
The literature on historical institutionalism is concerned with how institutions re-enforce each other 
and reproduce similar outcomes, and the situations under which they may be susceptible to change.  
This approach has recently been reviewed by authors in regard to their potential use in the context of 
transitions (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017). (Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 
2017) propose criteria for helping explain energy transitions in terms of institutions. This sub-section 
focusses on four of these considerations, which are considered useful for the analysis of a single case 
study bounded at the national level. A summary of these is displayed in table 3.  
 
Aggregation of values and interests through political systems  
Primarily the institutional arrangements in a given context will shape which ideas and interests are 
given more precedence. A key consideration here is the role of partisan veto players, defined as 
“individual or collective actors whose agreement is necessary for a change in the status quo” 
(Tsebelis, 2002: 19). The role and influence of such veto players is affected by variations of political 
institutions, including the electoral system in a given setting. Lockwood et al., (2017) argue that 
countries with Proportional Representation (PR) electoral systems are more likely to adopt 
environmental policy measures than those with majoritarian systems, where majoritarian systems 
incentivise politicians to target the concerns of a relatively small group of swing voters in marginal 
constituencies, while PR incentivises parties to seek support from a broader spectrum of voters by 
providing public goods (Lizzeri and Persico, 2001). Second is that PR systems tend to result in centre-
left governments which arguably are more proactive in pursuing transitions. Third is that PR systems 
accommodate smaller political parties, and are more likely to result in coalition government, which 
gives more influence to groups otherwise marginalised in majoritarian systems. Majoritarian systems 
instead provide more opportunities for NGOs as vehicles for change (Lockwood et al. 2017).  
Another consideration is the role of ‘institutional veto players’, which relate to constitutional 
agreements. Primarily, this is concerned with if the political system is presidential vs parliamentarian, 
and federalist vs. centralised. Fundamentally the argument is that where political power is 
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concentrated within a government arrangement, it allows for greater influence of a small number of 
groups, and without the involvement of institutional veto players, can result in both inaction and 
inertia or conversely, allow for radical action resulting in either acceleration or reversal in the rate and 
direction of transition.    
 
Credible commitment and political institutions  
The credibility of political commitment in a given policy mix is related to the political and electoral 
system in a given context. Following from the arguments regarding the differences in political 
systems outlined above, these also affect the credibility of the political commitment and in turn the 
policy mix that results from the policymaking process. PR systems tend to give more credibility due 
to the number of different actors represented in government, meaning that generally once consensus is 
reached political commitment to a given policy mix tends to be more stable.   
 
Delegation, regulatory inertia and regulatory activism.  
Regulatory responsibilities may be delegated to a non-government agency. This may be because 
government lacks the technical expertise to implement and regulate policy, or may be in order to 
shield it from political contestation, provide more certainty, and reduce risk (Kuzemko, 2016; 
Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017). This can lead to situations where the appointed regulator may 
favour approaches that are in their own interests, or align with the practices or norms currently 
followed. In such instances, inertia may occur if the regulator intentionally resists some policy 
initiatives and slows change in the direction of transition. This effect is amplified by the extent to 
which the regulator has influence/autonomy over regulatory (or even more broadly, policymaking) 
processes. Conversely, in some situations, the role of the regulator may be underplayed if they do not 
have statutory powers to instigate policy measures, rendering policymaking and regulatory processes 
more susceptible to political contestation and providing less stability(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 
2017).  
 
Power and capture by incumbents 
Commonly this phenomena is considered as regime resistance in transitions literature, but 
mechanisms through which such incumbents can affect policymaking processes are often implicit or 
overlooked. Broadly speaking Lockwood et al. (2017) identifies the role of incumbents in such 
processes into three considerations:  the power of incumbents, the interests of incumbents, and the 
openness of policy and regulatory processes to capture.  
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Table 3 - Important institutional factors for sustainability transitions (adapted from Lockwood et al. 2017) 
Institutional 
consideration Key considerations 
Aggregation of 
values and interests 
through political 
systems 
- Role of veto players 
- Electoral system – Proportional Representation (PR) vs. majoritarian 
- PR allows marginalised political powers to have more influence 
- PR allows public opinion to influence politics more as politics appeals to a wider 
group of voters. 
- In political systems concentrating power with few institutionalised veto players, 
both inaction and radical change are possible.   
Credible 
commitment and 
political 
institutions 
- Lower credibility in majoritarian systems due to fewer veto players 
- Tendency for things to be re-politicised in times of crisis. 
Delegation, 
regulatory inertia 
and regulatory 
activism 
- Delegation of regulatory decision-making. 
- Used to reduce risk and shield from political interference, in potentially 
controversial areas. 
- Strategy of creating new veto players, which can be used to increase credibility. 
- Delegation could slow the rate of change if these actors have ideas that are 
inconsistent with transition. 
Power and capture 
by incumbents 
i)The power of incumbents 
-How much leverage actors have over policymakers. 
-Related to the level of centralisation/market share of the system. 
ii)The interests of incumbents 
-Ownership and corporate governance. 
-Asset specificity 
iii)The openness of policy and regulatory processes to capture 
-Delegation of policy and regulatory decision making to private sector actors. 
 
The power that incumbents have is related to their market share, the degree of 
centralisation/oligopoly, and other factors such as ability to provide resources that government needs 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017). The interests are typically assumed to be in opposition to 
transition, however this is not homogenous. One consideration is different forms/arrangements of 
corporate governance across different actors/groups will result in different outcomes, i.e. more 
cooperatively owned organisations may be more interested in pursuing transition. Also, asset 
specificity, i.e. how well the proposed transition fits with existing infrastructure of incumbents – will 
influence the relative support or resistance from these actors. The final consideration is the 
susceptibility of policy and regulatory processes to capture from such incumbents. Government may 
lack the technical expertise to design effective policy, which may be exacerbated in institutional 
arrangements like in the UK, where companies are not obligated to disclose data to government 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017), or there are insufficient measurement or enforcement of 
regulations, making evidenced based decision making more difficult.  
 
29 
 
Chapter 2. Theory and literature review – Data analysis Institutional literature and Historical 
Institutionalism 
Having introduced the theoretical basis of the thesis, and literature on which the thesis draws and 
builds upon, the next chapter introduces the empirical context the thesis.  
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Chapter 3. Empirical context: Low/zero carbon housing  
 
“Failure is more newsworthy than success, and political analysis is generally more interesting when it 
includes (at least to some degree) strong aspects of failure.” (McConnell, 2015).  
 
This chapter introduces the empirical case for the thesis, the UK Zero Carbon homes policy mix. The 
first section gives an overview of the UK context in terms of the role of buildings and domestic 
buildings (housing) can play in national efforts to achieve significant carbon abatement, and an 
overview of the policies introduced in the UK towards achieving this. The second section then 
introduces the case specifically, and outlines the main reasons that it is considered as particularly 
useful for the purposes of testing the theoretical propositions of the thesis.  
  
3.1.Context of the UK and the role of domestic buildings in carbon mitigation  
 
There is ‘significant potential’ for carbon reductions from improving efficiency in buildings 
(IEA, 2012), and domestic and non-domestic buildings account for 49% of energy 
consumption (DECC 2014a), and in 2009 buildings accounted for about 43% of UK’s carbon 
emissions. In recent years, there have been numerous changes to the policy mix for energy 
efficiency (and buildings) in the UK during this time period. Kern et al., (2016) conducted 
research in this area focusing on the characteristics of the policy mix in both the UK and 
Finland (2000-2013), but did not consider the policy processes behind the evolution of the 
policy mix. Since 2013, there have been subsequent changes to the policy mix, which in 
aggregate would indicate reduced ambition and political support for this area of development.  
 
Progress has been slow since the second National Energy Efficiency Action Plan (NEEAP), 
compared to other EU member state countries in energy efficiency policies. In the period of 
2012-2015 the UK was ranked 27 out of 28 countries, where in 2012 it was ranked 13 (Energy 
Efficiency Watch, 2015). Due to the significant policy changes made in this sector, I consider 
it to be an unusual case (Yin, 2014 p.52), which will serve as a testing ground to build 
theoretical propositions.  
 
Energy standards in the UK are contained within the national building regulations, under ‘Part 
L’, and are under the mandate of the Department of Communities and Local Government 
(DCLG 2008). Updates to these regulations occur every three years and go through a 
consultation process, which invites participation from industry to provide feedback on draft 
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regulations and gives the opportunity for revision before their implementation. Once 
implemented, the enforcement of regulations is delegated. The Construction Industry Council 
(CIC) is a central government organisation which regulates Private Building Control. Local 
councils, who prior to the 1984 Building act were solely responsible for enforcement of the 
regulations, still operate as Local Area Building Control (LABC). The client (e.g. contractor) 
has the option to choose, but in some regions due to funding cuts and capability shortages, 
there is not always an option of LABC. The energy component of the building regulations in 
the UK is measured under the Standard Assessment Procedure (SAP), which calculates the 
energy performance of the building based on its design specifications.  
 
The domestic construction industry is made up of many private companies, but is dominated 
by large volume house builders (Building 2008). These relatively powerful actors operate 
under a business model where they typically buy land for future developments. The size of this 
land bank has increased over time and the largest builders typically land on which to build for 
the next 3-5 years (Sceptre 2007). Importantly for updating building regulations, the current 
arrangements mean that developers can start the construction phase of these planned new 
developments which locks that site to the standards contained within the building regulations 
at the time at which construction starts. Accordingly, the business model of these largest 
developers is to start construction on all of their sites just prior to the implementation of new 
building regulations, which effectively allows them to avoid building to new regulations and 
there is typically a lag of around three years before large developments are built to the newly 
implemented standards. This causes a significant lag in the rate of progress and technological 
change. Importantly, the SME builders do not typically have land banks and are therefore the 
segment of the industry that have to build to the new standards first, despite not having the 
large amounts of capital at their disposal to spend on R&D that the larger builder do.   
 
3.2.Zero Carbon Homes policy mix in the UK 
 
In 2006 the UK announced that within 10 years all new domestic housing would be built to ‘zero-
carbon standards’. This at the time was a very ambitious proposition, mainly because the UK was 
largely considered a laggard with regards to energy efficiency. What makes this announcement 
particularly ambitious is that when first announced, it included the emissions associated with 
household appliances, which made it the highest standard of anywhere in the world.  
This case is also particularly suited to the testing of theoretical conceptual development of the thesis 
for a number of reasons. Primarily, the original design of the Zero Carbon Homes (ZCH) target was 
designed as a policy mix. The policymakers intended for the target to be met by three core policy 
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instruments (DCLG 2006) combined with a number of additional innovation policies, including R&D 
funding, tax incentives and procurement schemes.  Uncommon for transitions, was that the main 
policy instruments were what Kivimaa & Kern (2016) call ‘control policies, which seek to phase out 
existing technologies or practices. Secondly, over its development, there were several different 
political objectives are related to the ZCH policy mix. For example, the UK has an ongoing ‘housing-
crisis’, where declining rates of supply and increasing demand has led to highly inflated property 
prices. Interesting to ZCH is that it was originally intended to achieve both of these political 
objectives simultaneously, increase volume of supply, while also stimulating a transition in the 
housebuilding sector.  
Another reason that this is a suitable case is that it concerns a wide range of different stakeholders 
(actors, coalitions, industries) each with their own interests. These include: the incumbent large-scale 
house builders, large-scale and centralised (renewable) energy companies/utilities, small-scale micro 
renewables, component manufacturers, NGOs. This allows for a rich analysis of the roles of these 
different actors in policymaking processes, and their different degrees of influence on decision 
making.   
The final reason that this is deemed an interesting case is that ultimately it is an example of a failed 
transition. While there has been some progress made in the UK housebuilding sector as a result of the 
ZCH policy mix, this progress is, arguably, relatively low-hanging fruit which allowed for some 
incremental improvement of the existing technologies and practices in the building sector. Why I 
consider it a failed transition is that it did not produce any significant path-breaking or radical change 
within UK housebuilding. Arguably the most successful aspect of the ZCH policy mix is that the 
announcement and early commitment from the UK government prompted other countries to adopt 
their own zero/nearly zero carbon requirements for buildings, which, hopefully, will not suffer the 
same fate as ZCH.  
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This section details the research design of the thesis along with the methods and data used in the 
papers of the thesis. The thesis follows a qualitative research design. Accordingly, the rationale 
behind a case study design is outlined, along with process tracing, allowing for the study of 
phenomena over time (Yin, 2014). The remainder of the section then outlines the data sources and 
data collection procedure, before giving an overview of the data analysis. Since the data analysis is 
different from paper 2 to paper 3 these are considered separately.  
 
 
4.1. Case study  
 
“[O]ne must consider dynamic processes that can highlight the implications of short time horizons, the 
scope of unintended consequences, the emergence of path dependence, and the efficacy or limitations of 
learning and competitive mechanisms. This requires genuinely historical research. By genuinely 
historical research I mean work that carefully investigates processes unfolding over time.” (Pierson 
2000).  
 
Case study research is relevant when trying to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, and also 
while studying an ‘in-depth’ description of a social phenomenon (Yin, 2014, p.4). The case 
study allows for in depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its real world 
context, and is especially useful when the ‘boundaries between phenomenon and context 
may not be clearly evident.’ (Yin, 2014 p.16). When researching politics, many concepts are 
hard to operationalise in quantitative terms. Opinions can be codified in terms of documents, 
statements of intent, but these artefacts capture ideas, normative and cognitive aspects which 
are more suited to an interpretivist research design. Coupling ideas and views to effects 
requires identifying operational linkages that need to be traced over time, rather than mere 
frequencies or incidence (Yin, 2014 p.10). Furthermore, for the study of politics and policy 
feedback, quantitative studies often provide insufficient detail of certain conditions and 
phenomena, or omit them completely (for a review see Pierson, 2007). While it would be 
possible to utilize deterministic research design in attempt to understand aspects of the policy 
process13, these studies have usually looked at the effect of a single policy on target 
populations14. Case studies are more suitable for understanding complex causal mechanisms 
(George and Bennett 2004), and can explain the presumed causal links in real world 
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interventions that are too complex for survey or experimental methods (Yin, 2014). Case 
study is also relevant to illustrate certain topics within an evolution, explore a situation 
where intervention has no single output, and where the investigator has little control over the 
events (Yin, 2014). 
The research consists of a longitudinal single case study, because the complexity of politics 
requires tracing of the phenomena over time. Single cases aim to produce knowledge 
generalizable to theoretical propositions but not to populations or universes (Yin, 2014, p.21). 
Within a single case, empirical observations can be multiplied by formulating and testing 
hypotheses about the mechanisms that connect causes to effects (Bennett and George 1997). 
The case study has a single unit of analysis and corresponds to a holistic design single case 
study (Yin, 2014).  
The unit of analysis will be the policy mix for low carbon housing, influenced by the effects of 
the instrument mix on the socio-technical system, and the socio-political, administrative and 
fiscal feedbacks mechanisms that occur. In order to elucidate the effects of policy feedback 
mechanism on policy change, I will look for evidence of how feedbacks influence the policy 
process. Important to the study of policy feedback is that effects do not necessarily or 
inherently generate feedbacks (Pierson 1993), and require the actions of actors through 
coalition forming, lobbying, framing and discourse. Many changes will occur within the STS, 
but in order to reduce the scope of analysis only those relevant to policy feedback mechanisms, 
or those that had influence through the framings discourse and actions taken by actors will be 
considered. This is a way to bound the study of such complex causal mechanisms, as the 
effects that are generated from policy design and implementation influence policy feedbacks, 
or may require attention to be drawn by a focusing event which directs attention to particular 
effects in the socio-technical system.  
The starting point of the empirical analysis is 2006, ending in 2016. Earlier periods that help 
explain the history of energy efficiency policy, the progress made, and the socio political and 
economic factors of the country are also considered as background information. This period 
has been chosen as it coincides with the implementation Zero Carbon Homes target, following 
the EU Directive on the energy performance of buildings (EPBD) (Directive 2002/91/EC 
(EPBD, 2003). This is considered as an exogenous pressure placing pressure on UK policy 
makers, and the timeframe preceding it allows insight into endogenous conditions of the UK 
political system. Following the implementation of the EU directive, the UK Housing Act 2004 
was implemented, and the analysis of the time preceding this will inform the ‘initial 
conditions’ of the policy mix for energy efficiency in domestic buildings.  
The time period also includes the finical crisis of 2007 which substantially reoriented spending 
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on policy and acted as a focusing event on the policy subsystem. Throughout this time period, 
there have been two successive changes in electoral majorities, moving from a Labour 
majority government, to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government and finally 
Conservative majority since May 2015. Again, while these exogenous socio-political changes 
are not directly attributed to policy feedback at the subsystem level, they help explain the 
interplay of endogenous policy feedbacks, and why certain feedback effects may be amplified. 
I consider this to be particularly salient to the analysis, and as suggested by Patashnik and 
Zelizer (2013, p. 1077), ‘scholars have paid insufficient attention to influence of elections 
outcomes and partisan forces on the prospects for policy entrenchment’. 
 
4.2.Data sources and collection  
 
The thesis draws on two main sources of evidence. First, archival data for the period 2006-2016.  This 
included newspapers, industry journals, white papers, green papers, consultations, statements, written 
and oral references in the House of Commons and House of Lords, select committee inquiries, and a 
Treasury enquiry (table 5). Based on a freedom of information request we also received access for all 
minutes, agendas and supplementary documents from all meetings of the Zero Carbon Task Force 
(see Appendix F).  
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Table 4- Interviewees by actor type, group, format, date and duration. 
 
Second, the thesis used 18 semi-structured expert interviews (table 4). Interviewees were selected 
based on their knowledge of and involvement in relevant processes, while also seeking a balance 
between different actor groups (policy-makers, NGOs, industry, academic, experts). Interviews were 
based on a semi-structured questionnaire, were conducted face-to-face and over telephone in the 
period from August until October 2018, and lasted on average 79 minutes. They were supported by a 
timeline visualisation compiled from archival data, which allowed for validation of the event timeline 
with experts, while also looking for additional information.  
Interview Actor type Actor group  Format Date Duration 
(minutes) 
1 UK-Green Building Council NGO Face to face 31/08/2017 90 
2 World Wildlife Fund/Task force/ 
UK-Green Building Council/Zero 
Carbon hub 
NGO Telephone 17/08/2017 50 
3 NGO/advocacy group NGO Telephone 23/09/2017 90 
4 Manufacturing – advocacy group  Industry/ 
Manufacturing/NGO  
Face to face 3/10/2017 90 
5 Manufacturing – advocacy group  Industry/ 
Manufacturing/NGO  
Telephone 18/09/2017 105 
6 Manufacturing/ Zero Carbon Hub Industry – 
manufacturing  
Telephone 2/10/2017 90 
7 House builder/Zero Carbon Hub/ 
National House Building Council 
Industry  Face to face 12/10/2017 90 
8 Developer Industry - developer Face to face 4/10/2017 90 
9 House Builders Federation Industry - developer  Telephone 1/12/2017 45 
10 Chartered Institutions of Building 
Service Engineers     
Expert/ industry Telephone 17/11/2017 90 
11 Consultant/Zero Carbon Hub  Industry/ Expert  Telephone 24/10/2017 90 
12 Consultant/Zero Carbon Hub  Industry/ Expert  Face to face 11/09/2017 90 
13 Expert/ academic  Expert Telephone 5/09/2017 90 
14 Academic  Expert Face to face 26/10/2017 60 
15 Civil servant/Carbon Trust   Policy maker/ Expert Face to face 7/09/2017 90 
16 Minister/Department of 
Communities and Local 
Government 
Policy maker Face to face 17/10/2017 50 
17 Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister/ Local Area Building 
Control  
Policy maker  Face to face 14/09/2017 90 
18 Building Research 
Establishment/Housing 
association  
Policy maker/ 
Industry  
Face to face 13/10/2017 60 
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Table 5 - Archival data by type, source and quantity 
 
 
4.3. Data analysis  
 
This section justifies the method of data analysis used in the empirical work contained in papers 2 and 
3. Fundamentally, a ‘framework analysis’ methodology was used for the analysis of collated data 
(Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). While the methodological approach was consistent throughout the thesis, 
the frameworks used in papers 2 and 3 were different. As a consequence the coding systems used in 
these two approaches are different.  
Type of archival data  Data Source Quantity   
Policy documents – 
Government responses to 
consultations, publications 
(white papers), speeches, 
impact assessments   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u
k/20120919183345/http://www.commun
ities.gov.uk/  
https://www.gov.uk/  
137 
2016 Task Force - meeting 
minutes, agendas, supporting 
documents/reports 
Freedom of information request to 
Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) 
115 (See Appendix A) 
Zero carbon hub publications  http://www.zerocarbonhub.org/recent-
publications  
148 
Industry journals  https://www.endsreport.com/  
https://www.building.co.uk/  
https://www.cibsejournal.com/   
https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/  
603 articles - reviewed for 
relevancy and reduced to 112   
Secondary literature  https://www.scopus.com  25 academic papers  
Inquiries  https://www.parliament.uk  71 written responses in 
Treasury inquiry  
99 written responses in ‘Home 
energy efficiency and demand 
reduction’ inquiry, Energy and 
Climate Change Committee  
Documents reviewed using 
search terms “zero carbon 
homes” and “allowable 
solutions”. 
Debates in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords 
over the period of 2006-2016  
https://hansard.parliament.uk/  260 spoken references  
22 written statements 
Occurrences resulting from 
search terms ‘Zero Carbon 
Homes’ and ‘Code for 
Sustainable Homes’  
Letters (to government 
ministers) 
Various 3  
Media  https://www.theguardian.com/uk  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/  
https://www.ft.com/?edition=uk  
https://www.independent.co.uk/  
427 occurrences - reviewed for 
relevance using search terms 
“zero carbon homes”, “eco-
towns” and “code for 
sustainable homes”. Reduced 
to 67. 
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Data was first coded by drawing on the collated archival data key events were arranged 
chronologically. These events were then assigned codes of the conceptual framework and changes in 
the socio-technical system and the policy mix. For the socio-technical system, quantitative and 
qualitative information was collected on demonstration projects, annual built rates, research and 
development activities, activities of key market actors and industry development. For the latter, we 
included changes in the policy strategy and the instrument mix. For the coding method used here see 
Appendix A-D. 
Interviews were transcribed verbatim and then indexed using NVivo11 to deductively code for four 
phases with nodes derived from our framework. We also coded ‘other’ as sub-nodes of both policy 
effects and feedback mechanisms, to account for any phenomena not captured by the framework9. We 
ran multiple queries to investigate the relationships between elements of the framework, using matrix-
coding queries to look for overlaps. In doing so, we examined whether the interviewees agree with 
each other and whether there were significant differences in responses, e.g. between interviewees 
from different actor types. We triangulated our interviews with our archival data to ensure the 
robustness of our findings. Collectively these sources allowed for a rich analysis of co-evolutionary 
mechanisms. For an illustration of coding frequency per concept see Appendix E. 
Additional content analysis involved processing of the primary data of meetings of the task force 
obtained from the freedom of information request. This analysis involved tracing the participants of 
meetings of the zero carbon task force, helping identify who had more influence in this aspect of the 
policy subsystem. Paper 3 also pays more attention to the elected officials responsible for the zero 
carbon homes policy mix, their involvement and their influence over decision making.  
 
 
 
 
9 However, since the research was designed to look for evidence of the main a priori conceptual components, 
most data was expected to fit the framework (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). 
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Abstract 
Understanding how policymaking processes can influence the rate and direction of socio-technical 
change towards sustainability is an important, yet underexplored research agenda in the field of 
sustainability transitions. Some studies have sought to explain how individual policy instruments can 
influence transitions, and the politics surrounding this process. We argue that such individual policy 
instruments can cause wider feedback mechanisms that influence not only their own future 
development, but also other instruments in the same area. Consequently, by extending the scope of 
analysis to that of a policy mix allows us to account for multiple policy effects on socio-technical 
change and resultant feedback mechanisms influencing the policy processes that underpin further 
policy mix change. This paper takes a first step in this regard by combining policy studies and 
innovation studies literatures to conceptualise the co-evolutionary dynamics of policy mixes and 
socio-technical systems. We focus on policy processes to help explain how policy mixes influence 
socio-technical change, and how changes in the socio-technical system also shape the evolution of the 
policy mix. To do so we draw on insights from the policy feedback literature, and propose a novel 
conceptual framework. The framework highlights that policy mixes aiming to foster sustainability 
transitions need to be designed to create incentives for beneficiaries to mobilise further support, while 
overcoming a number of prevailing challenges which may undermine political support over time. In 
the paper, we illustrate the framework using the example of the zero carbon homes policy mix in the 
UK. We conclude with deriving research and policy implications for analysing and designing 
dynamic policy mixes for sustainability transitions. 
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5.1. Introduction 
 
Understanding the role of policy processes in influencing the rate and direction of sustainability 
transitions remains a fundamental challenge in the existing literature on socio-technical transitions 
(Markard et al. 2012). Scholars in this field have sought to facilitate the restructuring of socio-
technical systems towards more sustainable ways of fulfilling societal needs (Geels 2002, 2004). 
Moving towards more sustainable configurations requires significant structural changes in existing 
systems, often instigated by policy to reconfigure market selection environments, user preferences and 
cultural perceptions (Geels et al. 2016). Policy action is argued to be required to overcome various 
market and system failures (Weber and Rohracher 2012).  
However, ‘behind policy there is always politics’ (Meadowcroft 2011: 73) and political negotiations 
can have a major influence on the stability or change of policy, which in turn influences socio-
technical developments. It has been argued that policy stability is beneficial in creating positive 
expectations of a path to commercialization for early stage technologies (Foxon et al. 2005). 
However, it has also been argued that policy needs to be able to account for changes in the socio-
technical system, incorporating enough flexibility to allow for revisions without deterring investor 
confidence (Hekkert et al. 2007). Due to the long timeframes involved in sustainability transitions, the 
types of policy instruments aimed to foster transitions may change significantly over time to address 
changing objectives and different stages of innovation (Turnheim et al. 2015). The ways in which 
policy mixes evolve over time can have a significant influence on the rate and direction of 
sustainability transitions (Reichardt et al 2016). Collectively, these considerations highlight that in the 
context of sustainability transition processes, it is important  not only to study the content of policy 
instruments (e.g. what level of support is provided for which technology?), but the processes through 
which instruments are introduced, adapted or kept stable over time.  
Another challenge in understanding the influence of policy on sustainability transitions is the need to 
move beyond a focus on single policy instruments towards wider policy mixes (Rogge et al. 2017). 
Contributions from various literatures, including innovation studies (Nauwelaers et al. 2009), 
environmental economics (Lehmann 2010) and policy analysis (Howlett and Rayner 2007), have 
already sought to explore important aspects of policy mixes; such as the design features of individual 
instruments in the mix (Kemp and Pontoglio 2011), instrument interactions (del Río González 2006; 
Nauwelaers et al. 2009), the elements of the mix (Borrás and Edquist 2013), the policy strategy 
(Quitzow 2015a), as well as overall characteristics of mixes (Howlett and Rayner 2013; Reichardt and 
Rogge 2016) and policy processes (Flanagan et al. 2011). Sustainability transitions are complex, 
multi-faceted processes, involving long time frames, multiple actors, and often a range of both 
competing and complementary technologies (Geels 2004). Such complexity means that no single 
42 
 
Chapter 5. The Co-Evolution of Policy Mixes and Socio-Technical Systems: Towards a conceptual 
framework of policy mix feedback in sustainability transitions (Paper 1) - Introduction 
approach, technology, intervention or policy instrument is capable of achieving transformative 
change, often resulting in large numbers of policy instruments being implemented over time to 
address multiple objectives (Loorbach 2010; Kern and Howlett 2009; Kern et al. 2017).  
Recently, scholars have called for an integration of these perspectives into the study of sustainability 
transitions, to produce more meaningful analytical insights and policy recommendations (Rogge and 
Reichardt 2016). This paper follows suggestions of Flanagan et al. (2011) and Rogge and Reichardt 
(2016) to take a first step towards better conceptualising the role of policymaking processes in the co-
evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical change. Only few studies have started to draw on policy 
process theories in the context of transitions to better understand processes of policy change (Kern 
and Rogge 2017). Others have sought to analyse how single policies co-evolve with the socio-
technical system (Hoppmann et al. 2014), but only present a relatively simplistic conceptualisation of 
the policy process. We complement these early attempts by paying greater attention to how 
policymaking processes influence the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical systems. We 
do so by drawing on the policy feedback literature from the field of policy sciences (Pierson 1993). 
The policy feedback literature draws attention to the continuous interactions between public policy, 
the outcomes in society, and how these outcomes affect policy actors in ways that influences politics 
and subsequent policymaking (Weible 2014: 13). We suggest this analytical focus offers important 
insights to explain the dynamic and recursive nature of how policy mixes and socio-technical systems 
co-evolve. Our proposed framework aims to explore how policy mixes stimulate changes in socio-
technical systems through policy effects, and how these changes can subsequently generate feedback 
mechanisms influencing the evolution of the policy mix. The paper is predominantly a conceptual 
contribution developing a novel framework, but uses the zero carbon homes policy mix in the UK as 
an empirical illustration to help highlight interactions dynamics of the framework. This seems a 
particularly well suited example as it represents an instance where an ambitious policy target lost 
political support over time due to a range of policy effects and feedback mechanisms, ultimately 
leading to its abandonment. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we review two emerging strands of 
research exploring the role of policy in sustainability transitions: section 2.1 reviews work on policy, 
politics and policy processes within sustainability transitions, while section 2.2 reviews the 
development of policy mix thinking and its application to sustainability transitions. In section 3, we 
review concepts from the policy feedback literature and in section 4 utilise these ideas to 
conceptualise the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical change for sustainability 
transitions. To illustrate interaction dynamics of the framework, section 5 draws on the zero carbon 
homes policy mix in the UK. In section 6 we derive conclusions, suggest avenues for further research 
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and policy mix design considerations for sustainability transitions.  
5.2. Sustainability Transitions, Politics and Policy Mixes  
‘Socio-technical systems’ are commonly understood as the “linkages between elements necessary to 
fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004: 900), such as energy, transport, housing and food production 
and consumption. Such a system consists of multi-faceted combination of actors, networks, 
institutions, artefacts, infrastructure, markets and practices along with cultural and symbolic views 
and representations (Geels 2004). A socio-technical transition is a combination of processes leading to 
a fundamental shift of a socio-technical system (Geels and Schot 2010). Transitions involve 
technological, organisational, institutional, political, and socio-cultural changes (Markard et al. 2015). 
Changes to any of these aspects can produce systemic effects, due to their interactions with other 
components of the socio-technical system (Foxon 2011). However, reconfigurations do not happen 
autonomously and require the activities of human actors (Geels 2004: 900).  
Historical examples of transitions include the shift from sailing ships to steamboats (Geels 2002), and 
from horse-driven carriages to automobiles (Geels 2005). Studies of such examples highlight that 
transitions have historically taken long periods of time (25-50 years) to unfold (Geels and Schott 
2007). Yet, some more recent transitions have been shown to occur quicker (Sovacool 2016) and there 
is a live discussion about whether sustainability transitions can occur more quickly if they are 
consciously governed, while most historical transitions were emergent, market-driven processes (Kern 
and Rogge 2016). This is indeed the ambitious foundational claim of much thinking in the 
sustainability transitions literature, that it is possible to influence the speed and direction of socio-
technical transitions towards sustainability and that public policy can play a key role in this regard. 
One of the main challenges in this field therefore is to improve the understanding of how policies can 
influence transitions (Markard et al. 2012). In the following sections, we review two areas of 
development within the literature that have sought to address this challenge: first the role of policy, 
politics and policy processes in sustainability transitions and second the growing interest in 
considering policy mixes rather than single instruments.  
5.2.1. Policy, politics and policy processes in sustainability transitions  
Policy is widely considered as an integral constituent of transitions towards sustainability (Jacobsson 
and Lauber 2006) and is argued to help accelerate the pace of transitions (Kern and Rogge 2016). One 
important policy to change selection environments towards more sustainable configurations, is to 
internalise the external costs of environmental damage, either through carbon pricing or cap and trade 
schemes (Baranzini et al. 2017). Early advocates of transition management proposed the use of such 
‘control policies’ as part of efforts to promote transitions (Kemp and Rotmans 2004). However, 
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beyond internalising the market failure of environmental externalities, a number of structural and 
transformational system failures have been identified which also require policy intervention (Weber 
and Rohracher 2012; Wieczorek and Hekkert 2012). In this regard, policymakers can implement 
policies to stimulate transitions, including subsidies, procurement, R&D grants, and upskilling and 
training incentives (Markard et al. 2015).   
More specifically, the Strategic Niche Management (SNM) literature suggests that policymakers need 
to create protective spaces to shield and nurture sustainable innovations; and to make mainstream 
market conditions more favourable to emergent technologies (Smith and Raven 2012, Raven et al. 
2016). In addition, the Transitions Management literature stresses the importance of ‘transition 
arenas’ to bring together frontrunners to create new networks and accelerate learning and 
technological development (Kemp and Rotmans 2004). It has also been stressed that experiments 
should be complemented with long term agenda setting to help establish a shared vision to guide 
investment and reduce uncertainty (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010).  
Transition scholars suggest that a constant realignment of policy with the changing conditions of the 
socio-technical system is necessary (Hoppmann et al. 2014), requiring reflexive policymaking and 
learning over time to account for the unpredictable nature of transitions (Rotmans and Loorbach 
2010). Equally, policy change can impact resource availability, investor confidence, or signal changes 
in political will. Accordingly, not only changes in policy content, but also the process through which 
policy changes, can have impacts on the socio-technical system (White et al. 2013; Reichardt et al. 
2017). Consequently, over time policy changes can lead to virtuous or vicious cycles of causation 
influencing the momentum of sustainability transitions (Hekkert et al. 2007).  
So far, the transitions literature has typically referred to the content of policymaking in terms of 
objectives, programs, regulations, laws and resource allocations (Markard et al. 2015). Moving 
beyond the content of policies, “[p]olitics refers to the procedural dimension of policymaking, with a 
variety of actors negotiating and interacting to produce public policies” (Markard et al. 2014: 4). 
Policymaking can be understood as the design, implementation, adaptation and discontinuation of 
public policies (Sabatier and Weible 2014). This can be considered as the process of implementing 
overarching objectives, and is heavily influenced by the political conditions. States are dependent on 
prevailing economic structures and industries, which can create vested interests as political and 
economic actors become entangled, often resulting in a high level of influence of incumbent actors on 
policy decisions (Meadowcroft 2011; Johnstone et al. 2017).  
A number of contributions have already sought to help analyse the politics of transitions (Baker et al. 
2014; Meadowcroft 2009; Meadowcroft and Langhelle 2009; Shove and Walker 2007). Studies have 
for example focused on the way in which ideas are presented (Kern 2011; Scrase and Smith 2009), the 
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role of coalitions (Hess 2014, 2015; Markard et al. 2015), power relations (Avelino and Rotmans 
2009; Avelino 2011; Geels 2014), and policy networks (Normann 2017). To conceptualise how 
politics influences policymaking processes, transition scholars have started to integrate insights from 
prominent policy process theories, including Sabatier’s Advocacy Coalition Framework (Markard et 
al. 2015), Kingdon’s Multiple Streams (Normann 2015), and Marsh’s Policy Networks Approach 
(Normann 2017). From these contributions, we know that during transition processes windows of 
opportunity can allow actors to advocate certain technologies and gain favourable policy outputs. Yet, 
over time, changing conditions can cause these windows to close and policy support to be withdrawn 
(Normann 2015). Similarly, beliefs of actors can change over time, which may influence participation 
in coalitions (Markard et al. 2015) and the formation of policy networks (Normann 2017). 
Some contributions have also explored linking policy processes to the rate and direction of change in 
the socio-technical system more directly. Hoppmann et al. (2014) highlight the iterative process of 
policy realignment for solar PV in Germany, responding to the changing conditions within the socio-
technical system. Lauber and Jacobsson (2016) also follow the evolution of the German Feed-in-
Tariff (FiT), focussing on the politics surrounding the empowerment of niche actors and how changes 
in the socio-technical system over time influenced discourses of different actor groups. These papers 
highlight policy change in response to changes in the socio-technical system, but their 
conceptualisations of policymaking processes is underdeveloped. Furthermore, these papers only 
cover a single policy instrument and its revisions over time, rather than a wider policy mix.  
Consequently, the interplay of technological change, politics and policy processes remains 
understudied (Schmidt and Sewerin 2017) and under conceptualised, particularly when considering 
collections of policies that make up an overarching policy mix. In the following, we therefore review 
the emerging literature on policy mixes in the field of sustainability transitions.  
 
5.2.2. Policy mixes and sustainability transitions  
Recently, there has been increased attention to policy mixes in innovation studies (Flanagan et al. 
2011; Guerzoni and Raiteri 2015). Scholars of sustainability transitions also, have argued to extend 
the scope of analysis beyond individual instruments to that of broader policy mixes (Rogge and 
Reichardt 2016). Sustainability transitions exhibit several characteristics that make the policy mixes 
required to foster transitions distinct, and arguably more challenging than in other areas. This is not 
only due to a number of interrelated market and system failures (Foxon et al. 2005; Weber and 
Rohracher 2012) but also due to the required speed and unprecedented scale and complexity of the 
required changes.  
46 
 
Chapter 5. The Co-Evolution of Policy Mixes and Socio-Technical Systems: Towards a conceptual 
framework of policy mix feedback in sustainability transitions (Paper 1) - Sustainability Transitions, 
Politics and Policy Mixes 
Two particular challenges concern destabilization and accumulation. Regarding the former, scholars 
have argued that policy mixes for sustainability transitions need to actively seek to destabilise the 
existing configuration to speed up transitions (David 2017; Johnstone and Rogge 2017; Kivimaa and 
Kern 2016). Regarding the latter, policies to support sustainability transitions are commonly added to 
the mix alongside existing policies (often supporting the regime) rather than replacing them (Kern and 
Howlett 2009; Kern et al. 2017). This can limit the transformative potential of policy mixes for 
sustainability transitions and produce complex combinations of interacting instruments leading to 
unintended or undesirable effects.  
Given these challenges, Rogge and Reichardt (2016) propose a framework for analysing policy mixes 
for sustainability transitions. They argue that it is important to not only look at interacting instruments 
but also to consider policy strategies as elements of a policy mix. We follow this conceptualisation, 
thereby acknowledging the need for long-term strategies for guiding transitions (Foxon and Pearson 
2008; Weber and Rohracher 2012), which are considered separately from the instrument mix10 (Figure 
1).  
Drawing on insights from the policy design and innovation literatures they also stress that policy mix 
characteristics, such as the consistency of the instrument mix with stated policy objectives, may help 
explain the impact of policy mixes (see also Kern and Howlett 2009; Alkemade et al. 2011). In line 
with Flanagan et al. (2011), they also call for increased attention to the underlying “political problem-
solving process among constrained social actors in the search for solutions to societal problems – with 
the government as primary agent taking conscious, deliberate, authoritative and often interrelated 
decisions” (Rogge and Reichardt, 2016: 1625).  
 
10 This is an important distinction as much of the policy mix literature uses ‘instrument mix’ and ‘policy mix’ 
interchangeably.  
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Figure 1 - Politics, Policy Processes and Policy Mixes in Sustainability Transitions 
Our contribution focusses on these policy processes, specifically on the effects of policy decisions on 
socio-technical systems, and the resultant influence of these changes on the further evolution of the 
policy mix (Section 4). In order to develop a conceptual framework for studying these processes, we 
draw on the policy feedback literature (Pierson 1993) which we review in the following section.  
5.3. Analysing policy processes: Insights from the Policy Feedback Literature  
To address the call for a more explicit consideration of policy processes in the field of sustainability 
transitions we apply insights from the Policy Feedback literature (Pierson 1993). We have chosen to 
build on this approach for four reasons.  
First, this literature addresses the interdependencies between policies and further policymaking. It 
investigates how the effects of a policy change alter subsequent rounds of policymaking, which makes 
it well suited to our focus on the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical change. Secondly, 
in the transitions literature technological and institutional co-evolution has been used to partly explain 
‘carbon lock-in’ (Foxon 2011; Unruh 2000). We suggest that the policy feedback literature with its 
attention to path dependency (Pierson 2004) can contribute to our understanding of such lock-in 
processes. Third, policy feedback thinking has epistemological similarities to the transitions literature. 
Both approaches have conceptual roots derived from the punctuated equilibrium paradigm (Gould and 
Eldredge 1977). Each propose that revolutionary change happens in cycles, where disruption of a 
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stable system leads to a period of radical change, which re-stabilises over time to reach a new 
equilibrium. Finally, within the feedback literature some authors have focused on single policy 
instruments (Jordan and Matt 2014), while others have already drawn attention to the importance of 
considering several instruments (Weaver 2010; Oberlander and Weaver 2015). Consequently, the 
latter strand particularly lends itself to our purpose.  
The policy feedback literature has its roots in historical institutionalism and rational choice (Pierson 
1993, 2004), and has more recently integrated insights from punctuated equilibrium theory (Jacobs 
and Weaver 2015; Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). It explores mechanisms through which policies 
reshape social and state actors’ interests and capacities over long periods of time in ways that change 
the prospects for the policies’ future maintenance, expansion, or reversal (Skocpol 1992). The core 
argument in this literature is that policies are not merely the products of politics, but also influence 
politics through societal reconfigurations. Policy alters state capacities, it changes incentives for 
collective action, and encourages social adaptations that may become difficult to reverse (Patashnik 
and Zelizer 2013).  
In Pierson’s (1993) seminal work he identified ways in which policy design can incentivise actors to 
participate in policymaking processes and shape the political conditions. This early literature seeks to 
explain the influence of policy through two factors: ‘resource effects’ (policies as packages of 
resources that affect interest groups, state capacities and mass publics), and ‘interpretive effects’ 
(policies as sources of information that affect patterns of cognition, understanding and meaning) 
(Mettler and Soss 2004: 60). Patashnik and Zelizer (2013) built upon these effects, drawing attention 
to the institutional supports that may limit the capacity of a policy to create positive feedback. They 
argue that failure to uproot institutional arrangements, or layering new policy alongside existing 
arrangements, can generate conflicts among programs and agencies which undermines policy support. 
Consequently, layering is considered much less effective for institutional recalibration than 
dismantling (terminating the existing arrangements) (Patashnik and Zeilzer 2013:1077).  
Recent scholarship has highlighted that these effects (resource, interpretive and institutional) are 
better termed ‘feed-forward’ effects, as they describe post-enactment policy consequences with no 
complete feedback loop (Schneider and Ingram 2009: 103; Jordan and Matt 2014: 231). These effects 
“show the feed but not the back (or they just assume the back)” (Campbell 2012: 347). Therefore, 
following the suggestions of Jordan and Matt (2014), we move towards a conceptualisation of 
complete feedback loops making a distinction between the forward and backward dimension of 
feedback processes. We refer to the effects of policymaking on the socio-technical system as the 
‘policy effects’ and the resultant influence of the socio-technical system on future policymaking as the 
‘feedback mechanisms’ (see section 4.1- 4.2).   
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Policies are not thought to automatically generate feedbacks mechanisms, but require coalitions of 
actors to take political action for the effect of a given policy to influence further policy processes 
(Pierson 1993, 2000). Scholars have conceptualised various feedback mechanisms, including 
influence on interest groups, altering of administrative capacities of the state (state-building), and 
changes in political participation (Pierson 1993; Mettler 2002; Béland 2010). In a recent contribution 
from Oberlander and Weaver (2015), feedback mechanisms are conceptualised into three broad 
categories: socio- political, fiscal and administrative (see section 4.2 for details). We draw on this 
contribution as it is the most fully realised conceptualisation of feedback mechanisms to date, while it 
responds to two criticisms of the existing literature. 
First, much feedback literature has narrowly focussed on the occurrence of positive feedback, and has 
been increasingly criticised for over-determinism (Béland 2010). The underlying assumption of the 
(positive) feedback literature is that feedbacks will occur, whereby choosing policy alternatives 
becomes more costly over time, making it increasingly difficult to choose alternatives (Pierson 1993). 
Therefore, a recent line of scholarship has highlighted the role of negative feedback, and even 
suggested that negative feedback may have greater influence on policymaking than positive feedback 
(Patashnik and Zelizer 2009, 2013; Weaver 2010).  
Secondly, while scholars have succeeded in providing empirical instances of feedback mechanisms 
(Pierson 2007), there had been little progress in translating this into a comprehensive research agenda 
determining when feedback mechanisms are expected to occur (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013: 1075). 
Scholars had sought to explain how these feedbacks occurred, but less attention was paid to if they 
occur or the conditions under which they may or may not. Oberlander and Weaver (2015) describe 
both positive (self-reinforcing) and negative (self-undermining) feedback mechanisms; along with the 
conditions that would amplify the occurrence of negative feedback mechanisms. Consequently, we 
draw on these categories in developing our framework.   
5.4. Policy Mix Feedback in Sustainability Transitions: Towards a conceptual framework  
In this section, we develop a novel conceptual framework for analysing the co-evolution of policy 
mixes and socio-technical systems in processes of sustainability transitions (Figure 2). More 
precisely, as transitions unfold through co-evolutionary dynamics of system components, our 
framework focusses on the co-evolution of the policy mix, as part of the institutional structure of the 
system, with the other system components including technologies, user dynamics, and business 
strategies (Foxon 2011).  
The key idea of our co-evolutionary framework is that policy mixes have resource, interpretative and 
institutional effects on the evolution of the socio-technical system, and that in turn, developments in 
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the socio-technical system influence the policy mix through a range of feedback mechanisms11 
(Figure 2). These include socio-political, administrative and fiscal feedback mechanisms. 
However, rather than influencing the policy mix directly these feedback mechanisms rather influence 
the ‘policy subsystem’. Such a policy subsystem can be conceptualised as the relationships between 
actors responsible for policy decisions and ‘pressure participants’ (Jordan et al. 2004), which include 
interest groups with which decision makers consult (Cairney and Heikkila 2014). Thereby, actors play 
a central role in the framework as the agents of change in both the policy subsystem and in the socio-
technical system.  
When considering the influence that actors have on the policy process, the implicit assumption in the 
transitions literature involves a power struggle between niche actors and dominant incumbents. We 
infer from existing literature that the political influence of actor coalitions is related to their ability to 
mobilize resources (Hess 2014; Markard et al. 2015), where resources can be considered “persons, 
assets, materials or capital, including human, mental, monetary, artefactual and natural resources” 
(Avelino and Rotmans 2009: 551). Accordingly, policy processes are characterised through resource 
interdependencies in which bureaucrats seek information and advice from different interest groups, 
who exchange information for access to and potential influence within government (Cairney and 
Heikkila 2014).  
 
11 As explained in section 3, we distinguish between the forward and backward dimension of policy feedback. 
We consider the forward dimension as the policy effects of the mix on socio-technical change. We use 
‘feedback mechanisms’ and ‘feedbacks’ interchangeably throughout the remainder of the paper to capture the 
backward dimension of policy feedback. Feedback loops capture both the forward and backward dimension of 
policy feedback, which are explained in section 4.4. 
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Figure 2 - Dynamic interactions of the policy mix and the rest of the socio-technical system 
In the following subsections, we develop the conceptual framework in more detail. While we describe 
each component in turn, these processes often occur simultaneously, where policies create multiple 
policy effects, and the forms of feedback that occur often influence each other. Consequently, section 
4.4 elaborates potential interactions between the various processes covered by the framework.    
 
5.4.1. Effects of Policy Mixes on Socio-Technical System   
The policy mix, with its strategies and various instruments, stimulates change in the socio-technical 
system through resource, interpretative and institutional effects. These policy effects are determined 
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by choices (intentional or otherwise) regarding design features of individual instruments (such as their 
level of support), and characteristics of the policy mix (such as its consistency or credibility).  
5.4.1.1. Resource Effects  
Resource effects are the result of the resources that the policy mix bestows upon target groups 
(Pierson 1993; Patashnik and Zelizer 2009). These resources can influence the rate and direction of 
transitions. For example, policy mixes can support knowledge creation of low-carbon technologies 
through R&D (Hekkert et al. 2007), facilitate their demonstration and procurement (Jacobson and 
Bergek 2011), or create favourable market conditions for the diffusion of sustainable solutions (Smith 
and Raven 2012). Providing resources can therefore influence the activities and strategies of actors in 
ways that stimulate changes of the socio-technical system towards sustainability (Foxon 2011). The 
magnitude and target actors of resource effects are determined by the design features of individual 
instruments (e.g. level and duration of support) and interactions with other instruments in the mix 
(Kemp 1997; del Rio González 2010; Rogge and Reichardt 2016). 
Sustainability transitions are complex, multi-faceted processes with multiple actors and often involve 
supporting both complementary and competing technologies (Geels 2004). Consequently, policy 
mixes aiming to foster transitions produce multiple resources effects, stimulating hard to predict 
interactions in the socio-technical system and unintended consequences. This increases as layering of 
policy mix elements accumulates and as policy instruments act in a changing social, technical and 
economic context (Jacobs and Weaver 2015). A policy mix may simultaneously support both niche 
and regime actors, or policy makers may seek to reduce resource flows to unsustainable regime 
practices which typically affects incumbents (Kivimaa and Kern 2016). Consequently, how resources 
are allocated will not only influence the rate and direction of socio-technical change, but will also 
incentivise actors to mobilise and support or oppose the policy mix to protect or secure resources.  
5.4.1.2. Interpretive Effects  
The policy mix also produces interpretive effects, providing information and changing patterns of 
cognition, understanding and meaning (Pierson 1993), thereby creating or changing visions and 
expectations of actors (Jacobson and Bergek, 2011; Smith and Raven 2012).  This is important in 
sustainability transitions as actors’ perceptions can influence investment decisions and innovative 
activities (Hekkert et al. 2007; Jacobson and Bergek 2011), including: engaging in green R&D 
(Hekkert et al. 2007), the formation of learning networks (Mourik and Raven 2006) and advocacy 
coalitions to lobby for resources for more sustainable alternatives (Bergek et al. 2008).   
If actors perceive apparent ‘failings’ in the design of either individual policy mix elements (strategies 
and instruments) or the mix as a whole, it can influence stakeholders’ opinions of the capabilities of 
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the public sector actors charged with design and implementation of the mix, and/or can be seen as 
indications of limited political will to achieve policy objectives. For example, a policy strategy to 
promote sustainable innovation may establish expectations about future resource effects beneficial to 
niche actors, as it provides guidance and a mandate for the design of individual instruments, as well as 
the composition of the instrument mix. Yet, if actors perceive instruments as providing insufficient 
resources to achieve policy objectives, this inconsistency may negatively influence the cognitions of 
actors regarding the strength of the political will behind the stated policy objectives (Reichardt et al. 
2016).   
In such instances, policy makers may wish to appear to support an area of development for political 
benefit (such as electoral payoffs), while being reluctant to devote sufficient resources due to split 
incentives, close networks between incumbents and state actors or budget constraints (Patashnik and 
Zelizer 2009). Consequently, the credibility of the policy mix, i.e. the extent to which it is considered 
believable and reliable (Rogge and Reichardt 2016), will influence the perceptions of actors and may 
have direct effects on their investment decisions (Rogge and Schleich 2018).  
 
5.4.1.3.Institutional Effects  
The institutional structure of the socio-technical system includes laws, rules, and regulations. 
Accordingly, policy mix change can be considered as part of institutional change. However, the mix 
will also interact with the wider institutional structure it is situated in, which can influence its effects 
on socio-technical change, and may limit its capacity to achieve policy objectives. Policy mix change 
may instigate reconfigurations of these wider aspects of the institutional structure through institutional 
effects. This may include expanding state capacities to design, implement, and evaluate policies, and 
to enforce compliance, in order to make the policy mix operational (Patashnik and Zelizer 2009). This 
may for example include the capabilities of local authorities to implement national level policy 
objectives, which may affect their relative success (ibid). An example of such institutional effects 
would be establishing an autonomous agency capable of launching policy initiatives (ibid). 
Similarly, institutional effects can reconfigure aspects of the institutional structure that may otherwise 
support the regime. These may include replacing the established unsustainable rules embodied in 
institutions (e.g. legislations), and changing participation in policy networks to involve outsiders 
(niche actors) in addition to insiders (incumbents) (Kivimaa and Kern 2016). Policy mixes for 
sustainability transitions will face the ongoing challenge of maintaining political support if they 
threaten or impose losses on powerful groups, providing them with motivation for political opposition 
to protect their interests (Patashnik and Zelizer 2013). Thus, to support a niche as it scales up requires 
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reforming the institutional structure to protect it, both from processes within the niche that could 
otherwise de-stabilise it, and against external destabilising processes originating from resistance 
within the unsustainable regime (Mourik and Raven 2006). For example, bureaucracies and other 
public bodies may develop operating procedures that favour certain sources of evidence and some 
participants over others (Béland 2010). Failing to reform these arrangements may allow established 
relationships with regime actors to influence policy decisions, which may negatively influence the 
rate and direction of transitions.   
After having conceptualised how the policy mix has effects on the socio-technical system, the next 
subsection will discuss how changes in the socio-technical system, in turn, create feedbacks to the 
policy subsystem. 
5.4.2. Feedback Mechanisms  
Feedback mechanisms contribute to a reconfiguration of the policy mix over time through socio-
political, fiscal and administrative feedbacks. These feedback mechanisms are considered to influence 
policymaking through different groups of actors active in the policy subsystem. These actors 
influence the support for the policy mix, which may contribute towards policy mix change. Positive 
feedbacks can help explain how new policy strategies can become stable and self-reinforcing. 
Negative feedbacks help explain why opposition against new policy strategies and instruments can 
result in a loss of political support for policy mix elements. This may result in a reduction or 
withdrawal of public resources for sustainable alternatives, consequently reducing momentum of 
transition.  
 
5.4.2.1.Socio-Political Feedback Mechanisms 
Socio-political feedbacks concern whether public and stakeholder support for a policy mix, or certain 
components of it, is reinforced or undermined over time. Such socio-political feedback can involve 
three dimensions: cognitive, constituency and agenda feedbacks.  
Cognitive feedbacks contribute to cognitions regarding the effectiveness and/or efficiency of a policy 
mix or specific components thereof. For example, the mix may be perceived to be successful or 
disastrous in achieving policy objectives (Oberlander and Weaver 2015). As such, soft institutions 
including culture and societal views can contribute to this form of feedback. Cognitive feedbacks can 
involve mass publics, especially if the policy mix is widely perceived as providing benefits or 
imposing losses relative to the status quo (Jacobs and Weaver 2015). Public opinion can be 
particularly significant in the context of sustainability transitions if policy mixes impose concentrated 
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losses on the public. This could occur, for example, through highly visible effects such as wind farms 
altering landscapes and triggering local opposition (Wolsink 2007). Another example may be the 
policy mix imposing highly visible financial costs, e.g. though surcharges on electricity bills for 
supporting renewable energy (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016). 
Constituency feedbacks relate to whether changes of the policy mix predominantly lead to the 
mobilization of supporters or opponents of the change (Oberlander and Weaver, 2015 p.43). For 
example, the financial support provided for renewable energy technologies in Germany through the 
FiT over time led to an increasingly powerful coalition of green groups, renewables manufacturing 
firms, local energy cooperatives and installers who benefited from the policy. The political 
mobilisation of this coalition protected the policy against powerful opponents such as the utilities 
(Jacobsson and Lauber 2004). In general, sustainability transitions face significant political 
challenges, as they typically require a reform of sectors long dominated by incumbent firms, typically 
with close relationships with state actors (Kern and Howlett 2009). Consequently, more radical policy 
and wider institutional reforms are often politically contested by dominant coalitions, commonly 
consisting of incumbents who often lobby against major policy changes or try to actively undermine 
them during implementation (Markard et al. 2015; Stenzel and Frenzel 2008). However, there are 
instances where such incumbents are not homogenous in their beliefs and actions. Markard et al. 
(2015) show that in the Swiss energy transition several of the incumbent energy firms were supportive 
of policy reforms, suggesting that if firms see transitions as opportunities rather than as threats they 
are more likely to be supportive. Even if incumbents mobilize opposition against reforms, if powerful 
countervailing coalitions organise the reforms can be protected (Hess 2014; Lauber and Jacobsson 
2016).  
 
Agenda feedbacks cover whether satisfaction with, or objection to, the policy mix leads to the 
consideration of incremental changes to existing policy mix elements or more dramatic reforms 
(Oberlander and Weaver 2015). Therefore, this form of feedback influences the stability of policy mix 
elements. How readily replaceable a certain element of the policy mix (such as a specific instrument) 
is considered, will influence its prospects for maintenance, revision or termination (Jordan and Matt 
2014). For example, if there are no obvious alternatives, opposing groups will struggle to make the 
case for reform or redesign (ibid). In a policy mix, if certain instruments are considered replaceable 
and ineffective, modification or replacement with a new type of instrument may occur more readily.  
Similarly, if alternative options for achieving broader objectives (such as mitigating climate change) 
are seen as more effective or efficient, then radical changes to the mix may occur, including severe 
reductions in ambition or funding, or even termination of the policy strategy and its supporting 
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instruments. For example, if demand reduction is advocated as more cost effective for achieving 
carbon abatement than replacement of existing generation capacity with sustainable alternatives, then 
instruments supporting sustainable generation technologies may lose political support.   
 
5.4.2.2.Fiscal Feedback Mechanisms 
“Fiscal feedbacks capture whether a [policy mix] creates budgetary strains that are likely to raise 
concerns among powerful actors, notably Treasury or Finance Ministers” (Oberlander and Weaver 
2015: 43).  In most political systems, the finance ministry is a powerful organisation with the ability 
to control resource flows. It can exert substantial influence on the policy process, potentially 
weakening the autonomy of groups otherwise dominating the policy subsystem (ibid).  
A rapidly growing demand on the general budget (for example, if the earmarked funding stream 
becomes insufficient due to unexpected cost trends) and/or an ongoing funding crisis, will likely lead 
to strong concerns among budget guardians (Oberlander and Weaver 2015: 42). In addition, over time 
as exogenous conditions (e.g. macro-level socio, economic and political trends) change, the priorities 
of the finance ministry may shift, and/or the perceived costs of supporting the policy mix may change 
accordingly. This is a significant risk for sustainability transitions, which are long-term processes. 
Therefore, if the policy mix can generate tax revenues or produce benefits which align with other 
ambitions such as economic growth or industrial development, it is more likely to attract or maintain 
support of the finance ministry who may prioritise these considerations over sustainability.  
 
5.4.2.3.Administrative Feedback Mechanisms 
Administrative feedbacks relate to the public bodies in charge of policy design and implementation 
(Oberlander and Weaver 2015: 42). Administrative feedback can lead to strengthening or weakening 
of internal morale, sense of mission, external reputation, external political support, and the ability to 
recruit qualified staff (ibid). Positive feedback can occur when policy objectives are clear and 
achievable, allowing public bodies to avoid highly visible failures and maintain a reputation for 
competence (ibid). Negative feedbacks can occur if highly visible failures are blamed on the 
administrative bodies, which potentially damages reputation, internal morale and external support.  
Consequently, administrative feedback may contribute to resultant policy mix changes such as the 
expansion or reduction of resources and capacities to design and implement policy (Pierson 1993; 
Béland 2010). For example, thinly staffed public bodies might lack the capabilities to perform the 
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ambitious task of policy learning, reflexivity and adjusting policies to changing conditions (Borras 
2011). This may require the outsourcing of tasks and may reduce the autonomy of the public body. 
Alternately, a department with high reputation may assimilate a low reputation department, thereby 
broadening its mandate and taking on new responsibilities. Conversely, a department with low 
capacities may receive increased support in order to design and implement policies more effectively, 
if political support for the policy mix objectives is strong.  
 
5.4.3. Exogenous Conditions  
The interplay between policy effects and feedback mechanisms occurs through changes within the 
socio-technical system. However, few policy changes occur purely through endogenous feedback 
mechanisms (Oberlander and Weaver 2015), but instead are often also influenced by exogenous 
changes beyond the socio-technical system (ibid; Rosenow 2013). In the transitions literature, 
exogenous conditions (e.g. macro-economic trends, demographic changes, catastrophic events) are 
conceptualised as the landscape, where landscape developments may be putting pressure on the 
regime (Geels 2002). We build upon this notion, while also considering learning and innovation 
outside the boundaries of the socio-technical system as exogenous conditions. Such exogenous 
conditions can influence the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical change in a number of 
ways:  
First, exogenous conditions can influence the rate and direction of change in the socio-technical 
system. Economic trends and innovation from outside the system can influence investment and 
market development, while the entry of new actors from other geographical settings may cause a 
change in networks or the legitimacy of certain technologies. Exogenous conditions may also 
influence the incentives of actors to participate in political action. Policy mix elements that originally 
generated positive feedbacks, may find that under different circumstances such as sudden, unexpected 
changes in market conditions, start to generate negative feedbacks (Patashnik and Zelizer 2009). For 
example, in Germany, international competition from the Chinese PV industry weakened domestic 
support coalitions when German PV manufacturers went bankrupt and domestic PV manufacturing 
jobs were lost (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016).  This undermined the case for supporting the roll-out of 
(Chinese manufactured) PV modules for actors interested in creating industrial benefits in Germany 
(ibid; Quitzow 2015b). 
Second, exogenous conditions may amplify or constrain the influence that feedback mechanisms have 
on policy change. Feedback mechanisms are more likely to contribute to policy change when coupled 
with focusing events that bring attention to policy problems (Jacobs and Weaver 2015; May and 
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Jochim 2013). For instance, negative feedback mechanisms are rarely a sufficient cause for policy 
mix change, often requiring other conditions or events to push policy makers to seek alternatives 
(Oberlander and Weaver 2015). For example, a difficult fiscal climate may bring or increase attention 
to the relative costs of supporting a policy mix, and strengthen the case for cutting resources. Learning 
and innovation outside the boundaries of the socio-technical system can also affect feedback 
mechanisms. For example, learning from policy experiments elsewhere may instigate consideration of 
modifications to the policy mix (Jacobs and Weaver 2015). In some instances, policy mix elements 
may remain unchanged simply because there are no obvious or known alternatives towards addressing 
the problem. Therefore, learning from outside the system boundaries may allow proponents of change 
to suggest policy or technological alternatives, thereby contributing to agenda feedbacks.  
Third, exogenous conditions can also directly influence the policy subsystem, by changing which 
actors are represented or have influence over the policymaking process. Electoral cycles, changes in 
government or changes in responsibilities or mandates within government, can change which actors 
are active in the policy subsystem. This may alter the influence of certain feedback mechanisms on 
policy change, if proponents/opponents of the policy mix resonate more closely with the ambitions or 
ideologies of the new or changed government. Interest groups and coalitions may ultimately only be 
successful in influencing policy change when sympathetic politicians gain power (Oberlander and 
Weaver 2015). Electoral cycles may also change government’s preferences regarding the style of 
policymaking, with potential repercussions for the policy mix (Patashinik and Zelizer 2009). 
However, reforms are more resistant to changes in government if there is a strong domestic lobby 
supporting the policy strategy and corresponding instrument mix. For example, in Germany the 
Conservative-Social Democrat coalition continued to support the existing instruments in place for 
supporting renewables after coming to power, even at a time when the subsidies were contested 
because of contributing to rises in electricity prices, because of the existence of a strong domestic 
lobby (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016; Geels et al. 2016). 
Finally, international governance (UN, EU) may place pressure on national policymakers to 
implement policy reforms. One example is the pressure of the World Bank for all countries to phase 
out fossil fuel subsidies by 2025 (Hafeneth 2017). Another example concerns the threat of 
reputational losses through not living up to international expectations, such as in the case of 
Germany’s pending failure to meet its 2020 target for reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% 
(Podewils 2018).   
Considering these factors, the timing of policy implementation relative to exogenous conditions will 
influence the effects of the policy mix on the socio-technical system and the feedback mechanisms 
that occur (Pierson 2000; Oberlander and Weaver 2015). Poor timing can imply that conflicting 
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objectives in other policy areas mean the policy mix is politically contested from the outset, or that 
changing exogenous conditions may shift priorities and reduce support for policy mix objectives 
(Patashnik and Zeilizer 2009). 
5.4.4. Dynamic Interactions of Policy Effects and Feedback Mechanisms  
Having explained the conceptual components of the framework individually, we now turn to 
explaining possible interaction dynamics and feedback loops. In our elaboration of how the processes 
described above can interact dynamically over time we focus on explaining key interactions, 
notwithstanding that many more are conceivable.   
Policy effects on socio-technical change can lead to positive and negative feedback mechanisms, 
which may strengthen or weaken support for the policy mix. Positive feedbacks, which maintain or 
strengthen support, are likely to lead to steady resource flows in favour of transitions which makes 
successive positive feedbacks more likely (positive feedback loop). Conversely, negative feedbacks 
may limit the capacity of the policy mix to become stable, and can reduce support and resources for 
the transition. Over time, reduced resources may result in successive negative feedback occurring 
(negative feedback loop) leading to the policy mix being revised or terminated. Therefore, the co-
evolution of policy mix change and socio-technical change over time can lead to virtuous or vicious 
cycles12.  
In the following subsections, we describe some conditions under which both positive (virtuous) and 
negative (vicious) feedback loops may occur. For the sake of concision, we abbreviate the key 
processes as: resource [RE], interpretive [IntE] and institutional [InstE]; socio-political [SPF], fiscal 
[FF] and administrative [AF] feedbacks; and exogenous conditions [ExC]. 
5.4.4.1.Virtuous cycles of positive feedback loops 
Positive feedback mechanisms are most commonly generated when a policy mix provides resources 
that are visible and traceable to government action [RE] (Arnold 1990), incentivising supporting 
constituencies to protect these resources [SPF]. Similarly, if public resources are used to create 
beneficiaries in the wider public [RE] (Campbell 2012), certain instruments may gain political support 
through formation of electoral coalitions or influencing mass cognitions in favour of support for the 
policy mix [SPF]. Reinforcing mechanisms may be most prominent where policy mixes encourage 
investment over long timeframes [RE], creating vested interests in supporting policy maintenance 
 
12 Such cycles can however be interrupted, for example through changing exogenous conditions. 
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[SPF] (Arrow 2000). This also generates positive expectations, signalling political commitment from 
government, and indicating stable investment conditions, thereby reducing investor risks [IntE].  
Under these conditions, as the new configuration of the socio-technical system matures and niche 
actors gain market shares, these actors can form increasingly powerful coalitions and networks that 
challenge the ideas presented by regime actors who may become less influential in lobbying to retain 
the status quo [SPF]. Secondly, as supply chains are being established and upscaling of production 
occurs, this can lead to a growing market, improvements in technological performance and cost 
reductions. This strengthens the arguments put forward in support of the policy mix, which may 
change perceptions regarding costs of supporting the policy mix [SPF], which may also alleviate the 
concerns of finance ministers [FF] and improve the reputation of the policy makers responsible for 
designing the mix [AF]. This may enable expansion of state capacities in favour of the transition 
[InstE] and the maintenance or expansion of resources [RE]. As a transition matures, the wider 
diffusion of more sustainable technologies or practices can lead to widespread visible benefits, such as 
improved air quality, which has the potential to produce increasing levels of public support [SPF], 
which further sustains the policy mix and reinforces the new direction of travel of the socio-technical 
system.  
5.4.4.2. Vicious cycles of negative feedback loops 
If policy instruments are poorly designed, are overly complex, and/or are not well aligned with other 
instruments in the mix, they are expected to be limited in their transformative potential (Kivimaa and 
Kern 2016) and their ability to generate positive feedbacks. A policy mix may be poorly designed if it 
does not provide sufficient resources [RE] or fails to sufficiently support niche technologies through 
protection and empowerment [RE & IntE & InstE].  Similarly, if resources are widely dispersed and 
‘hidden’ from beneficiaries [RE & IntE], this renders the mix ineffective in mobilising support [SPF] 
(Patashnik and Zeilizer 2009). In such cases, the policy mix will not stimulate sufficient change 
within the socio-technical system to mobilise supporting constituencies or achieve its objectives 
[SPF], which can ultimately undermine political support.  
Negative feedback mechanisms have been found to be most prevalent where layering of policy mix 
elements leads to complexity and inconsistency (Jacobs and Weaver 2015), and elements seek to 
address multiple objectives, particularly when their success depends on the support of the general 
public (Skogstad 2016). If the mix creates concentrated losses (or the expectation of concentrated 
losses) for powerful actors [RE], it will provide incentives for them to oppose the mix. However, if 
the policy mix fails to reform the institutional structures that support the existing regime [RE & 
InstE], or does not phase out support for unsustainable technologies or practises [RE], it is expected to 
facilitate regime actors in maintaining their influential position to oppose the mix through negative 
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feedback [SPF]. Finally, if the amount of support (resources) reduces over time [RE], this can be 
interpreted as an indication of the direction of travel [IntE], and the level of political will towards 
meeting sustainability objectives (Rogge and Dütschke 2017). This is most prominent if multiple 
conflicting changes occur (in rapid succession) leading to uncertainty and perceptions of instability 
[IntE].  
Under such conditions, the pace of transitions may be slow, as the policy mix does not enable green 
niche actors to grow and gain political influence in order to lobby for resources or to protect the 
sustainability objectives from opposition [SPF]. In such instances, it is expected that the existing and 
well-established networks between incumbents and policymakers ensure the stability of the regime 
through negative feedbacks [SPF]. Such negative feedbacks may lead to a reduction in political will 
supporting sustainability transitions and may result in reduced resources and revisions or terminations 
of policy mix elements. This could become even more likely if changes in exogenous conditions such 
as an economic recession or a shift in political ideologies [ExC] further undermine sustainability 
objectives.   
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5.5. An Empirical Illustration of Policy Mix Feedbacks in Sustainability Transitions: the 
UK zero carbon homes policy mix 
 
In this section, we briefly illustrate dynamics of the framework by drawing on the empirical example 
of the zero carbon homes (ZCH) policy mix in the UK. The ZCH target was announced in 2006 and 
entailed the ambition that by 2016 all new domestic homes in the UK should be zero carbon. This 
case provides a relevant illustration showcasing the utility of the proposed framework for several 
reasons. First, the ZCH target was intentionally designed as a policy mix with several policy 
instruments to meet the target. Second, the target was conceived to be very ambitious when 
introduced. Finally, the case provides a rich illustration of an instance where an ambitious policy mix 
failed to generate self-reinforcing positive feedbacks, leading to its abandonment in 2016.  
 
 
5.5.1. Methodology  
The illustration draws on an analysis of policy documents, industry journals, secondary literature, 
government consultations, select committee publications, inquiries, and debates in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords over the period 2006-2016 (Table 1). Based on these, we established a 
chronology of events, mapping the elements of the policy mix and their changes over time (Figure 3). 
We identified the relevant policy mix following the top down approach outlined by Ossenbrink et al. 
(this issue), considering the target and the instruments implemented towards achieving it. 
Our illustrative case spans the period between September 2006 when the target was first announced, 
to May 2016 when the target was officially abandoned. For this period, we interpreted the changes in 
the policy mix through the different conceptual components of the analytical framework proposed in 
the previous section, which enables us to illustrate some of the interaction dynamics between policy 
effects and feedbacks in this case. We limit the illustration to the national policy level and focus on 
the co-evolution of the policy mix with the UK house building socio-technical system.  
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Type of data source  Quantity   
Policy documents – Government response to 
consultations, publications (white papers), 
speeches, impact assessments   
137 
Zero carbon hub publications  148 
Industry journals  603 - featuring most prominently ENDS report 
and Building magazine  
Secondary literature  25 academic papers  
Inquiries  71 written responses in Treasury inquiry  
99 written responses in ‘Home energy efficiency 
and demand reduction’ inquiry, Energy and 
Climate Change Committee  
Debates in the House of Commons and House 
of Lords over the period of 2006-2016  
260 spoken references  
22 written statements 
Most occurrences resulting from search terms 
‘Zero Carbon Homes’ and ‘Code for Sustainable 
Homes’  
  
Letters (to government ministers) 3  
Media  427 - Guardian, Telegraph, Financial Times , 
Independent 
Table 6 - Types of data source and quantity 
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Figure 3 - Policy Mix for Zero Carbon Homes
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5.5.2. Overview of illustrative case 
The zero carbon homes target sought to promote a radical paradigm shift in the UK house building 
socio-technical system by mainstreaming green building methods and techniques (Greenwood 2012). 
It was adopted for a variety of reasons, including pressure from the EU as well as domestic 
considerations around meeting carbon targets, and formed a component of the UK Low Carbon 
Transition Plan (HM Government 2009).  
The target was designed to work primarily through two main instruments, a voluntary instrument 
known as the Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH)13, and planned updates to the Building Regulations, 
which became progressively more stringent leading to zero carbon requirements in 2016. An 
exemption from stamp duty (economic instrument) was also announced in 2007 for all houses built to 
zero carbon standards before 2012.  
After its announcement, the ZCH target underwent several significant redefinitions, as described in 
detail by Greenwood (2012, 2015), Heffernan et al. (2015) and Schweber et al. (2015). Also, despite 
being formalised in 2007, a definition of the technical specifications required to meet the target was 
not finalised until 2015. In parallel to the ZCH target, the government also aimed to build three 
million new homes by 2020 in order to tackle a housing crisis. At the time, this second policy target 
was seen to be complimentary with the ZCH target14.  
 
5.5.3. Dynamics of Policy Effects and Feedbacks: Examples from the UK zero 
carbon homes policy mix  
Throughout the evolution of the ZCH target, a number of policy effects and feedback mechanisms can 
help explain the revisions and eventual denouncement of the target. For our illustrative purposes, we 
use empirical examples to highlight some of the dynamics that played a role in these processes. First, 
we highlight a positive feedback loop occurring after the initial announcement leading to innovation 
and resource allocation and the expansion of capacities to design and implement policy. Secondly, we 
describe a series of negative feedback loops which led to the eventual denouncement of the target. In 
the following, we will use our analytical framework to highlight a number of important interactions 
 
13 The Code for Sustainable Homes (DCLG, 2008) is the most prominent voluntary sustainability label for 
housing in England (Heffernan et al., 2015). The code was developed by BRE, a private company formally 
known as the Building Research Establishment (Greenwood 2012), and managed under the direction of the 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The Code is a holistic sustainability rating tool in 
which homes are rated against indicators in nine categories. Homes can be awarded a star rating between levels 
1 and 6, with 6 being the most sustainable (Heffernan et al., 2015). 
14 The combined objectives were intended to deliver 1 million zero carbon homes between 2016-2020. 
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and use the same abbreviations introduced above for the different processes stipulated in the 
framework: resource [RE], interpretive [IntE], and institutional [InstE] effects; positive (+) or 
negative (-) socio-political [SPF], fiscal [FF] and administrative [AF] feedbacks; and exogenous 
conditions [ExC].   
 
5.5.3.1.Virtuous cycles: An empirical example 
The target was first announced in 2006 and was accompanied by a voluntary standard for sustainable 
homes, planned updates to energy efficiency building regulations, and financial support through a tax 
exemption and public procurement. This created positive expectations of a potential market for low 
carbon housing technologies [IntE] and signalled political commitment to improving the efficiency of 
new buildings, leading to considerable growth of the green housing niche15.  
In the mainstream building sector, there was little understanding of the methods required to 
significantly cut emissions among developers (ENDS Report 2006), who were unwilling to move 
away from traditional methods (Osmani and O’Reilly 2009; Gibbs and O’Neill 2015). However, the 
expectation of potential resources being channelled into this area seems to have provided a strong 
enough market signal to stimulate innovative activity among incumbent actors [IntE]. Several of the 
major housebuilders were founding members of the UK Green Building Council (UK-GBC), a 
membership organisation which networks actors and provides information about sustainability in the 
built environment (Seager 2007). Of these housebuilders, Barratt Homes was the first firm to 
prototype a demonstration of a zero carbon home16, and developed the first large scale housing 
scheme built to zero carbon standards17.  
When announced, despite signalling political commitment from government, the original definition of 
the zero carbon homes target was a very general one, raising several questions which became the 
subject of significant debate across the building industry [IntE] (Greenwood 2012). UK-GBC  
produced a report (2008) showing that the original 100% on-site energy generation requirement for 
ZCH was unachievable on 80% of sites in the UK. This suggested the original targets were 
overambitious, and brought attention to limited capabilities of government to design and implement 
effective policy [-AF]. However, due to the support from the building sector and political 
 
15 For example, the EcoBuild exhibition has grown from under 1,000 to almost 60,000 visitors and 1,200 
exhibitors in 5 years. 
16 The Barratt Green House, which was showcased among other similar projects in the BRE’s Innovation Park.  
17 Barratt started development on a site of 186 houses at Hannam Hall in 2008. The efficiency standards of the 
site were amended in line with the redefinitions of zero carbon throughout its development. Construction 
finished in December 2015.  
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commitment from government towards the agenda [+SPF], positive agenda feedbacks resulted in 
incremental fixes to the strategy.  
Acknowledging the concerns, the government commissioned the Callcutt review. Part of the 
recommendations made to government resulting from the review, was to establish a new platform to 
work towards an achievable target and implementation plan for the industry [+SPF]. In response, the 
Zero Carbon Hub was established [RE & InstE], a public private-partnership to act as a steering group 
towards achieving the target (Schweber et al. 2015). The target was redefined providing clearer 
guidance for industry on how to meet the target [IntE]. The Hub acted as a coordinator of various 
actors within the industry and produced research highlighting challenges and skill shortages the 
industry faced in the run up to 2016.  
Overall, we argue these developments to be an example of a beginning virtuous cycle. A strong, long 
term policy target is established and accompanied by a range of instruments to meet the target. This 
leads to a positive response from the target group (the mainstream building sector) in terms of 
investments in pilot projects and knowledge development, and when questions about the definition of 
the target were raised, a public private partnership was set up to help industry to clarify and meet the 
target. However, as we will see in the next section these initially positive developments were soon 
overshadowed by other dynamics. 
5.5.3.2.Vicious cycles: An empirical example     
In 2010, the Labour government was succeeded by a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, which 
introduced austerity policies in response to the financial crisis [ExC]. Related to the recession, there 
was also a shortage of supply of new housing in the UK which pushed up housing prices. This was 
highly visible in the general public and media [-SPF] and became a key priority for government. A 
deregulation agenda was pursued by the coalition Government as an attempt to increase the volume of 
new build in the UK, and the ZCH target was simply seen as another regulation impeding increased 
supply in this context [-SPF].  
As reflected in the 2010 spending review, the perceived relative cost of supporting the zero carbon 
homes agenda had clearly increased in the treasury [-FF], ultimately leading to a reduction of 
resources [RE]. The grant funding of the Zero Carbon Hub was reduced in 2010, and subsequently cut 
altogether in 201118 [RE]. In the 2011 budget, the target was redefined for a second time, reducing the 
overall amount of carbon abatement required. Implementation of the 2013 increase of energy 
efficiency requirements in the building regulations was delayed by a year and then only reflected a 
 
18 Funding was subsequently awarded from government for specific projects, while majority funding was 
provided by the National House Building Council (NHBC).  
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6% increase on the 2010 regulations19. Collectively these changes were largely considered by industry 
to be a weakening of government commitment towards the target [IntE], which seems to have slowed 
down socio-technical change. In the words of Jo Wheeler20: “The watering down of the definition of 
zero-carbon, coupled with the uncertainty surrounding standards for Part L [building regulations] 
2013 and 2016 has inevitably resulted in a decline in innovation” (ENDS Report 2013). 
The decline in innovation in the sector due to an uncertain political climate made the achievement of 
the targets less and less likely in the run up to 2016. The delayed and reduced 2013 building 
regulation requirements subsequently meant a larger increase in energy efficiency was needed in a 
shorter period in order to meet the target. Opposing constituencies, consisting of some of the more 
conservative actors in the mainstream building sector, put forward the argument that the cost of 
meeting the target would further reduce the volume of new build [-SPF], which seems to have 
resonated with the ambitions of the treasury to increase the supply of houses. Shortly after the 2015 
election, where Conservatives gained an absolute majority [ExC], the target was disbanded. The 
denouncement came directly from the treasury, who justified the decision by stating that costs of 
meeting the target were a tax on development 21.  
After the denouncement of the target, the UK-GBC organised over 246 senior leaders from industry 
actors and interest groups to write an open letter to the Chancellor [+SPF] (UK-GBC 2015). The letter 
warned that the abandonment of the ZCH target had “undermined industry confidence in 
Government” and will “curtail investment in British innovation and manufacturing” [IntE]. 
Importantly, of the 246 signatories on this letter (UK-GBC 2015b), none of the 25 top volume 
housebuilders over 2007-2010 or the top 20 in 2016 (Building 2016) appeared on this list. It also 
excluded major housebuilders who had been founding members of the UK-GBC, such as Barrat and 
Crest Nicolson. We suggest this indicates that the beliefs of these actors had changed over time [IntE] 
and they withdrew their support for the agenda, fragmenting the supporting coalition [-SPF]. Without 
the continued support of these politically influential actors, the opposing constituencies were 
successful in lobbying government to abandon the target [-SPF].   
Overall, we argue these developments to be an example of a vicious cycle. A change in government, a 
change of government priorities, and a reduction of resources together led to a decline in innovative 
activity in the sector and a delay of key policy changes, as well as a fracturing of the coalition 
supporting the target, ultimately leaving the policy mix in a vulnerable position.  
 
19 This was less than the lowest scenario (an 8% increase) considered in consultations. 
20 Senior policy advisor at the UK Green Building Council (UK-GBC).  
21 In the inquiry of the treasury, the additional average cost of meeting the target incurred per dwelling was 
estimated as £3,500. This equates to 1.6% of the average cost of a UK house in 2016, which was £216,750. 
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5.6. Conclusions  
Understanding the role of policy processes in influencing the rate and direction of sustainability 
transitions remains a fundamental challenge in the existing literature. In particular, the processes 
influencing the development of policy mixes rather than single policy instruments, remain under 
conceptualised and underexplored. In this paper, we therefore proposed a novel conceptual framework 
for analysing the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical systems. The core of the 
framework consists of policy effects influencing socio-technical change, and resulting feedback 
mechanisms influencing the subsequent development of the policy mix. We consider the framework 
to be applicable to a wide range of sustainability transitions, such as in energy, mobility or agriculture. 
We illustrated the interaction dynamics conceptualised in the framework using the zero carbon homes 
policy mix in the UK.  This example initially displayed characteristics of a virtuous cycle, which 
became disrupted (partly by exogenous factors), and turned into a vicious cycle, leading to the 
eventual abandonment of the policy target. The illustration demonstrated that the proposed framework 
enables new insights on the co-evolution of developments in the policy subsystem and the UK 
building socio-technical system, helping to explain which processes contributed to this failed attempt 
of promoting a low carbon transition. 
The illustration also helps identify limitations of the proposed framework. Most notable is the current 
conceptualisation of fiscal feedback adopted from the policy feedback literature. In the illustration, the 
treasury’s priorities shifted towards increasing the volume of new build and considered the 
sustainability transition to impede upon this ambition, leading to opposition to the target from the 
treasury. This suggests that finance ministries may oppose a transition if it is seen to be conflicting 
with other ambitions such as economic growth, irrespective of whether the costs of supporting the mix 
are borne directly by the finance ministry itself. Similarly, quicker than expected uptake of solar PV 
in Germany led to concerns about the costs of supporting the technology, resulting in a reduction of 
resources (Lauber and Jacobsson 2016). The same process played out in the UK less than a year after 
a FiT was introduced (Smith et al 2014). In these cases the costs of supporting renewable energy was 
borne by the electricity bill payer, rather than the finance ministry. Therefore, we suggest further work 
may need to extend the scope of fiscal feedback mechanisms to account for these processes.  
Additionally, further conceptual and empirical studies should deepen insights linking policy mix 
characteristics (such as credibility, comprehensiveness, consistency and coherence) to the kinds of 
expected policy effects and feedback mechanisms, and how changes of characteristics over time (e.g. 
its credibility decreasing) influence these dynamics. Finally, more attention should be paid towards 
the vertical dimensions of policy mix design (Howlett et al 2017), including implementation of 
national level policies at the local scale. This could help develop the framework further, in particular, 
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how policy mix elements spanning multiple levels of government can be integrated to reduce 
conflicts. These considerations may help further conceptualise how policy effects interact with the 
socio-technical system, and the kinds of resultant feedback expected to occur.  
We argue that the proposed framework may help generate important insights for policy makers 
seeking to support sustainability transitions. It directs attention towards designing policy mixes 
capable of generating positive feedback, thereby strengthening political support over time. Without 
generating political support, contestation and potential conflicts with other policy objectives can result 
in a weakening, dismantling or removal of policy mixes for sustainability transitions (or constituent 
elements thereof). Consequently, we suggest that maintaining political support through creating 
incentives for participation from supporting groups and constituencies, is fundamental to maintaining 
momentum in sustainability transition processes.  
It is sometimes argued in the sustainability transitions literature that powerful regime actors need to 
support the newly emerging socio-technical system for the transition to ‘break through’ (Rotmans and 
Loorbach 2010). Therefore as seen through the lens of our framework, the argument would be that 
policy mix design should not only create incentives for emerging niche actors but also for powerful 
actors to support the transition (Raven et al 2006; Kemp and Rotmans 2007; Markard et al 2015). In 
doing so, positive feedbacks can be strengthened while simultaneously reducing negative feedback if 
powerful actors, who would otherwise oppose the transition, have reason to support it.  
However, others have argued that policy mixes need to support creative destruction processes by 
putting incumbents under pressure (Kivimaa and Kern 2016). In this vein and seen through the lens of 
our framework, positive feedbacks can be strengthened if the policy mix phases out resources for the 
incumbent regime configuration, or breaks up the institutional structures through targeted instruments. 
While such reforms will likely face opposition from the regime, they may be necessary as the 
transition matures to weaken the influence of powerful actors who are unwilling to change and would 
otherwise seek to undermine it. However, the timing of these interventions is relative to the phase of 
the transition (Rotmans and Loorbach 2010: 131). If the policy mix attempts to displace the regime 
before alternative socio-technical configurations have matured and established sufficiently strong 
coalitions in their favour, the regime may mount significant opposition leading to backlash, which can 
reverse the direction of travel (ibid).  
Building on these ideas, we suggest that the timing (Patashnik and Zelizer 2009) and sequencing 
(Meckling et al. 2017) of policies should be relative to the phase of the transition. In the formative 
phase the mix should focus on the promotion of positive feedbacks while aiming to reduce negative 
feedback until the new socio-technical configuration becomes stable enough to withstand resistance 
from the regime. Over time, the policy mix can begin phasing out support for the old configuration, 
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while providing incentives for incumbents who are willing to innovate and adapt to the new 
sustainable configuration. Beyond the reallocation of resources, this also requires the reconfiguration 
of supporting institutional structures to break the lock-in of the incumbent regime. Failing to reform 
institutions will likely dampen the ability of the new socio-technical configuration to become 
stabilised, and will facilitate continued resistance from the regime. These considerations illustrate how 
policy mix design for sustainability transitions is fraught with political difficulties, but the proposed 
framework may help analysts and policymakers to ‘think through’ the political logic of different 
potential policy effect and feedback mechanism interactions, and can thereby help inform their 
strategies for policy formulation and implementation. 
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Abstract  
 
Understanding how policy and policy-making processes can influence the speed and direction of 
socio-technical change is an important, yet underexplored research agenda in the field of 
sustainability transitions. This paper applies a novel analytical framework which conceptualises the 
co-evolutionary dynamics of policy mixes and socio-technical systems, by complementing the 
sustainability transitions and policy mix literatures with insights from policy feedback theory. Our 
paper is an in-depth empirical case study which represents the first application of this analytical 
framework. It scrutinises the proposed claims about how policy effects and feedback mechanisms 
influence the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical systems. Empirically, we focus on the 
zero carbon homes policy mix in the UK which sought to promote radical change in the UK house 
building system. Our paper makes three contributions. First, it makes an empirical contribution by 
analysing an example of an ambitious policy strategy in the housing sector while much sustainability 
transitions research focuses on the energy sector. Our analysis shows how various policy effects and 
feedback mechanisms led to a loss of political support for the target, eventually leading to its 
abandonment, and only limited change within the socio-technical system. Second, our paper produces 
novel insights about the effects of policy mix credibility on socio-technical change, and the 
underlying feedback mechanisms which influence its formation and loss. Finally, based on our 
empirical analysis we propose conceptual refinements to the co-evolutionary framework and suggest 
avenues for future research explaining the dynamics of feedbacks between policy mixes and socio-
technical systems.  
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6.1. Introduction  
 
Understanding the role of policy, policymaking and politics in shaping sustainability transitions is a 
fundamental challenge. Policy is widely considered as an integral aspect of transitions (Drews & van 
den Bergh, 2016; Markard, Suter, et al., 2016), and arguably can be used to accelerate the rate of 
change (Kern & Rogge, 2016). Neo-classically derived policy recommendations typically involve 
internalising environmental externalities to address the corresponding market failure in the under-
provision of environmental protection, but transition scholars have identified a number of structural 
and transformational system failures which also require policy intervention (Weber & Rohracher, 
2012; Wieczorek & Hekkert, 2012). Policy suggestions, amongst others, include creating protective 
spaces for novel sustainability innovations (Raven, Kern, Verhees, & Smith, 2016; Smith & Raven, 
2012), creating new networks to accelerate learning and technological development (Geels et al. 
2016), and establishing shared long term visions and expectations (Kemp et al., 2007; Rotmans & 
Loorbach, 2010).  
Beyond the type of policy instruments (e.g. regulation, market-based instruments) and their specific 
design, the process of policymaking itself has been argued to be of relevance as well (Markard et al. 
2012, Rogge and Reichardt 2016). Policymaking refers to the process through which policies are 
designed, implemented, adapted and discontinued (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). Transition scholars 
argue that policymaking needs to be iterative and reflexive, in order to adapt to the changing 
conditions of the socio-technical system as a transition unfolds (Voß and Kemp 2015). To better 
understand policymaking processes, transition scholars have started to draw on prominent policy 
process theories (for a review see Kern & Rogge 2017). Other studies link policymaking to socio-
technical change more directly, where the two elements co-evolve over time (Hoppmann et al., 2014; 
Lauber & Jacobsson, 2016b). Despite some conceptual advances on the interactions of technological 
change, politics and policy processes (Edmondson et al. 2018; Meckling et al. 2017), these dynamics 
remain empirically understudied in the transitions literature (T. S. Schmidt & Sewerin, 2017).   
Sustainability transitions are, by nature, inherently political (Meadowcroft 2009, 2011), and often 
contested by powerful actors who typically have vested interests in maintaining the status quo (Kern 
& Howlett 2009; Avelino & Rotmans 2009). Most states have close relationships with powerful 
incumbents, which contributes to lock-in of existing socio-technical configurations (e.g. see Unruh 
2000 on carbon lock-in). For instance, some policy instruments which could radically change the 
socio-technical system, such as implementing a stringent carbon tax which would impose significant 
losses on powerful actors, are generally considered politically unfeasible (Drews & van den Bergh, 
2016).  
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To compound these challenges, the speed at which sustainability transitions need to occur, and the 
scale and complexity of the required changes are unprecedented. Consequently, single ‘silver bullet’ 
policy instruments cannot address the interrelated multiple market and system failures (Foxon et al., 
2005; Weber & Rohracher, 2012), and many governments try to tackle these complex challenges with 
a variety of policy initiatives (e.g. see Kern et al. 2017 on energy efficiency). Several publications 
have contributed to this growing research strand focussing on policy mixes for sustainability 
transitions, such as transitions to sustainable energy systems (for a review see Rogge et al. 2017).  
Of these contributions, Rogge & Reichardt (2016) propose a framework for analysing policy mixes 
for sustainability transitions which extends the scope of analysis from individual policies (and their 
interactions) to that of an overarching policy mix which captures policy strategies and instrument 
mixes, as well as policymaking and implementation processes associated with policy mix elements 
(Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). They also argue that the impact of policy mixes on socio-technical 
change may be better understood through considering policy mix characteristics such as consistency, 
coherence, comprehensiveness and credibility (Costantini et al 2017, Rogge and Schleich 2018). 
Empirical evidence on policy mix credibility (which captures the extent to which the policy mix is 
considered believable and reliable), suggests a link with other policy mix characteristics, such as the 
overall consistency of the policy mix (Rogge & Dütschke, 2018). If shortcomings in a policy mix are 
unaddressed by policymakers this may indicate a lack of political commitment or inadequate 
capabilities of government to design an effective policy mix.   
We follow the call of Flanagan et al. (2011) to pay increased attention to the policy processes, as well 
as to their coherence, i.e. to the synergistic and systematic nature of the policy processes which 
underpin the evolution of the policy mix (Rogge & Reichardt (2016). Several recent contributions in 
the transitions literature have explored the role of politics and policy processes, but importantly, have 
only focussed on single policy instruments. Moreover, there are few co-evolutionary analyses of 
policy change and socio-technical change. Hoppmann et al. (2014) is a notable example, but their 
conceptualisation of the policymaking processes is underdeveloped, and follows a single policy 
instrument and technology. This paper addresses these shortcomings in the literature by drawing on 
the conceptual framework proposed by Edmondson et al (2018), which builds on insights from policy 
feedback theory (Pierson 1993, 2000; Beland 2010; Campbell 2012) in order to understand the co-
evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical change. Policy feedback theory has been argued as a 
promising approach for such co-evolutionary analysis (Kern & Rogge, 2017; Roberts et al., 2018), 
because of its focus on the effects of policy design and implementation on subsequent rounds of 
policy making.  
Empirically, we chose the UK zero carbon homes policy mix, an ambitious strategy intending to 
phase-out unsustainable practices and technologies while mainstreaming sustainability in the domestic 
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built environment. We follow the mix’s co-evolution with the low carbon house-building sector in the 
UK from 2006 (when the target was announced) until 2016 (when the target was disbanded). The mix 
initially stimulated change and showed signs of positive feedbacks, but over time started to produce 
negative feedbacks, resulting in its abandonment. Accordingly, it is an interesting case since the 
policy feedback literature would predict that initial positive feedback leads to a self-reinforcing 
dynamic. 
Thereby, we make three contributions to the literature. First, we provide the first empirical application 
of a novel conceptual framework on policy mix feedbacks in sustainability transitions. Second, we 
generate novel insights about the role of policy mix credibility in stimulating socio-technical change, 
and subsequently, maintaining political support. Third, we propose refinements to the conceptual 
framework for studying policy mix feedbacks in sustainability transitions. The analysis seeks to 
answer two research questions: i) how policy effects and feedback mechanisms influenced the co-
evolution of the zero carbon homes policy mix and the socio-technical system, and ii) why the zero 
carbon homes target got abandoned. In doing so, we derive policy recommendations for governing 
transition processes.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the analytical framework, 
section 3 outlines the methodology, and section 4 introduces the research case. We present the 
findings of our case study in section 5 and discuss these in section 6. Section 7 offers conclusions and 
avenues for future research.  
 
6.2. Policy mix feedback in socio-technical systems: a co-evolutionary framework  
 
In this section we give an overview of the conceptual framework proposed by Edmondson et al. 
(2018) (see figure 1). At its core the framework captures the co-evolution of policy mix change and 
socio-technical change. It proposes that policy mix change influences the rate and direction of socio-
technical change through policy effects, while socio-technical change can affect subsequent 
policymaking through feedback mechanisms. That is, this co-evolutionary framework elaborates how 
policy outputs, i.e. elements of the policy mix, can influence policy outcomes, i.e. socio-technical 
change, namely through the effects the mix has on the socio-technical system. It also explains how 
policy inputs can affect policy-making processes through the influence feedback mechanisms and 
exogenous conditions have on the policy subsystem, thereby explaining changes in the policy mix. 
Importantly, the framework emphasises the role of actors as the agents of change: actors are 
influenced by policy effects, and seek to influence policymaking through feedback mechanisms.  
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The socio-technical system is a main component of the framework and captures the “linkages between 
elements necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004: 900), consisting of multi-faceted 
combination of actors, networks, policies, institutions, artefacts, infrastructure, markets and practices 
along with cultural and symbolic views and representations (Frank W. Geels, 2004). The existing 
configuration in the socio-technical system consists of social groups (supply chain, users, research, 
production, public authorities and societal groups), physical artefacts (technology, infrastructure) and 
institutions (formal and informal) (F. Geels, 2005). The existing policy mix is therefore part of the 
socio-technical system. Supporting sustainability innovations can help foster the emergence of novel 
socio-technical configurations. As these emerging configurations scale up, they may change the 
structural components of the dominant configuration. Such socio-technical change [STC] can occur 
through several possible transition pathways involving adaption and replacement of structural 
components (Frank W. Geels et al., 2016; Frank W. Geels & Schot, 2007).  
Another key component is the policy subsystem which captures the groups of actors involved in the 
policymaking process (government departments, elected ministers, consultants, experts and ‘pressure 
participants’ such as lobbyists). Policy subsystem change [PSC] relates to substituting actors involved 
in the policy process or their respective roles, and/or the views and opinions of the actors involved. 
We expand on Edmondson et al. (2018), by considering the policy mix as the codified outcomes of 
negotiations of actors who are active in the policy subsystem. The mix’s elements are therefore the 
output of the process of policy mix change [PMC] (Fig.1). The mix’s elements consist of an overall 
strategy addressing a policy problem (an objective and principle plans towards achieving it) and the 
policy instruments implemented towards achieving the policy objective. Importantly, we consider the 
process through which elements are (attempted to be) added/removed/revised (not simply the final 
outcome in terms of changes to the policy mix elements) as policy mix change [PMC]. Accordingly, 
proposed changes may have effects on the socio-technical system even if they are not adopted.   
The framework captures the influence of the policy mix on the socio-technical system through policy 
effects which influence actor behaviour, thereby leading to a reconfiguration of the socio-technical 
system. Policy effects change as the policy mix does, but even when the policy mix is stable (no 
change) it will continue to have effects. There are three policy effects: resource, interpretive and 
institutional effects22. Resource effects [RE] describe the allocation of resources that affect interest 
groups, state capacities and mass publics (Mettler & Soss 2004: 60). The influence of resource effects 
on socio-technical change depends on several variables, including the amount and duration of 
resources provided (Patashnik & Zelizer 2009, 2013), and how dispersed, visible and traceable to 
government action the resources are (Campbell, 2012). Interpretive effects [IntE] describe the 
 
22 While considered separately for analytical purposes, a single policy change commonly produces multiple 
effects simultaneously. 
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information a policy mix provides, affecting patterns of cognition, understanding and meaning 
(Mettler & Soss 2004: 60). Information can be provided through both the codified outputs of 
policymaking (e.g. instruments), but also through the processes by which the policy mix changes 
(including implementation). Institutional effects [InstE] describe the interaction of the mix with the 
wider institutional structure of the socio-technical system (E. M. Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013). Failure 
to reform existing constraining institutional arrangements may limit the mix’s transformative capacity 
and its ability to generate positive feedback (E. Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009). For instance, existing 
rules and arrangements may structure how policy instruments are implemented, enforced or evaluated. 
Institutional effects thus include, for example, reforming such rules, creating new agencies or 
expanding formal networks which may be necessary to successfully implement the mix23.  
 
Figure 4 - Dynamic interactions of the policy mix and the rest of the socio-technical system. Source: 
Edmondson et al. (2018). 
 
23 These may require further revision as the policy mix and socio-technical system change over time. 
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The framework differentiates between three main types of feedbacks: socio-political, fiscal and 
administrative feedback mechanisms (Oberlander & Weaver, 2015). Socio-political feedback [SPF] 
comprises of three dimensions: cognitive, constituency and agenda. Cognitive feedback relates to how 
well the mix (or its elements) are perceived to be performing by actors in the policy subsystem. 
Constituency feedback relates primarily to whether the mix mobilises supporters or opponents. 
Agenda feedback is whether policy alternatives are considered by actors in the policy subsystem. 
Fiscal feedback [FF] relates to whether the costs of supporting the policy mix over time raise concern 
to powerful actors, notably the finance ministry. Finally, administrative feedback [AF] relates to the 
public bodies in charge of policy design and implementation, and can lead to strengthening or 
weakening of internal morale, sense of mission, external reputation, external political support, and the 
ability to recruit qualified staff (Oberlander and Weaver, 2015).   
The framework also captures how a socio-technical system is also affected by exogenous conditions 
[ExC], including social, political and economic trends, along with innovation and policy learning 
from outside the system. Exogenous conditions can affect the system in four main ways. First is the 
direct effects on socio-technical change, such as economic trends affecting market conditions. Second, 
they can amplify or constrain the influence of feedback mechanisms on policy change. For example, 
feedback mechanisms are more likely to contribute to policy change when coupled with focusing 
events that bring attention to policy problems (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015; May & Jochim, 2013). Third, 
exogenous conditions can affect the policy subsystem directly. For instance, a general election will 
replace ministers from the previous government. This may affect the influence that feedback 
mechanisms have on the policy process, if supporters/opponents resonate more closely with the 
ambitions or ideology of the new government. Finally, international agreements such as the COP21 
Paris Agreement or EU 2030 targets can place pressure on national policymakers to implement policy 
reforms. The timing of policy change in relation to changing conditions exogenous to the system can 
significantly affect the impact of a policy mix, and its prospects of maintaining political support over 
time (Oberlander & Weaver, 2015; E. Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009; Pierson, 2000). For example, 
changes in political and economic conditions may render the mix more susceptible to negative 
feedback, while adverse conditions at the time of implementation may generate opposition from the 
outset. 
The framework’s conceptual elements interact dynamically over time, and can result in the occurrence 
of feedback loops. Positive feedbacks, which maintain or strengthens support, are likely to lead to 
steady resource flows in favour of transitions which makes successive positive feedbacks more likely 
(virtuous cycle). Conversely, negative feedbacks may limit the capacity of the policy mix to become 
stable, and can reduce support and resources for the transition. Over time, reduced resources may 
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result in successive negative feedback occurring (vicious cycles) leading to the policy mix being 
revised or terminated.  
6.3. Methodology  
 
For answering our research questions on how policy effects and feedback mechanisms influenced the 
co-evolution of the zero carbon homes policy mix and the socio-technical system, and the reasons for 
its eventual denouncement, we chose a qualitative research design, conducting a case study which 
allows for tracing of the phenomena over time (Yin, 2014). Process tracing has been used by case 
study researchers “either to uncover evidence of causal mechanisms at work or to explain outcomes” 
(George and Bennet 2005:9). Process tracing therefore allows for the development and testing of 
theory focussing attention on processes, and the causal mechanisms linking causes to effects  (Beach, 
2017; George & Bennett, 2005; Tansey, 2007).This is well suited to our focus on co-evolutionary 
dynamics of the zero carbon homes policy mix and the UK house building socio-technical system.  
We drew on two main sources of evidence. First, we collected archival data for the period 2006-2016 
(Table 1).  This included newspapers, industry journals, white papers, green papers, consultations, 
statements, written and oral references in the House of Commons and House of Lords, select 
committee inquiries, and a Treasury enquiry. Based on a freedom of information request we also 
received access for all minutes, agendas and supplementary documents from all meetings of the Zero 
Carbon Task Force (TF1-115 Appendix A). Based on these data, important events were arranged 
chronologically (see supplementary material), including changes in the socio-technical system and the 
policy mix. For the former, we looked for quantitative and qualitative information on demonstration 
projects, annual built rates, research and development activities, activities of key market actors and 
industry development. For the latter, we included changes in the policy strategy and the instrument 
mix. For the resulting timeline of events (see supplementary material) we also created a simplified 
visualisation (see fig 4 in section 3).  
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Table 7 - Type, Source and Quantity of Archival Data. 
 
We then conducted interviews with 18 experts (see table 2) who were selected based on their 
knowledge of and involvement in relevant processes, while also seeking a balance between different 
actor groups (policy-makers, NGOs, industry, academic, experts). Interviews were based on a semi-
structured questionnaire, were conducted face-to-face and over telephone in the period from August 
until October 2018, and lasted on average 79 minutes. They were supported by the timeline 
visualisation which enabled us to validate this event timeline with experts, and look for additional 
information.  
 
Type of archival data  Data Source Quantity   
Policy documents – 
Government responses to 
consultations, publications 
(white papers), speeches, 
impact assessments   
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.u
k/20120919183345/http://www.commun
ities.gov.uk/  
https://www.gov.uk/  
137 
2016 Task Force - meeting 
minutes, agendas, supporting 
documents/reports 
Freedom of information request to 
Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) 
115 (See Appendix A) 
Zero carbon hub publications  http://www.zerocarbonhub.org/recent-
publications  
148 
Industry journals  https://www.endsreport.com/  
https://www.building.co.uk/  
https://www.cibsejournal.com/   
https://www.architectsjournal.co.uk/  
603 articles - reviewed for 
relevancy and reduced to 112   
Secondary literature  https://www.scopus.com  25 academic papers  
Inquiries  https://www.parliament.uk  71 written responses in 
Treasury inquiry  
99 written responses in ‘Home 
energy efficiency and demand 
reduction’ inquiry, Energy and 
Climate Change Committee  
Documents reviewed using 
search terms “zero carbon 
homes” and “allowable 
solutions”. 
Debates in the House of 
Commons and House of Lords 
over the period of 2006-2016  
https://hansard.parliament.uk/  260 spoken references  
22 written statements 
Occurrences resulting from 
search terms ‘Zero Carbon 
Homes’ and ‘Code for 
Sustainable Homes’  
Letters (to government 
ministers) 
Various 3  
Media  https://www.theguardian.com/uk  
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/  
https://www.ft.com/?edition=uk  
https://www.independent.co.uk/  
427 occurrences - reviewed for 
relevance using search terms 
“zero carbon homes”, “eco-
towns” and “code for 
sustainable homes”. Reduced 
to 67. 
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Table 8 - Actor type and group of interview participants. 
 
We followed a ‘framework analysis’ methodology for analysis of collated data (Ritchie & Spencer, 
1994). Interviews were transcribed verbatim and then indexed using NVivo11 to deductively code for 
four phases with nodes derived from our framework. We also coded ‘other’ as sub-nodes of both 
policy effects and feedback mechanisms, to account for any phenomena not captured by the 
framework24. We ran multiple queries to investigate the relationships between elements of the 
framework, using matrix-coding queries to look for overlaps. In doing so, we examined whether the 
 
24 However, since the research was designed to look for evidence of the main a priori conceptual components, 
most data was expected to fit the framework (Ritchie & Spencer, 1994). 
Interviewee Actor type Actor group  Format Date Duration 
(minutes) 
1 UK-Green Building 
Council 
NGO Face to face 31/08/2017 90 
2 World Wildlife Fund/Task 
force/ UK-Green Building 
Council/Zero Carbon hub 
NGO Telephone 17/08/2017 50 
3 NGO/advocacy group NGO Telephone 23/09/2017 90 
4 Manufacturing – advocacy 
group  
Industry/ 
Manufacturing
/NGO  
Face to face 3/10/2017 90 
5 Manufacturing – advocacy 
group  
Industry/ 
Manufacturing
/NGO  
Telephone 18/09/2017 105 
6 Manufacturing/ Zero 
Carbon Hub 
Industry – 
manufacturing  
Telephone 2/10/2017 90 
7 House builder/Zero Carbon 
Hub/ National House 
Building Council 
Industry  Face to face 12/10/2017 90 
8 Developer Industry - 
developer 
Face to face 4/10/2017 90 
9 House Builders Federation Industry - 
developer  
Telephone 1/12/2017 45 
10 Chartered Institutions of 
Building Service Engineers     
Expert/ 
industry 
Telephone 17/11/2017 90 
11 Consultant/Zero Carbon 
Hub  
Industry/ 
Expert  
Telephone 24/10/2017 90 
12 Consultant/Zero Carbon 
Hub  
Industry/ 
Expert  
Face to face 11/09/2017 90 
13 Expert/ academic  Expert Telephone 5/09/2017 90 
14 Academic  Expert Face to face 26/10/2017 60 
15 Civil servant/Carbon Trust   Policy maker/ 
Expert 
Face to face 7/09/2017 90 
16 Minister/Department of 
Communities and Local 
Government 
Policy maker Face to face 17/10/2017 50 
17 Office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister/ Local Area 
Building Control  
Policy maker  Face to face 14/09/2017 90 
18 Building Research 
Establishment/Housing 
association  
Policy maker/ 
Industry  
Face to face 13/10/2017 60 
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interviewees agree with each other and whether there were significant differences in responses, e.g. 
between interviewees from different actor types. We triangulated our interviews with our archival 
data to ensure the robustness of our findings. Collectively these sources allowed for a rich analysis of 
co-evolutionary mechanisms. 
 
6.4. Research case  
 
For the first application of the co-evolutionary framework on policy mixes for sustainability 
transitions we chose the UK zero carbon homes strategy which was intentionally designed as a policy 
mix, including a number of interacting instruments. This is a highly illuminating case because it offers 
an example of a failed transition attempt based on an ambitious policy target which included the 
phase-out of dominant technologies and practices. As such, the application of the framework can help 
us understand why transitions may lose support and to derive recommendations for more successful 
policy mixes. In the following, we provide an introduction to the UK housebuilding socio-technical 
system and the zero carbon homes policy mix as a background to the case study. 
6.4.1.  UK House-building socio technical system  
 
Demand for new housing in the UK is around 280,000 new homes a year (roughly 1% of total housing 
stock), due to net migration and a trend towards smaller properties (Kay 2017). Current build rates do 
not match this demand, as in 2016 only 190,310 new houses were built (ONS 2017a). Low supply has 
created a ‘housing crisis’, with housing prices increasing 74.4% since 2006, despite the recession 
(fig.3). Build rates have declined since 1970 by 46.7%, largely due to a drop in the provision of social 
housing through local authorities in the UK by 99% (DCLG 2017). Consequently, the housebuilding 
industry is dominated by private developers, whose market share has increased from 48.0% in 1970 to 
81.1% in 2016 (fig. 2). To address the highly politicised issue of housing supply, at the time of 
launching the zero carbon homes policy mix, government also announced an ambition to build 3 
million homes by 2020, of which 1 million would be zero carbon. 
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The private sector housebuilding industry accounts for around 20% of the whole construction sector 
in the UK (Statista 2018). Market actors comprise of a relatively small number of high volume house-
builders, and a larger number of low volume builders. The Home Builders Federation (HBF) is a trade 
association representing large private sector house-builders and its members deliver around 80% of 
new homes, while the Federation of Master Builders (FMB) is a trade body representing SMEs. In 
2007, the top 25 house-builders accounted for around 49.5% of completed projects, while the top 5 
accounted for 32.6% (Building 2008).  
6.4.2.  Zero Carbon Homes policy mix 
  
The zero carbon homes target was designed as a net-zero approach to housing, aiming for all new 
housing post 2016 to contribute zero emissions for their operation. This overall strategy would be 
achieved through a combination of energy efficiency improvements to reduce energy use for heating, 
cooking and appliances, and complemented by small-scale renewables to offset any remaining 
emissions. The target was ambitious, accounting for unregulated energy emissions25, which exceeded 
 
25 Post occupancy emissions associated with appliances. 
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European and international standards.  After the target’s announcement in 2006, a number of different 
policy instruments were implemented towards achieving the overall strategy, comprising of 
regulations and funding schemes. We used a top down perspective to identify instruments 
(Ossenbrink, Finnsson, Bening, & Hoffmann, 2018), and categorised them according to classifications 
proposed by Borras and Edquist (Table 3). “Generally speaking, there are three large categories of 
instruments used in public policy: (1) regulatory instruments, (2) economic and financial instruments, 
and (3) soft instruments” (Borras and Edquist 2013:11). The main implementation of the target was 
through the national building regulations, which were pre-existing prior to the implementation of the 
mix but were updated.  
 
 
26 While the building regulations did not start in 2006, they were updated at the start of our analysis and became 
aligned with the overall strategy. For the purposes of this analysis, they can be considered as part of the policy 
mix at that point.  
Table 9 - Zero Carbon Homes policy mix. 
Policy mix 
element 
Name Element 
Function 
Started  Redefined/modified  
 
Terminated   
Strategy  Zero 
Carbon 
Homes 
target  
Target  2006 - 2007 (treasury) 
- 2008 (consultation) 
- 2010 (standard for 2010 building 
regulations decided 
- 2011(removal of unregulated energy 
use)  
- 2013 (marginal increase in the 2013 
building regulations) 
- 2014 (small sites exemption and 
removal of requirements for micro-
renewables) 
- 2015 
(denounced) 
- 2016 
(officially 
disbanded) 
Instrument  
Mix 
Building 
regulations 
- Part L 
(energy)  
Regulatory  1985 -2006 (aligned with target)26 
-2010 (implemented as planned) 
-2013 (postponed to 2014 and only 
marginal increase) 
- 2016 (Part L was not implemented) 
N/A 
Zero carbon 
task force  
Soft 
instrument 
2006 2010 (terms changed and housing 
minister stopped attending meetings) 
2014 (final 
meeting) 
Code for 
sustainable 
homes  
Soft 
instrument  
2007 - 2010 (modified to align with the 
new definition of the target) 
- 2014 (plans to terminate) 
N/A  
Still active  
Tax stamp 
duty 
exemption  
Economic and 
Financial 
(market pull)  
2007 N/A 2011(ended - as 
planned) 
Eco-Towns  Economic and 
Financial 
(supply push) 
2007 2009 (commitment to 4 towns) 
2010 (only 1 town would be built to 
original standards) 
2011 ( no 
further sites 
awarded)  
Carbon 
challenge  
Economic and 
Financial 
(supply push) 
2007 2008 (additional sites added) 
2010 (funding reductions) 
2012 (no 
additional sites 
awarded) 
AIMC4 Economic and 
Financial 
(R&D) 
2008 N/A 2011(ended - as 
planned) 
Zero carbon 
hub  
Fiscal (grant 
funding) 
2008 2010 (funding withdrawn apart for 
specific projects) 
2016 
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6.5. Co-evolutionary analysis of the zero carbon homes policy mix and the house-building 
socio-technical system in the UK (2006-2016) 
 
The following subsections present our co-evolutionary analysis, structured into four phases between 
2006-2016 (for an overview, see fig 4 and table 4). Each phase starts with a period of significant 
changes to the policy mix, and is analysed according to a) the policy effects produced and their 
influence on socio-technical change, and b) the feedback generated and its influence on the policy mix 
change. We also pay attention to interactions of the socio-technical system and policy mix with 
exogenous conditions. 27 
 
6.5.1.  Phase 1: Initiation of the zero carbon homes policy mix (2006-2008) 
 
The zero carbon homes target announced in 2006 was implemented through increments to the national 
building regulations occurring in 2010, 2013 and 2016 [PMC]. A voluntary regulation for holistic 
building sustainability was also introduced in 2007, the Code for Sustainable Homes (CSH). CSH was 
a rating system with levels ranging from 0-6, where the energy requirements of the highest level (6) 
were aligned with the zero carbon target (interviews 15,18). CSH was intended to provide clarity and 
indicate the trajectory of future building regulations, allowing market actors to experiment with new 
designs based on these standards (DCLG 2006b).  
Resources in this phase were limited [RE], but several announcements were made of potential 
funding opportunities [PMC->IntE]. Most notably was the announcement of five ‘eco-towns’, large 
scale developments of 5,000-20,000 houses to be built to zero-carbon standards on publically 
commissioned land (ENDS 2007). Eco-towns were intended to accelerate housing delivery and serve 
as large-scale demonstration projects for zero carbon housing. Shortly after the ambition was 
increased to 10 eco-towns [PMC->IntE] (potentially 200,000 new homes). The sites proposed were 
previously undeveloped (green-field), and would be fast-tracked through the planning system. As the 
availability of land has significant impact on costs, and planning permission on ‘green-field’ sites is 
typically difficult to attain, this was an attractive offer to developers.  
 
27  We use abbreviations to refer to the conceptual components of the framework: Policy mix change [PMC], 
Resource effect [RE], Interpretive effect [IntE], Institutional effect [InstE], Socio-technical change 
[STC], Socio-political feedback [SPF], Fiscal feedback [FF], Administrative feedback [AF], Exogenous 
conditions [ExC], Policy subsystem change [PSC]. 
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           Figure 7 - Timeline of key developments in the socio-technical system in the period 2006-2016 
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Phase Policy mix change  Policy effects  Exogenous 
conditions  
Socio-technical system change Policy subsystem change  Feedback Mechanisms 
1. 
2006-
2008 
• Introduction of target  
• Launch of  Code of 
Sustainable Homes  
• Eco-towns 
• Carbon challenge (Eco-
villages) announced and 
Hanham Hall site 
awarded 
•Exemption from Stamp 
Duty Land Tax (SDLT), 
which included a different 
definition of target   
• Foundation of the task 
force  
•Callcutt review on 
housing delivery 
commissioned 
•Resource effects 
- limited in this phase  
- Carbon Challenge  
- SDLT exemption  for new zero-
carbon homes  
•Interpretive effects 
- expectation of future resources 
- strong indication of political 
commitment  
- lack of clarity (target and eco-towns) 
- concerns over cost 
•Institutional effects 
- establishment of new platforms for 
policymaking(Task Force) 
- Regulatory enforcement unreformed   
•High 
political 
attention to 
climate 
change  
•All party 
consensus 
on Climate 
Change Act 
2008 
•Initial support from some major 
house-builders 
•Foundation of UKGBC 
•KingSpan Light house, and Barratt 
Green House built on the BRE 
innovation park 
• Growth in property market 
•Labour Government  
•Yvette Cooper (HM DCLG28 2006-
2007) 
•Ruth Kelly, John Denham(SS 
DCLG29 2007-2008)  
•Gordon Brown (Chancellor – 
Treasury 2006-2007; 2007 – Prime 
Minster) 
- Support from treasury 
•Task force  
- Micro renewables industry not 
represented in task force  
 
•Support from several major 
house-builders and HBF 
chairman Stewart Baseley 
[+SPF] 
•Incremental changes to 
policy mix suggested [+SPF] 
•Suggestion to establish 
delivery body though Callcutt 
review [-AF, +SPF] 
•Support from manufacturing 
sector and micro renewables 
industry (REA) [+SPF] 
- REA less influential as 
excluded from task force [-
SPF] 
• Public opposition to eco-
towns  [-SPF] 
2.  
2008-
2010 
•Establishment of Zero 
Carbon Hub 
•HCA established  
•Target redefined through 
consultation  
•Reduced ambition of 
eco-towns  
•AIMC4 
•Carbon Challenge – 3 
additional sites 
 
 
•Resource effects 
- increased in this phase  
- ZC hub 
- AMIC4 
-Carbon Challenge 
•Interpretive effects 
- strong indication of political 
commitment despite recession 
- increased concerns over costs 
amplified by recession  
•Institutional effects 
- establishment of new platforms for 
policymaking(changes through HCA, 
ZC Hub) 
- Regulatory enforcement unreformed   
•Recession  • Increased uptake of the code 
drives innovation in new materials 
leading to widespread adoption 
(e.g. certified timber). 
• Work starts on Hanham hall in 
2009, but is delayed (due to 
recession). 
• Hanham hall design originally 
uses a CHP system and district 
heating 
• Hub operating as autonomous 
research institution 
•Labour Government  
- John Denham (SS DCLG) 
- Caroline Flint (HM DCLG 2008-
2009) 
- Margret Beckett (HM DCLG 2009)  
- John Healy (HM DCLG 2009-2010) 
•Task Force  
•ZC Hub 
- research role on delivering target 
through 5 works streams  
- influential in redefining the target 
- hub’s recommendations for FEES 
incorporated into 2010 building 
regulations 
 
•Increasing opposition from 
builders due to the recession 
[-SPF]  
•Redefinition of target after 
feasibility questioned [+SPF]  
•Political opposition to eco-
towns from Conservative 
Party [-SPF] 
3.  
2010-
2013 
• 2010 building 
regulations (contested)  
•Eco-towns abandoned 
•Cuts/removal of hub 
funding  
•Resource effects  
- significant cuts to resources through 
scale back of eco-towns, removal of 
grant funding for the Hub, scale back of 
carbon challenge 
•Election 
leads to new 
government  
• Political 
ideology 
•Barratt start construction on the 
main site at Hanham Hall 2011  
• AIMC4 finished 2011 
• PV becomes the principle way of 
achieving ‘carbon compliance’  
•Coalition Government: 
Conservative Party (CP) 
- Treasury dominates subsystem 
(Chancellor George Osbourne) 
- Eric Pickles (SS DCLG) 
•House-builders start pushing 
back harder which seems to 
resonate with new (CP) 
government [-SPF] 
 
28 HM DCLG - Housing minister, Department of Communities and Local Government  
29 SS DCLG - Secretary  of state, Department of Communities and Local Government 
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•HCA budget cut by 60% 
•Target reduced (un-
regulated energy 
removed) 
•2013 building 
regulations delayed  
- small amount of research funding 
tendered to ZC Hub 
•Interpretive effects 
- signals a reprioritisation of 
government towards volume of supply 
- delays to 2013 building regulations 
means target less feasible 
•Institutional effects 
- task force changes terms under new 
government  
- ZC Hub loses autonomy with funding 
cut 
- Regulatory enforcement unreformed  
- ZC Hub’s recommendations to change 
regulations to ‘as-built’ performance 
ignored by DCLG 
shift, 
austerity 
and 
deregulation 
• Rapidly 
declining 
costs of 
solar PV 
• Less 
political 
attention to 
climate 
change  
• Political 
resistance to 
‘green crap’ 
• Limited evidence of 2010 
building regulations in new builds 
• Manufacturers up-scale 
production lines anticipating the 
increase in building regulations  
- Grant Shapps (HM DCLG 2010-
2012) 
- Mark Prisk (HM DCLG 2012-2013) 
- Kris Hopkins (HM DCLG 2013) 
- Bandon Lewis (HM) 
Liberal-democrats (LD) ministers  
- Andrew Stunnell (2010 - 2012) 
- Don Foster (2012- 2013)  
- Stephen Williams (2013) 
• Task Force  
- no engagement from housing 
minister (CP) 
- engagement from LD ministers but 
low political influence   
• ZC Hub 
- research role hampered through 
reduced resources  
- recommendations for 2013 
regulations ignored by government  
 
•Barratt construct test units, 
projected costs generates 
opposition from stakeholders      
[-SPF] 
• Treasury reduced autonomy 
of DCLG and enforced 
austerity reducing resources 
in response to recession [-FF] 
•Lib Dem ministers 
supportive of target but not as 
powerful [+SPF] 
•Poor reputation of DCLG 
due to changes made during 
this phase [-AF] 
 
4. 
2014-
2016 
•Delay to 2013 building 
regulations  
•Consultation on removal 
of CSH 
•Small sites exemption  
•Denouncement of target  
•Amendment from the 
Lords to reinstate target 
defeated by a margin of 
four votes  
•Target officially 
abandoned - Housing and 
Planning Bill 
•Resource effects  
- no additional funding allocated 
- small amount of research funding for 
allowable solutions mechanism, but 
project cancelled after 1 month 
•Interpretive effects 
- zero carbon homes agenda seen as 
increasingly under threat  
•Institutional effects 
- task force disbanded  
- ZC Hub closes  
- Regulatory enforcement unreformed 
•2015 
Election  
•Change to 
conservative 
majority 
government 
• System stabilises through 
resistance to change  
• Coalition (2014 - 2015) 
-Treasury dominates subsystem 
(Chancellor George Osbourne) 
- Eric Pickles (SS DCLG 2014-2015) 
- Stephen Williams (LD) (2014-2015) 
• Conservative Party (2015-2016) 
- Greg Clark (SS DCLG 2015-2016) 
- Bandon Lewis (HM DCLG 2014-
2016 ) 
•Task Force  
- disbanded (Jan 2014) 
• ZC Hub 
- low influence  
- disbanded 2016 
 
• Weakened supporting 
coalition and no supporting 
house-builders [-SPF] 
•Opposition from parts of the 
industry and some politicians 
to small sites exemption 
[+SPF] 
•Denouncement appealed by 
UKGBC but weak supportive 
coalition weak 
[-SPF] 
- denouncement opposed by 
the Lords [+SPF] 
Table 10 - Summary of main developments within socio-technical system divided by four main phases  
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Smaller-scale funding was also available through the ‘carbon-challenge’ for medium scale ‘eco-
villages’ (100-750 homes), also built to zero carbon standards [PMC->RE] (Morby 2010). These 
villages would allow for experimentation with new designs and technologies, and were intended to 
assist the delivery of the larger-scale towns [RE->STC]. The first site - Hanham Hall - was awarded 
to Barratt Homes in 2007 (Jansen 2007). Finally, there was a tax exemption for new homes built to 
the zero carbon standards before 2011 (Gov 2016). The tax exemption was meant to benefit 
consumers, reducing the overall costs of buying a new home.  
These policy changes were introduced within the existing institutional arrangements, rather than 
reforming them [PMC->InstE]. Most notably was the legal requirements regarding how compliance 
with building regulations are evaluated and enforced. The only requirement to satisfice building 
regulations in the UK is to submit a design specification for the standards of the new build [PMC-
>IntE&InstE] (interview 17). Consequently, there is no legal requirement to evaluate the real 
performance of buildings after construction [InstE]. Thus, many sites are value-engineered during 
construction, and materials are replaced with cheaper, less-effective components [PMC->Inst&IntE-
>STC] (interviews 1,15,18). Another issue relates to skills shortages of site operatives lower down 
the supply chain, to effectively install components and technologies. Accordingly, there is a 
commonly acknowledged ‘performance gap’ between as-designed specification and the final building 
[STC] (interview 1,2,4,6,7,9,18). A notable change of institutional effects was the establishment of 
the Zero Carbon Task Force, a political steering group for the target [PMC->InstE]. The purpose of 
the group was to act as a platform in the policy process in which different stakeholders could discuss 
with the housing minister about future actions to be taken in achieving the target [PSC] (interview 2). 
The task force was convened by the housing minister and included representation from housebuilders 
and manufacturers, yet the micro-renewables industry seems to have been excluded, despite 
requesting representation30 (TF11). Consequently, the opinions of this this industry were excluded 
from the formal policymaking procedure [-SPF]. 
The most notable effect was the expectations of future resources [IntE], considered a commercially 
attractive opportunity to potential beneficiaries (interviews 1,2,6). Combined with perceptions of 
strong political commitment [IntE], this led to the establishment of UK-GBC31 [STC], and helped 
elicit support from some major house builders [+SPF]. However, the eco-towns policy also generated 
negative feedback from the general public who protested against the proposals, and led to political 
opposition from the Conservative Party (CP) [-SPF]. Another issue involved different definitions for 
the target announced by DCLG and Treasury (finance ministry) with the introduction of the tax 
 
30 The Renewable Energy Agency (REA) is the trade body representing the micro renewables sector. REA wrote 
a letter to the task force voicing support for the target and requesting representation. However, reviewing the 
attendees at subsequent meetings, REA were not represented.  
31 UK Green Buildings Council. 
90 
 
Chapter 6. Policy mix feedback in socio-technical systems: a co-evolutionary analysis of the Zero 
Carbon Homes policy mix in the UK (Paper 2) - Co-evolutionary analysis of the zero carbon homes 
policy mix and the house-building socio-technical system in the UK (2006-2016) 
exemption. This meant that actors weren’t sure how to proceed, leading to inertia in the initial phase, 
with the exception of some experimentation with prototypes on the BRE innovation park (interviews 
1,2,7,10,14). The lack of clarity regarding the target [IntE] motivated UK-GBC to produce a report 
assessing the feasibility of the current target [STC], and proposing a new definition which was 
presented to the task force [+SPF] (TF15). This led to suggestions from house builders to introduce 
the option of off-site carbon mitigation (TF17-20). It also led to the recommendation made in the 
Callcutt review on Housing Delivery, that government should form a new delivery body, 
acknowledging a capability deficit to effectively implement the target [-AF] (interviews 2,6). 
 
6.5.2.  Phase 2: Resource expansion, redefinition and recession: the emergence of an 
opposing coalition (2008-2010) 
 
Acknowledging the identified issues from the previous phase [+SPF&-AF], government worked 
towards re-defining the target [PSC->PMC](Gibbs & O’Neill, 2015), and launched the Zero Carbon 
Hub (ZCHub) [PMC->InstE]. The redefined target comprised of three aspects: a Fabric Energy 
Emission Standard (FEES), carbon compliance and allowable solutions (Heffernan et al. 2015; 
Schweber et al. 2015). FEES set the expected level of efficiency of the building fabric, while carbon 
compliance captured the amount of abatement on-site through the use of renewable energy. The 
allowable solutions component was originally planned as an abatement fund for local carbon 
mitigation, without requiring it to be 100% on-site (DCLG 2009c) (interviews 1,4,18). The ZCHub 
received grant funding from government [PMC], enabling it to serve as an autonomous research 
group working towards redefining the target and identifying and overcoming potential barriers 
[RE&InstE]. In addition, there was additional funding allocated in this phase through the carbon 
challenge, AIMC4, and commitment to funding four of the proposed eco-towns [PMC->RE]. This 
helped maintain perceptions of political commitment throughout the phase [IntE] (interview 
1,2,6,10). Another significant institutional effect in this phase resulted from the Planning and Energy 
Act 2008 [PMC] which introduced mandatory use of the ‘Merton Rule’ by local councils, effectively 
allowing local councils to require higher levels of sustainability in their planning permission 
applications [IntE], and was implemented in many boroughs of London [STC] (interviews 
1,7,11,12,16). Combined with the Introduction of ‘Home Information Packs’ [PMC] which required 
all new homes to have a sustainability rating [IntE], there was increased applications of the code of 
sustainable homes (mainly level 3 and some level 4) [STC] (table 5). This was a strong stimulus for 
innovation [STC], helping promote the uptake of new products into mainstream use, including the 
adoption of Forest Stewardship Council certified timber [STC] (interview 11,12,18). We consider 
these socio-technical changes as the emergence of a potential virtuous cycle.  
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As the transition started to gain momentum, however, the UK moved into recession [ExC] and the 
construction sector was one of the worst affected sectors. House prices dropped by 15.9% by the end 
of 2008 (fig. 5) (Osborne 2009) and the pre-tax profits of the ten largest house-builders dropped from 
around £2.5 billion in 2006 to over -£3 billion by 2008 (Mathiason 2014)32, leading to 25% job losses 
in the sector (Peacock 2010) [ExC->STC]. Typically, during periods of ‘bust’ in the construction 
industry, job losses commonly impact innovative actors worse, leading to reduced capabilities 
(interviews 1,2,6,7,10). The adverse market conditions and drop in profits also meant that there was 
less resources available for innovation. The recession also impacted specific instruments, most 
notably eco-towns. Under tighter economic conditions [ExC] the overall budget was reduced [PMC-
>RE] (Hope 2008). More importantly, the lack of regulation of the financial sector was blamed for 
the economic crisis [ExC], which increased attention to the role of regulations [PSC]. Consequently, 
the proposals to fast-track the planning system were revoked [PMC] (Arnold 2009). Following this 
change, DCLG produced a report estimating only marginal profits for developers of eco-towns [RE], 
which undermined the expectations created throughout the first phase [IntE]. By 2009, Labour 
committed to funding 4 eco-towns [PMC->RE], but the proposals were now less attractive [IntE], 
and under tight economic conditions [ExC], house builders became more vocally opposed to the 
target [-SPF]. HBF claimed it was unachievable (Goodchild & Walshaw, 2011), and led to the 
narrative that the target may impact on the delivery of new homes [STC->-SPF] (Ends 
2008).However, resource allocation through the carbon challenge [RE] helped maintain support of 
some house builders, notably Barratt Homes [+SPF]. In spite of growing opposition [-SPF], 
commitment to the target remained strong under Labour [PSC], and the support of some powerful 
actors [+SPF] meant no changes to the target were made [PMC]. 
 
 
32 These actors subsequently evened balance sheets by 2010, and had recovered to 2006 levels by 2014 
(Mathiason 2014). 
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Figure 8 - Percentage change of property value (2006-2016). Source: HM Land Registry. 
 
The UK came out of the recession by the end of this phase, however recovery was the slowest in 
recorded history [ExC] (Owen 2015). Despite adverse market conditions [STC], throughout this 
phase progress was made through the CSH [IntE->STC] and the activities of the zero carbon hub, 
who conducted research on how to operationalise the target [RE->STC]. Participation in the hub from 
various parts of industry may have also helped safeguard the target’s credibility [PMC->IntE] 
(interview 1), and led to a peak of activity from 2009-2011. Notably, the number of CSH level 3 
homes increased significantly [STC] (table 5).  
Number of constructed properties to levels 0-6 of CSH (post-construction) 
Code level 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
2008-2009 0 0 1 58 4 2 0 
2009-2010 49 34 75 4326 290 37 7 
2010-2011 114 54 113 18208 1579 62 24 
2011-2012 234 106 335 32384 6299 136 111 
2012-2013 369 152 28 36150 9642 268 91 
2013-2014 465 120 248 31823 12459 55 14 
2014-2015 506 40 113 18749 7561 64 15 
TOTAL  1737 506 913 141698 37834 624 262 
Table 11 - Number of constructed properties according to CSH level (Source: DCLG). 
 
6.5.3.  Phase 3: Election, austerity, increasing opposition and a weakening supporting 
coalition (2010-2013) 
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In the third phase several detrimental changes to the policy mix occurred [PMC], including 
significant reductions of resources available (current or anticipated) [RE&IntE]. These changes can 
partially be attributed to a significant change in the policy subsystem [PSC]. The 2010 election [ExC] 
led to a new coalition government between the Conservative Party (CP with 306 seats) and the Liberal 
Democrats (LD with 57 seats) [PSC]. In general, the conservative party are less supportive of climate 
change mitigation (Carter & Clements, 2015), and place greater emphasis on economic growth [ExC-
>PSC]. Therefore, the appointment of CP ministers as the most senior positions within DCLG, and 
the finance ministry was an important change [PSC].  
In response to the recession, the government implemented austerity measures, and consequently the 
costs of supporting the policy mix became considered as an unnecessary expense. This resulted in 
various funding schemes being cut [PSC->PMC->RE] (interviews 1,10,11), including: ending the 
grant funding for the ZCHub [PMC->RE] effectively removing its research autonomy [PMC-
>InstE]; requiring that only one of the four planned eco-towns would be built to the original 
(sustainability) standards [PMC->RE&IntE]; and reducing funding available through the carbon 
challenge [PMC-> RE]. These reductions of resources significantly weakened the incentive for 
developers to support the target [PMC->RE&IntE&InstE->STC->SPF] (interviews 1,15). 
Combined with the cuts, no additional instruments were added to the mix to address any identified 
problem areas, support innovation or stimulate demand [PMC], which helped re-stabilise the existing 
socio-technical system [STC]. 
These changes are the policy subsystem, which under austerity measures was dominated by Treasury 
throughout this phase [PSC&-FF->PMC->RE]. With the ongoing housing crisis in the UK, treasury 
prioritised delivery of new houses over how efficient these were (interviews 1,2,3, 8,10,15,16,18). 
This is reflected in the amount of resources dedicated to housing delivery and stimulating the market 
through ‘First Buy’ and ‘Help to Buy’ policies. By 2013, the new government had committed £15.8 
billion to assisting first time buyers get onto the property market (table 6). Importantly, no 
sustainability requirements were included in these policies, which clearly reflected the government’s 
reprioritisation. This reprioritisation also meant that anything considered to impact on the volume of 
supply became opposed by treasury. Consequently, the opposing coalition had more influence, using 
the narrative that the costs of meeting the target would reduce the rate of housing delivery 
[SPF&PSC->PMC].  
Treasury’s dominance also affected other aspects of the policy mix. Following the target’s previous 
redefinition to include allowable solutions (abatement fund), this component was appropriated by 
Treasury, labelling it as a tax and under their mandate [PSC->PMC] (interviews 10,16). 
Consequently, throughout this phase, little progress was made towards defining component, as 
Treasury refused to sign-off on proposals [PSC->PMC] (interview 16).  
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The target was then subsequently weakened prior to the development of the first zero carbon 
demonstration [PMC]. This change made it significantly easier to achieve the target, for example it 
reduced the estimated costs of solar PV needed to develop this demonstration project alone by 
£2million [PMC->IntE->STC] (ZC Hub 2011). Along with this change, there was also diminishing 
political commitment to the task force throughout this phase [PMC->IntE] (interviews 1,2,7). In its 
first meeting under the new government, the CP housing minister proposed changing the terms of the 
task force (TF 62&65). After which, the CP housing minister stopped attending meetings, and LD 
junior minister responsible for the building regulations would attend instead [PMC->Inst] (TF6-115). 
Policy 
instrument  
Resources 
available  
Beneficiaries Start 
date  
Revision  End/ 
termination 
Eco-towns  Potential 5 
towns of 
5,000-20,000 
houses 
House 
builders  
2007 2007 - Ambition increased to 
10 towns. 
2009 - Ambition reduced to 
probable 2. 
2010 - £60 million committed 
to supporting 4 sites.  
2010 - Announcement that 
only one town would be 
required to be built to the 
original standards.  
 
2014 
Carbon 
challenge  
Funding for 
medium scale 
demonstration 
projects  
House 
Builders  
2007 2010 – HCA funding cuts 
(60%) 
 
2011 (no 
additional 
sites 
awarded) 
Tax stamp 
duty 
exemption  
Exemption 
from tax 
stamp duty on  
General public  2007 N/A 2011 
(31 houses 
were 
eligible) 
AIMC4 £3.4 million 
funding 
awarded (one 
off) 
House 
builders  
2009 N/A 2011 
Zero 
Carbon 
Hub 
£500,000 a 
year   
House 
builders, 
Manufacturers  
2008 2010 - Funding cut (20%) 
2011 - Funding  ended (some 
resources available for 
specific projects) 
2016 
Other funding for driving housing market (no sustainability requirements) 
First Buy £250 million  General public  2011 N/A 2013 
Help to 
Buy  
£15.5 billion  General public  2013 N/A 2016  
Table 12 - Funding mechanisms available for zero carbon homes policy mix compared to housing delivery 
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Whilst LD ministers were supportive and engaged with the target, ultimately CP ministers needed to 
approve decisions, meaning that overall political commitment wavered [PSC].  
Collectively, these policy mix changes signalled by the end of this phase that government was not 
committed to the target [PMC->IntE] (interviews 1,10,11,15,18). As several house builders began to 
detect this, they increased opposition by intensifying lobbying efforts [PMC->IntE->STC->SPF] 
(interviews 1,7). This simultaneously weakened the supportive coalition [-SPF], as those actors who 
hoped to gain a competitive advantage had less certainty (increasing risk) as the policy mix lost 
credibility [PMC->IntE->STC->-SPF]. Most notably, this culminated when the 2013 building 
regulations were delayed by 6 months, and when published only included a marginal increase of 6%, 
which was lower than any of the values considered throughout the consultation phase [PMC->IntE-
>STC]. Moreover, the recommendations of the ZCHub to amend regulations to apply to as-built 
performance, were excluded.  The delay, and the outcome of the consultations produced a strong 
interpretive effect that the government were not committed to the target. It also meant that the amount 
of abatement needed in the final stage was increased, while the amount of time left before 2016 was 
reduced [PMC->IntE].  
Some individuals within companies remained supportive because they thought it was the right thing to 
do, but this was in spite of the policy mix and socio-technical configuration, not because of them 
[SPF] (interviews 1,10). For example, the CEO of Barratt remained supportive as one of the major 
proponents of the agenda (interviews 1,2), but there was increasing pressure from stakeholders to 
resist the target (interview 15). By the end of 2013 the supportive coalition was significantly 
weakened, and resulted in all house builders withdrawing from the supporting coalition [PMC->IntE-
>STC->SPF], or as expressed by one interviewee: “after 2013 those voices [on the supportive side] 
started to go quiet” (interview 1). 
 
6.5.4.  Phase 4: Dismantling of the zero carbon homes policy mix (2013-2016) 
 
The final phase involved several policy mix changes dismantling the zero carbon homes policy mix, 
which culminated in the eventual denouncement of the target.  
By the end of the previous phase, the Zero Carbon Task Force33 met less frequently, without the 
housing minister, and had diminishing influence in the policymaking process. In January 2014, the 
task force had its final meeting (TF115) [PMC], which removed the formal policy network thereby 
 
33 The Zero Carbon Task Force was the steering group established under the Labour Government in 2007 to 
help implement the target.  
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changing the policy process [InstE]. By this phase the manufacturing sector was still broadly 
supportive of the target, but felt increasingly ‘shut-out’ of DCLG34 (interviews 4,5).  
After the abolishment of the task force a number of further changes to instruments and the target itself 
occurred [PMC]. The first of which was proposals to remove the code for sustainable homes (Mark 
2014). Next, the Infrastructure Bill published by government June 2014 further revised the target, 
removing the need for on-site renewables by allowing the abatement fund to offset emissions. With 
this announcement, a small sites exemption was also announced. This was largely considered as a 
loop-hole [IntE], which would allow developers to avoid compliance with building regulations by 
phasing sites in rounds of 10 units [STC] (Parliament 2014, interviews10,16).  
The 2015 general election was won by a conservative majority, changing the policy subsystem [ExC-
>PSC]. While LD ministers had been less influential throughout the previous government, their 
political support was considered to have kept the target alive, despite being significantly weakened b 
this point (interviews 1,2,14). In their absence after the election there was no remaining support from 
within government [PSC]. Shortly after the election, the target was denounced [PMC]. The 
announcement came from the treasury, who had already opposed the target throughout the coalition 
government. Their announcement was made without consulting other departments, highlighting the 
dominance of the finance ministry by this stage. In a final attempt to maintain the target, UK-GBC 
sent an open letter to the chancellor asking for the government to reconsider its decision [PMC-
>IntE->STC->SPF]. However, there were no house builders included in the 246 signatories (UK-
GBC 2015), and because the announcement was direct from treasury, UK-GBC did not expect the 
letter to have any impact (interview 1). The government’s decision was also opposed by the House of 
Lords [PMC->IntE->STC->SPF]. The Lords put forward an amendment to reinstate the target but 
were defeated by a margin of four votes and the target was officially abandoned in 2016. 
 
6.6. Discussion  
 
Our analytical framework proposes that in order to be successful, policy mixes need to induce 
changes in the socio-technical system leading to the creation of self-reinforcing (positive) feedback 
mechanisms. This is particularly the case for sustainability transitions, which are commonly contested 
by powerful incumbents (Kern & Howlett, 2009), requiring positive feedback mechanisms to 
overcome potential negative ones. In the following, we discuss three main insights from our empirical 
case of relevance for understanding and governing the co-evolutionary dynamics of policy mixes and 
socio-technical change. First, we reflect on how a potential virtuous cycle can be offset and turn into a 
 
34 The Department of Communities and Local Government is the department responsible for setting the building 
regulations and the target was under their mandate.  
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vicious cycle; second, we consider key design limitations which prevented the policy mix from 
producing more positive feedback; third; we highlight the role of credibility in the co-evolution 
process. Based on these findings we propose changes to the conceptual framework.  
6.6.1.  How was a potential virtuous cycle offset and turned into to a vicious cycle?  
 
We found that a potential virtuous cycle started to emerge in the early phases due to support from 
some major house-builders, along with the manufacturing and micro renewables sectors.  Resource 
allocation for demonstration projects, combined with the interpretive effects of strong political 
commitment, expectation of future resource allocation, and potential competitive advantage, attracted 
support from some large incumbent house-builders. In essence, we find a similar phenomenon to 
Markard et al. (2016) where incumbents are not homogenous in their beliefs and if such actors view 
transitions as an opportunity, they are more likely to be supportive.  
However, the potential for a virtuous cycle to emerge was partly offset due to adverse effects of the 
recession on the housebuilding socio-technical system. The market conditions led to large scale job 
losses and a decline in investment and innovation, and the first medium-scale demonstration project 
was delayed. The anticipated costs of meeting the target, while in difficult financial conditions, started 
to generate negative feedback from house-builders. However, resource allocation, perceptions of 
strong political support, and the sustained expectation of future resources, retained the support of 
some house-builders, meaning the rising opposition to the target was offset. 
A vicious cycle started when resources supporting the mix were removed after the 2010 general 
election. Innovation declined and very few demonstration projects were built, making the prospects of 
meeting the target progressively harder. There was little incentive for the previously supportive 
house-builders to continue to engage in innovation, and there were no resources available to help 
create positive feedback. Moreover, these changes signalled weakening political commitment, making 
investments higher risk and undermining perceptions of potential competitive advantage, giving no 
incentive for further investment.  
In the policy feedback literature, it is often argued that once a policy starts to generate positive 
feedback it can become locked-in and stable, making it harder to change to alternative policy options 
(Pierson 1993, 2000). However our case indicates that changing exogenous conditions (notably 
economic) can trigger a response in government (austerity), reducing the resources made available, 
which can turn previously positive feedback into negative (Oberlander & Weaver, 2015). This 
highlights how the timing of policy mix implementation, relative to the endogenous and exogenous 
conditions of the socio-technical system, can drastically affect the prospects of a mix to generate 
positive feedback (E. Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009).  
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While some conditions are unexpected and unpredictable, how the government responds to these 
conditions (more broadly and with regards to the policy mix) can dramatically influence the relative 
success of policy mixes supporting sustainability transitions. Our case shows that sustained political 
commitment and continued allocation of resources throughout a recession can help maintain positive 
feedback, but undermining either of these aspects will likely cause negative backlash (Kemp et al., 
2007). Our main recommendations towards withstanding adverse exogenous conditions is to maintain 
political support in order to: protect the policy mix, incentivise investment and support through 
sustained long-term resource allocation, and/or improving investor confidence through strong political 
leadership and commitment to the policy mix’s objectives by producing clear and believable resource 
effects. 
6.6.2.  What limitations prevented the mix from producing more positive feedback? 
 
To help understand the impact of the policy mix and its ability to produce positive feedbacks we 
consider the effects that the policy mix produced and how these influenced the socio-technical system. 
The resource effects were primarily grant funding for large-scale demonstration projects, and were 
mostly distributed to the major house-builders who otherwise had little incentive to support the target 
(Table 6). We suggest that such ‘one-off’ allocations of resources do not require recipients to protect 
them as they cannot be withdrawn, in contrast to social policies such as the provision of healthcare 
providing long term benefits. This implies that resource allocation should have foreseen subsequent 
rounds of funding to maintain support from beneficiaries. Even though resources which are episodic 
or of short duration are generally less effective at creating positive feedback than continuous 
resources (Campbell, 2012), it is still more effective than one-off allocations as seen in this case when 
subsequent rounds of funding for the eco-towns and the carbon challenge were cancelled. Over time, 
as beneficiaries make sunk investments (for example in RD&D) their support for the policy is likely 
to become stronger as they seek to protect their investments. However, in our case the recession 
happened early on in the process, before any demonstration projects had started, and before there had 
been significant investment from any of the early beneficiaries. That meant that when the resources 
available were later cut, the mix had not stimulated strong positive feedback and the incentive to 
support the target was undermined, making it susceptible to negative feedback.  
The way the policymaking process was organised was also a key factor in the case. Our findings 
highlight how the institutional setting (who was allowed to participate) also affects the potential for 
the mix to create positive feedback. The sector which stood to benefit most from the target’s 
implementation was the micro-renewables industry. The original requirement for all carbon abatement 
to be achieved on-site, placed emphasis on micro-renewables. However, the Renewable Energy 
Association (a trade body representing the micro-renewables industry), was not involved in the Task 
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Force, despite requesting representation. Their exclusion from the policymaking process meant that 
their support for the policy mix had little influence. Consequently, it is unsurprising that closer to 
2016 the role of micro renewables was first reduced, and then removed from the target in 2014, 
permitting carbon mitigation to be achieved through the use of an abatement fund, something that the 
housebuilding industry had lobbied for. This highlights the importance of building the right coalitions 
to drive policy (Hess 2014, 2015). Similarly, in the later phases the manufacturing sector (the other 
main beneficiary) felt that they were excluded, and DCLG ceased correspondence. This points to the 
importance of including a variety of actors (including new entrants) at the negotiation table and points 
to the limits of an incumbent actors orientated policy approach as taken in the UK (Geels et al.2017). 
Moreover, the increments to building fabric efficiency (increased market for components) were 
implemented through the 2010 and 2013 (very marginal) updates to the building regulations. This 
reduced the incentive for the energy efficiency component-manufacturers (insulation, windows etc.) 
to support the target, as the target’s final implementation would not have had much (or any) impact on 
their market. 
Another key limitation was the lack of engagement with the general public, the other main beneficiary 
through potential cost savings on energy bills. However, these are long-term benefits which have low 
visibility, and due to the relatively low price of energy in the UK, are not particularly significant. 
More importantly, these potential future benefits never materialised as the target was abandoned. 
Consequently, it is difficult for the general public to mobilise to protect something that they have not 
received yet, and for the most part are unaware of. In addition, there is low market demand for zero 
carbon housing, and energy efficiency of housing is not reflected in property values in the UK 
(Osmani & O’Reilly, 2009). This raises opposition from house-builders who (claim that they) cannot 
recover the costs of building to higher regulations. One way of potentially generating support from the 
public as beneficiaries would be through the provision of social housing. If combined with promoting 
energy efficiency, then people may mobilise to protect the provision of social housing, rather than for 
higher sustainability standards. However, provision of social housing seems to be opposed by 
conservative party ideology, meaning this may only be possible after a change in government.   
 
6.6.3.  How are perceptions of policy mix credibility formed and how do these influence 
socio-technical change? 
 
In the early stages, the policy mix had some credibility due to strong political commitment, and 
provision of resources, but a lack of clarity about what was needed to meet the target and an initial 
period of redefinition of the target caused some inertia. The first reformulation of the target helped 
improve credibility, and led to a peak of activity in the sector. However, later, when resources were 
withdrawn and political support diminished, these perceptions of credibility were undermined. We 
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also consider the previously mentioned limitations (limited and one-off allocation of resources, 
exclusion of some actors in the policymaking process, and lack of engagement with the general 
public) to have negatively affected the credibility of the mix over time.  
A significant issue with the implementation of the policy mix was how building regulations in the UK 
are measured and enforced. There are no requirements to evaluate buildings post-construction, and the 
regulations are based on an ‘as-designed’ specification. The difference between the as-designed and 
as-built performance of buildings can vary significantly, for various reasons, including components 
being ‘value-engineered’ during the build-phase, replacing components with cheaper ones which may 
not perform as well. More importantly, even in instances where the performance of buildings has been 
found to not meet the required regulations, there has never been a prosecution, fine or any other form 
of legal consequence for non-compliance with energy efficiency regulations. We argue the lack of a 
robust enforcement mechanism meant that the regulations carried no consequence, which undermined 
the credibility of the policy mix as a whole and effectively allowed developers to opt-out of making 
their product more efficient (Pan & Garmston, 2012). 
We also found that feedback mechanisms can influence the credibility of the mix in four ways. First, 
through the respective strength of the supportive/opposing coalitions (SPF-constituency feedback). If 
incumbents are supportive of the mix, it makes the prospects of achieving its goal more credible, 
which may influence other actors to also support the agenda. Conversely, as we saw in our case, as 
powerful actors stopped supporting the policy mix this undermined credibility, and resulted in a 
further weakening of the supporting coalition. Second, we suggest that cognitive feedback (SPF) is 
directly related to credibility of the mix. If specific instruments or the mix as a whole are considered 
to be ineffective or poorly performing, and these are unaddressed by policy makers, the mix may be 
considered less credible. Another contributor to the mix’s reduced credibility was policy subsystem 
change and fiscal feedback. Following the election the treasury dominated the subsystem, who then 
considered the cost of supporting the policy mix as an unnecessary expense. Treasury cut all resources 
and reduced autonomy of other actors. As it became apparent to actors that the treasury opposed the 
target, this undermined the credibility of the mix as a whole. Finally, we consider administrative 
feedback to influence the credibility of the mix. If widespread perceptions are that the government 
lacks the capabilities to properly design and implement the mix, it may reduce credibility of the mix 
and dis-incentivise investment and support.  
These considerations suggest credibility is closely related to the occurrence of virtuous or vicious 
cycles. From our case, progress was initially made when the mix was considered credible, but for 
various reasons the mix became considered less credible, which only intensified after the vicious 
cycle started. Based on this we argue that policy makers are well advised to enhance the credibility of 
the policy mix by providing sufficient and sustained resources, resolving any limitations or 
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constraining institutions, and through synergistic and systematic policymaking and implementation 
processes to help improve investor confidence.  
6.6.4.  Refinement of the framework 
Based on our empirical analysis, we propose a number of refinements to the framework proposed by 
Edmondson et al (2018): 
First, the framework draws attention to the role and influence of the finance ministry, commonly 
underplayed or not treated as an important actor with its own interests in most of the transitions 
literature. The attention to fiscal feedbacks throughout the analysis helped explain the resource cuts 
that occurred in 2010, and the reluctance to devote any further resources to the mix. However, our 
application suggests that the current definition of fiscal feedback is too narrow to capture the observed 
phenomena in full. Currently, it only captures how the costs of supporting a policy mix may raise 
concerns among powerful actors, notably the finance ministry (following Oberlander & Weaver 
2015). In our case, however, opposition to the target from the treasury was not due to direct budget 
strains, but due to the potential costs on the overall national economy (which the finance ministry was 
concerned about) and potential backlash, which may affect the government’s re-election prospects 
(Jacobs & Weaver, 2015). Similar phenomena have been observed in the case of both the UK (Smith, 
Kern, Raven, & Verhees, 2014) and German  feed in tariffs for solar PV(Lauber & Jacobsson 2016), 
where costs of supporting the technology were borne by the bill payer and not the finance ministry. 
Consequently, we suggest extending the definition of fiscal feedback to consider both the direct costs 
on government budget, and societal economic costs (current or anticipated) of supporting the mix 
(which can also raise concerns among powerful actors).35 
Second, the application of the framework also highlighted a potential expansion of the definition of 
administrative feedback’s influence on policymaking. The finance ministry came to dominate the 
policy subsystem towards the later phases. This meant that the autonomy of the department previously 
responsible for policy design and implementation (DCLG) was reduced. Moreover, the changes to the 
mix in these later stages came direct from the finance ministry, without consulting other departments. 
However, the current definition of administrative feedback does not capture how the reputation of the 
government as a whole, and its capabilities, changed. It only narrowly considers the particular 
government department responsible for implementation (DCLG). Therefore, since the role of this 
department in the policy process was diminished, it does not capture the phenomenon adequately. 
Consequently, opinions of actors regarding the capabilities and reputation of the respective 
government departments (administrative feedback), based on the policy changes occurring later in the 
timeline, are outside the scope of analysis (because the opinions were traced back to finance ministry, 
 
35 Even if the reduced energy use would offset the initial capital cost in the long term.  
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not DCLG). We therefore suggest extending the definition of administrative feedback to include all 
government departments who have a role in the policy mix’ evolution. Therefore, in situations where 
the policy subsystem is dominated by the finance ministry, administrative feedback would relate 
primarily to the finance ministry (who are making the decisions about changes to the policy mix).  
Third, from our empirical application we can also reflect on the proposed interactions of exogenous 
conditions and the socio-technical system, and its co-evolution with the policy mix over time. Much 
of the feedback literature commonly only considers exogenous shocks, major events that shift policy 
makers’ attention. Jordan & Matt (2014), expand on these ideas to some extent with their 
consideration of exogenous conditions and give some examples, but do not propose specific 
typologies of interaction dynamics. We build on ideas from the transitions literature and our empirical 
findings to conceptualise mechanisms of interaction. More precisely, we derive direct and indirect 
interactions occurring within the policy subsystem and the socio-technical system, for each of which 
we provide examples from the case to illustrate these dynamics (Table 7).   
System  
Level  
Direct interaction Indirect interaction 
Policy 
subsystem  
Changes of individuals, and ideologies of 
actors in the policy subsystem. May be caused 
by a change in government. Can make certain 
feedback stronger if it resonates with the ideas 
of policy makers in the policy subsystem.  
 
Example: In our case, several changes 
occurred through the rotation of ministers in 
certain roles. Also, notably, there was a 
complete replacement of leading policymaking 
actors after the general election in 2010, and a 
partial reshuffle in 2015 (removal of Liberal 
Democrats). This change of policy actors led to 
decreased political support as the Conservative 
government were less interested in taking 
actions for climate change.  
Influence from international agreements 
which place pressure on policymaking 
actors in the policy subsystem.  
 
 
 
Example: In our case, the EU Buildings 
Directive helped generate momentum to 
implement national policies. Later the NZB 
2020 target was actually seen to be a 
constraining factor as the national policy 
did not match the requirements.   
Socio-
technical 
system  
Changes which influence the endogenous 
conditions of the socio-technical system may 
contribute to producing (or changing any 
existing) feedback. Such conditions may 
include economic trends changing market 
conditions, new market actors from outside the 
system, and innovation from outside the system 
which can introduce policy options. 
 
Example: In our case, we observed that a 
change in the economic conditions of the 
country led to the generation of negative socio-
political feedback, which had previously been 
mostly positive (or at least neutral). Later, the 
change of government changed the finance 
ministry’s perceptions of the relative costs of 
supporting the mix and led to negative fiscal 
feedback.  
The influence of exogenous conditions may 
not result in the formation of new feedback 
mechanisms, but may affect the endogenous 
conditions of the socio-technical system in 
ways that amplifies or constrains existing 
feedback mechanisms occurring.  
 
 
 
Example: In our case the recession 
negatively affected market conditions, 
which gave greater influence of the 
opposing coalition, and after the change in 
government (and policy subsystem) the 
opponents of the policy mix were more 
influential.  
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Table 13 - Interactions of exogenous conditions with socio-technical system and policy subsystem 
6.7. Conclusions 
  
In the context of sustainability transitions, several authors have argued that due to the complexity, 
scale, and urgency of sustainability transitions, analyses should move towards studying multiple 
policy instruments and their interactions (Rogge et al., 2017). In particular, we follow the call for 
increased attention to the underlying policymaking processes (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge & 
Reichardt, 2016), offering the first empirical study to combine a consideration of policy processes in 
an integrated deductive co-evolutionary analysis of policy mix change and socio-technical change. 
This goes beyond the existing literature by analysing specific mechanisms of how co-evolutionary 
dynamics play out in practice.  
Our paper makes three contributions to the sustainability transitions literature:  
First, empirically our study follows a unique case with a very ambitious target being introduced to 
radically transform the house-building socio-technical system in the UK. Initially, we observed some 
increasing momentum, but then a vicious cycle set in, slowing progress and raising opponents to the 
target. Over time the target lost the support of powerful actors in the advocacy coalition. Eventually, 
the target, vulnerable due to its weakened supportive coalition, was denounced, instigating significant 
backlash in the transition to a low carbon housing system in the UK. Such cases of failed transitions 
can help analysts identify important negative dynamics and make policy recommendations of how 
these could be potentially avoided.  
Second, the paper generates novel insights about the role of policy mix credibility, both regarding the 
factors which influence it and its impact on the socio-technical system. This contributes to the 
emerging discussion about the role of credibility in policy mixes for sustainability transitions (Rogge 
& Dütschke, 2018). Credibility was considered as a strong influence in the case, but it was beyond the 
scope of this paper to explore the role of all policy mix characteristics and their interactions with 
mechanisms in the framework. We suggest that systematically integrating policy mix characteristics 
into the framework could be a useful avenue for further work. In particular, the mechanisms of the 
framework could be used to help explain how certain policy mix characteristics influence socio-
technical change, and factors to consider when analysing them.   
Finally, conceptually the paper makes a contribution through applying a theoretically derived co-
evolutionary framework to an empirical case, and proposing three conceptual refinements on this 
basis. The first refinement is to extend the definition of fiscal feedback beyond simply budget strains 
arising from supporting the policy mix, to also consider the societal economic costs (current or 
anticipated) on the national economy. As a second refinement we widen the definition of 
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administrative feedback to relate to all government departments responsible for policy making, and 
the impact this has on the overall perceptions of government capabilities. As a third refinement we 
more explicitly define interaction mechanisms of exogenous conditions on the socio-technical system. 
More precisely, we propose that exogenous conditions have direct and indirect influences on the 
policy subsystem and the socio-technical system.  
We would also like to highlight three possible avenues for further work. In our case study we found 
that implementation of the mix at both the local and national level was of significance. The local level 
was important though implementation of the CSH in its planning requirements, and the role of local 
authorities as building control officers. Currently, the framework under-conceptualises vertical 
interactions between levels of policy mixes (Howlett, Vince, & Del Río, 2017). We suggest that such 
vertical interactions could be explored in further work. In addition, the analysis also brought attention 
to the role of coalitions throughout the co-evolution of the policy mix and the housebuilding socio-
technical system. In the policy feedback literature such coalitions are captured by interest groups, but 
a more nuanced view of the role of coalitions could complement the framework. Accordingly, further 
co-evolutionary work could integrate ideas from the Advocacy Coalition Framework. Finally, it was 
beyond the scope of this paper to unpack the policymaking process in terms of the difference between 
design and implementation, which could also be a potential avenue for further work.  
We hope the empirical and conceptual contributions made in this paper can assist in the analysis of 
policymaking processes for sustainability transition policy mixes, by  drawing attention to how design 
choices can influence the socio-technical system, which then generates feedback mechanisms 
affecting subsequently policymaking.  
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Abstract  
 
In 2006, the UK launched an ambitious strategy to radically transform the housebuilding sector. The 
intention was that by 2016, all new homes would be built to ‘zero-carbon’ standards. Previous work 
on the Zero Carbon Homes policy mix has pointed to several factors that were considered as 
constraints towards achieving the target, beyond the design of the specific elements of the policy mix. 
These issues, including procedural aspects of the policymaking process such as a lack of evidence 
base used in decision making, are in this paper considered as institutional barriers. The paper draws 
on institutional literatures and empirical data to develop three heuristic frames for analysing housing 
policymaking processes in the UK, and then applies these to the specific example of the zero carbon 
homes policy mix. In doing so, the paper generates insights which help better understand why zero 
carbon homes had limited impact towards stimulating a transition in the UK house-building sector, 
and posits reasons which help explain its eventual denouncement. These insights are then linked to 
wider considerations of policy-mix-making processes including credibility, the susceptibility of policy 
processes to capture from incumbents, and the ability of policy mixes to generate policy feedback. 
The findings of the paper also have implications for successive attempts to stimulate transition in the 
UK housebuilding sector, and highlight that without institutional reform, such attempts will be 
susceptible to the same constraining factors which ultimately undermined the zero carbon homes 
policy mix.  
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7.1. Introduction  
 
Improving the efficiency of energy use in buildings has significant potential to contribute to global 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction strategies (IEA, 2012). However, currently, there is a lack 
of progress in reducing emissions across the UK’s building stock (CCC, 2016), and housing currently 
contributes 20% of the UK’s CO2e emissions (CCC 2018). New buildings make a small, but 
important contribution to these efforts, which is set to increase over time as more efficient new homes 
are built. An ambitious policy mix to radically change the house-building sector was introduced in the 
UK in 2006. The overall aim was that by 2016, all domestic new buildings would be net-zero carbon. 
This meant that the energy use of the building would be substantially reduced through the use of more 
sustainable components and new designs, while any remaining emissions would be offset by using on-
site renewable generation for electricity and heating (Greenwood, 2012, 2015; Heffernan et al., 2015). 
Interestingly, the strategy introduced in the UK exceeded any international performance standards at 
the time by accounting for the emissions associated with household appliances. This was particularly 
ambitious as the UK was largely considered a laggard in this area when contrasted with the relatively 
high standards achieved in other Northern European countries (Schweber, Lees, & Torriti, 2015). 
However, after successive changes reducing the standards needed to achieve the target, and limited 
success in stimulating a transition, the government finally denounced the Zero Carbon Homes policy 
mix in 2015.  
When considering the potential causes of success or failure, it is “almost impossible to remove the 
effects of political institutions” (Peters, 2015: 265). In that regard, previous work on the Zero Carbon 
Homes (ZCH) policy mix has pointed to institutional factors related to the processes of policymaking, 
rather than simply the design of specific policy instruments, as potential barriers. Greenwood (2012) 
identifies several conditions considered to have limited the impact of ZCH, including: a lack of 
evidence base for decision making, decisions being made at a ministerial level; a lack of expertise in 
the civil service; and lack of incentive to report issues to a minister. Pan and Garmston (2012) also 
highlight low levels of compliance with building regulations in the UK among house-builders as a 
potential barrier, and Love et al., (2017) question the validity of the testing and measuring procedures 
used in order to check/validate compliance. This paper builds on these empirical findings, taking a 
detailed view of the influence of institutional arrangements on the failure of ZCH.   
Processes of structural transformation of embedded societal needs (in this case housing) are the focus 
of the literature on sustainability transitions (Köhler et al., 2019). Sustainability transitions are 
"[l]ong-term, multi-dimensional, and fundamental transformation processes through which established 
socio-technical systems shift to more sustainable modes of production and consumption" (Markard, 
Raven, & Truffer, 2012). Socio-technical systems are commonly understood as ‘“linkages between 
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elements necessary to fulfil societal functions” (Geels 2004), including transport, energy 
generation/use and food provision. A central concept of the transitions literature is that existing socio-
technical configurations can be destabilised by: i) the emergence of novel, radical, innovations; 
combined with ii) social, political, environmental and/or economic conditions, which place pressure 
on the old configuration to change, and influence selection preferences/criteria in favour of the novel 
innovations. A new socio-technical system develops around emerging technologies and practices, and 
a transition can happen through various pathways (Geels and Schot 2007), including complete 
displacement of the existing configuration, or through adapting and integrating the emergent 
configuration while retaining extant structural elements.  
Another core idea is that incumbent actors who benefit from the status quo will typically resist change 
and seek to stabilise the existing configuration (Geels, 2014). Policy action can be used to accelerate 
and influence the direction of transitions (Kern & Rogge, 2016; Rosenow, Kern, & Rogge, 2017), but 
is often politically contested, leading to a growing research agenda within sustainability transitions 
studies towards better understanding the processes of sustainability orientated policymaking 
(Markard, Suter, et al., 2016; Normann, 2015, 2017). Edmondson, Kern, & Rogge, (2018) 
conceptualise policy processes while also incorporating the notion of ‘policy mixes’ (Rogge, Kern, & 
Howlett, 2017), as combinations of policy instruments implemented towards achieving an overall 
strategy. They develop a co-evolutionary framework to analyse policy-mix-making processes in 
relation to its dynamic interplay with the rate and direction of sustainability transitions, drawing on 
insights from policy feedback (Pierson, 1993). However, despite these advances, the role of 
institutions and their influence over policymaking processes among these contributions remains 
under-conceptualised (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Lockwood, Kuzemko, Mitchell, & Hoggett, 2017).  
Transitions scholars have used institutional concepts like rules, culture or legitimacy in order to 
account for the embeddedness of actors or the persistence of systems (Geels and Verhees, 2011; 
Geels, 2004, 2010). This conceptualisation of institutions draws predominantly from the work of Scott 
(1995), considering institutions as organisational fields (Andrews-Speed, 2016). However, the rich 
and diverse neo-institutionalist literatures can contribute useful insights to our understanding of 
policymaking processes in sustainability transitions (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Lockwood et al., 2017). 
For the conceptualisation of institutions, this paper builds upon Andrews-Speed (2016) and Lockwood 
et al. (2017), who outline potential contributions that institutional perspectives can provide for 
understanding policymaking processes. Regarding the conceptualisation of policy-mix-making 
processes in sustainability transitions, this paper builds upon the Edmondson et al., (2018) socio-
technical policy-mix co-evolution (SPC) framework. Combining these literatures, this paper zooms-in 
on the policy subsystem to consider how policy-mix-making processes are influenced by a given 
institutional setting in which they take place.  
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Broadly speaking, the paper combines theory with empirical data about UK policymaking processes 
to develop three heuristic forms: i) political institutions affecting decision-making through their 
influence on the policy subsystem, ii) policymaking institutional arrangements within the policy 
subsystem, and iii)  the institutional supports which interact with a policy mix affect its design, 
implementation and its impact on socio-technical change. The conceptualisation of these heuristics is 
an attempt to address the research question: how did institutional arrangements affecting UK housing 
policymaking contribute to the failure of the zero carbon homes policy mix? 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly considers how policymaking 
institutions have typically been defined in the literature on sustainability transitions, before section 3 
develops a heuristic to analyse the institutional setting in UK housing policymaking processes. 
Section 4 applies the heuristic to the case of the ZCH policy mix. Section 5 discusses the main 
insights in terms of their implications for credibility, capture from incumbents and links to policy 
feedback; before section 6 finally draws conclusions and makes recommendations for further work.  
 
7.2. Policy-mix-making, institutions and sustainability transitions  
 
This section outlines the recent research stream on policy-mix-making processes in the sustainability 
transitions literature, and insights institutional literature can contribute towards a better 
conceptualisation.  
 
7.2.1. Policy-mix-processes in sustainability transitions  
 
Scholars have argued that the pace of sustainability transitions can be accelerated and directed 
through targeted policies (Kern & Rogge, 2016), and there has been increasing attention to 
understanding the processes through which sustainably oriented policies are designed and 
implemented (Hoppmann et al., 2014). Transition scholars have drawn on various prominent theories 
of the policy process (Sabatier & Weible, 2014) to help better conceptualise these dynamics (for a 
review, see Kern & Rogge, 2017). These approaches have typically focussed on single policy 
instruments and their changes over time. However, increasingly, scholars in the field of sustainability 
transitions have stressed the need to consider overarching policy mixes (Rogge et al., 2017), 
consisting of multiple policy instruments implemented towards achieving an overall strategy (Rogge 
& Reichardt, 2016). Primarily, this is due to the scale, complexity, and urgency of sustainability 
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transitions, and an acknowledgment that no single policy or ‘silver bullet’ is capable of achieving 
such systemic transformational change.  
Policy mix design implies coordination is needed to meet an overall strategy, necessitating the 
consideration of interactions, trade-offs and synergies of instruments (Flanagan et al., 2011). 
Policymakers are rarely given a blank slate from which to implement new policies, and are typically 
‘layered’ alongside numerous pre-existing ones (Howlett & Rayner, 2007, 2013). Previously 
implemented policies may have produced path-dependant societal and political reconfigurations, 
making them increasingly difficult to change over time (lock-in) (Pierson, 1993, 2000, 2004). 
Additionally, the beneficiaries of existing policies may be resistant to change and will seek to 
influence policymaking outcomes (resultant change or stability of the policy mix as the outcome of 
policymaking processes occurring within the policy subsystem )36 in order to protect their interests37 
(Kern & Howlett, 2009; Kern & Smith, 2008). Moreover, as more polices are implemented in a given 
domain, there is a higher occurrence of unintended consequences as these instruments interact in a 
changing social and political context (Jordan & Matt, 2014). Consequently, the underlying policy-
mix-making processes are more complex than single instrument analyses, and scholars have called for 
increased attention to processes of policy mix change (Flanagan et al., 2011; Rogge & Reichardt, 
2016).  
Edmondson, Kern, & Rogge, (2018) focus on policy-mix-making processes, drawing insights from 
the policy feedback literature (Campbell, 2012; Pierson, 1993). They develop an analytical framework 
for the co-evolution of policy mixes and socio-technical systems, making two main postulations for 
conceptualising co-evolutionary interaction dynamics. Firstly, the process of policy-mix-change 
produces policy effects, which influence the rate and direction of socio-technical change by their 
influence on actor behaviour. Secondly, (often policy-induced) changes within the socio-technical 
system produce feedback mechanisms, affecting the ‘policy subsystem’ (the network of actors active 
in policymaking processes). In doing so, feedback mechanisms influence subsequent rounds of 
policymaking through actors’ behaviour within the subsystem. Therefore, in line with Flanagan et al., 
(2011), at the core of these processes is the role and agency of actors, who: i) shape policy outcomes 
by their involvement in processes within the policy subsystem; and ii) reconfigure the structural 
elements of the socio-technical system38. However, regarding the first of these considerations, despite 
being a fundamental presupposition of the co-evolutionary framework, the interactions of actors in 
processes within the policy subsystem are not explicitly conceptualised.  
 
36 The use of the term ‘policymaking outcome’ is not to be conflated with what Schmidt & Sewerin (2018) call a 
‘policy output’, which is better conceptualised as the impact of policymaking outcomes on the reconfiguration 
of the socio-technical system.  
37 Transition scholars commonly consider this as part of ‘regime resistance’.  
38 No configurations are static and require adaptation over time. Actors who support/benefit from the status quo 
will seek to prevent more radical reconfiguration and direct change in ways that supports their own interests.  
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Howlett and Ramesh (2003) define the policy subsystem as “a space where relevant actors discuss 
policy uses and persuade and bargain in pursuit of their interests”. Feedback mechanisms can help 
explain the interests of policymaking actors, why certain groups have incentives to seek change when 
they do (Jacobs & Weaver, 2015). Regarding how these processes unfold, interactions “occur in the 
context of various institutional arrangements surrounding the policy process, which affect how the 
actors pursue their interests and ideas and the extent to which their efforts succeed” (Howlett and 
Ramesh, 2003, pp. 53–54). Edmondson et al., (2018) acknowledge the importance of institutional 
arrangements, in particular, that institutional reform may be needed for policy mixes to achieve 
objectives and produce positive feedback mechanisms (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009). However, the role 
of institutional arrangements in policymaking processes remains under conceptualised. Given this 
conceptual gap, the next section turns to institutionalist literatures, drawing insights from Historical 
Institutionalism (HI) to further develop how these processes unfold within the policy subsystem. 
 
7.2.2. Institutions and sustainability transitions  
 
The main claim of institutionalist approaches is that institutions matter (Weaver & Rockman, 1993). 
Policy is almost inherently embedded within an institutional framework, making it hard to understand 
policy without the institutions that produce and reformulate it (Peters, 2012). Neo-institutionalism 
consists of various approaches which seek to help understand this fundamental claim (March & Olsen, 
1984). Functional approaches are concerned with linking individuals to institutions (Thelen, 1999), 
including sociological institutionalism (Scott, 1995), and rational-choice institutionalism (North, 
1992). The key difference between these approached is their consideration of the individual, where 
rational choice builds upon game theory and the work of North, and sociological institutionalism 
argues that decisions are socially constructed (Steinmo, 2008). Historical institutionalism (HI) is 
considered a structural approach (Peters, 2012), and is primarily focused on explaining dynamics of 
stability and change within politics and policymaking. Actors are still important, but HI is relatively 
agnostic when it comes to its model of the individual, which (put simply), is that the choices each 
individual makes incorporates elements of both rational choice and social constructivism, and 
importantly, these decisions are circumstantial (Immergut, 2006). A fourth, more recent branch is 
discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008), which is interested in the ways actors frame ideas to 
shape policy outcomes through discourse, but is less explicit about the institutional setting (structural) 
in which these processes play out.  
There has, to date, been relatively few applications of institutional approaches within the transitions 
literature. The use of institutions within this literature is primarily concerned with the concept of 
organisational fields, drawing predominantly on the work of Scott (1995). The first explicit use of 
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neo-institutionalism (Kern, 2012), combined discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 2008) with Hajer’s 
(1995) discourse coalitions approach. Recently, however, there has been interest in drawing insights 
from institutionalist approaches to help better conceptualise politics and policymaking in transitions. 
Andrews-Speed (2016) reviews neo-institutional approaches with regards to their potential usefulness 
for transition scholars. Of these approaches, HI is identified as being the approach which best 
conceptualises power dynamics within policymaking processes. Lockwood, Kuzemko, Mitchell, & 
Hoggett, (2017) also review the potential insights that HI can offer in more depth, arguing 
persuasively for the usefulness of HI as complimentary to transitions literatures, and proposing a 
research agenda working towards better conceptualisation and empirical evaluation of these insights.  
Building on the arguments of Lockwood et al. (2017), HI is also considered a particularly promising 
approach to help further conceptualise politics and policymaking processes in this paper for several 
reasons. Firstly, it better links public policy to public administration, which are intimately linked yet 
increasingly divergent disciplines (Peters 2012). Second, HI was developed from ideas regarding 
‘bringing the state back in’ (Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol, 1988) following the aggressive 
liberalisation agenda pursued in the 1980s. This resonates with the ideas advocated by many transition 
scholars, who emphasis the role of the state as a coordinator  and the need for strong political 
leadership to guide transition processes (Johnstone & Newell, 2017).  Thirdly, this paper bases its 
conceptualisation of policy-mix-making processes on Edmondson et al. (2018), who draw heavily 
from the literature on policy feedback. Policy feedback literature  was developed from HI, pioneered 
by Skocpol (1992) and Pierson (1993), and pays attention to ways in which policy, once enacted, can 
reconfigure politics. The policy feedback literature has produced multiple insights about the role of 
feedback on policy change or stability, but as argued by Jacobs & Weaver, (2015) there are limits to 
policy feedback, and other factors (including institutions) also influence politics and policymaking 
processes. As observed by Patashnik & Zelizer (2013) “we know what feedback can do—but not as 
much about when feedback will or won’t happen” (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013: 1075). I argue that 
feedback and institutional arrangements can be linked more explicitly, and that understanding the role 
of institutions can help understand how feedback mechanisms are generated (or not), and the 
influence of these feedbacks on policy outcomes.  
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7.3. Institutional arrangements of UK house building policymaking  
 
This section of the paper develops three heuristic forms of institutional arrangements which help 
understand the foundations on which new energy efficiency housing policy part of in the UK.  
To develop these forms, several forms of data were drawn upon including primary data and 
secondary. The primary data forms are 18 expert interviews and 118 documents obtained through a 
freedom of information request made to DCLG for all meeting agendas, minutes, and supplementary 
material from the Zero Carbon Task Force. Secondary data consisted of archival data, policy 
documents, media articles, grey literature and debates in the House of Commons and House of Lords.  
Interviews were conducted between August and October 2017 (table 1). The participants were 
selected based on their involvement in, or knowledge of the policymaking process of ZCH. 10 of the 
interviews were with actors directly involved in the policymaking processes. This means that they 
were involved in the formal networks of discussion/debate established (Task Force), or were delegates 
(Hub, BRE). Six of the actors were indirectly involved in policymaking processes, named ‘pressure 
participants’, meaning that they may have informally contributed to policymaking processes through 
lobbying (etc.) or through consultation. Finally, 2 interviews were conducted with experts to help 
validate and corroborate findings.  
Table 14 - Interviewees by actor group, role and affiliation 
 
Interview Actor group  Role Organisation/Affiliation  
[1] Policymaker Minister DCLG / Task force 
[2] Policymaker  Civil Servant  Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) / Local 
Area Building Control (LABC) / Zero Carbon Hub 
[3] Policymaker Civil servant  Carbon Trust / Zero Carbon Hub 
[4] Policymaker  Chairman Zero Carbon hub / Task Force 
[5] Policymaker  Director Zero Carbon Hub / Task Force 
[6] Policymaker  Managing Director Zero Carbon Hub / Task Force 
[7] Policymaker  Technical Manager Zero Carbon Hub  
[8] Policymaker  Technical Manager   Zero Carbon Hub  
[9] Policymaker Consultant /Expert  Chartered Institutions of Building Service Engineers 
(CIBSE) / Zero Carbon Hub 
[10] Policymaker  Technical Manager Building Research Establishment (BRE)  
[11] Pressure Participant  Industry (Developer) House Builders Federation (HBF) 
[12] Pressure Participant  Industry (Developer) House Builders Federation (HBF) 
[13] Pressure Participant Industry 
(Manufacturing) 
Construction Products Association (CPA)  
[14] Pressure Participant Industry 
(Manufacturing) 
Association for the Conservation of Energy (ACE) 
[15] Pressure Participant  NGO/Advocacy  UK-Green Building Council 
[16] Pressure Participant NGO/ Advocacy  E3G 
[17] Expert 
[18] Expert 
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These data sources were used throughout the rest of the paper in both developing the heuristic to 
evaluate UK housing institutional arrangements affecting the policymaking process, and then when 
applying these to help explain the failure of ZCH (section 7.4).  
 
7.3.1. Political institutional arrangements  
 
While political institutions originate from outside of the policy subsystem, their influence over the 
internal processes is profound, and can drastically affect the organisational structure, along with 
which ideas and interests which are more or less successful in influencing policymaking outcomes 
(e.g. policy-mix-change). Primarily the political institutions in a given context will shape which ideas 
and interests are given more precedence. A key consideration here is the role of veto players 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017), which are defined as the individual or collective actors whose 
agreement is a necessary condition for change (Tsebelis, 1995, 2002). For the most part political 
institutions are relatively stable, but that is not to say that stable political institutions leads to policy 
stability. To the contrary, some political institutional arrangements significantly change policymaking 
outcomes and vice-versa (Tsebelis, 1995). Accordingly, institutional change can occur, including 
changing in the number of veto players (Tsebelis, 2002), but is typically incremental (North, 1990).  
There are two forms of veto players, partisan and institutional.  
The role and influence of partisan veto players is related to the electoral system in a given setting, and 
relates to the number of different political parties who can influence (or more importantly block) 
decision making, therefore making policymaking more consensus driven. Lockwood et al. (2017) 
argue that Proportional Representation (PR) systems accommodate smaller political parties, and are 
more likely to result in coalition government. This creates more partisan veto players and gives more 
influence to groups otherwise marginalised in majoritarian systems, and leads to more stable policy 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017). As a Majoritarian system the UK is normally considered to have 
two main parties: Labour and the Conservatives. Consequentially, there are typically no partisan veto 
players, leading to combative politics (Lockwood et al. 2017).  
The number and role of institutional veto players, relate to constitutional agreements (Tsebelis, 2002). 
Primarily, this is concerned with if the political system is presidential vs. parliamentarian, and 
federalist vs. centralised (Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017).  
Policymaking is in the UK is centralised, set at a national level by government. Implementation is 
sometimes the responsibility of local authorities, but they generally lack autonomy to design policy 
independently and are not involved in passing legislation. The UK Government operates under a 
parliamentary system. Government debate occurs in the House of Commons, where all elected 
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members of parliament (MPs) are represented. UK Government also has a second chamber, the House 
of Lords. All bills and pieces of legislation must pass through the House of Lords, as well as the 
House of Commons. However, the Lords are not actually an institutional veto player, as their approval 
is not needed to pass new legislation (unlike the senate in the US). However, although it is MPs that 
have the final say, it is in the House of Lords where the Commons' amendments to bills are subjected 
to scrutiny and debate. Moreover, it would be incorrect to assume that second chambers without veto 
power do not affect legislation. Tsebelis and Money (1997) have demonstrated that such chambers 
can influence outcomes, and sometimes can even abort legislation. One example is by suspending 
legislation just before an election which leads to the termination of bills (Tsebelis, 2002). 
The parliamentary arrangement assigns key areas of government policy to various ‘Secretaries of 
State’, who make up an overall government ‘Cabinet’. The Cabinet are not voted for/elected publicly, 
instead being appointed by the Prime Minister. This directly affects authoritative decision making 
within a government department which significantly effects policymaking outcomes. Each 
government department is (typically)39 assigned a Secretary of State, who oversees the department 
and is the key veto player on policy decisions made at the level of the subsystem (fig 10). This is 
important since if policy change is secondary legislation, decisions can be made within the department 
(at least officially). Each department is also assigned a number of Ministers of State for specific 
responsibilities (for example, housing), and a number of junior ministers whose responsibilities are 
typically split across various different issues. The cabinet system in the UK undergoes fairly frequent 
re-shuffles (sometimes in response to crises or poor performance in local elections), in which, 
ministers (especially at the lower levels) are switched to other departments [1]. This procedure of re-
shuffling is not often well aligned with ministers’ training, background or experience, which can lead 
to appointments of ministers who have little knowledge (and sometimes interest) of the area in which 
they are making decisions [1]. The rotation of Ministers throughout the progression of ZCH is 
represented in fig 9. 
“It’s not a particularly sophisticated attempt to match people to their skills and aptitudes or their 
preferences, particularly not at the lower levels. People just want to be in the ministerial team and if the 
Prime Minister says ‘It’s Agriculture’ you say ‘Yes please’, you don’t say ‘No I only want Education’.” 
[1] 
 
39 Not all departments have a Secretary of State, for example HM Treasury (financial ministry) is headed by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer 
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Figure 9 - Rotation of Government Ministers throughout the progression of ZCH 
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Historically, the Cabinet would make collective, consensus-driven decisions on important new 
policies. However, since the 1980s, the role of the Cabinet in UK government decision-making has 
seemingly retracted, leading to less-formalised arrangements among a smaller number of political 
actors/key veto players (Hennessy, 2005). For example, the ‘new-labour’ government operated under 
an informal ‘sofa-cabinet’ (Hennessy, 2005). Officially, the Cabinet still operated, but was considered 
as a ‘rubber-stamping’ process for decisions which had already been made elsewhere (Heffernan, 
2011). This style of government more closely resembles a Presidential system, but without other 
institutional veto players involved as with the US (house and senate).  
This arrangement somewhat undermines the official structure and procedure of decision-making, and 
significantly concentrates power to a select few veto players. Moreover, informal decision-making 
with low visibility, also makes it hard to account what evidence is being used in decision-making. The 
‘sofa-cabinet’ came under scrutiny, with regards to the evidence of ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 
used to justify the UK’s involvement in the Iraq war (Butler Review, 2004). This resulted in some 
reform back towards the Cabinet Style of Government, re-establishing a number of Cabinet 
Committees (Hennessy, 2007). However, as will be explored in the next section, the political 
institutional arrangement during the Coalition Government (2010-2015) are significant for the ZCH 
policy mix, and its implications will be discussed further in the next section of the paper. 
Related to the number and type of veto players, is the presence or absence of credible commitment 
regarding policymaking processes. Broadly speaking, the fewer the number of veto players in a 
political system, the greater the power of those veto players to effect policy change. In Majoritarian 
systems with low/no partisan veto players, and a fairly low, concentrated number of institutional veto 
players, there is little credibility for long term decision making. The expectation is that in the 
occurrence of a change in government, the combative nature of majoritarian politics means that the 
newly elected government is likely to change the existing policies. PR systems tend to give more 
credibility due to the number of different actors represented in government, meaning that generally 
once consensus is reached political commitment to a given policy mix tends to be more stable 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017).   
Overall, the combination of political institutional arrangements in the UK means that power is 
concentrated, and allows for greater influence of a small number of key veto players (Lockwood, 
Kuzemko, et al., 2017). Without the involvement of other institutional veto players, or consensus-
driven decision-making, radical action and inaction/inertia are both possible depending on if the status 
quo aligns with the interests of this small, concentrated number of powerful veto players. However, 
veto players are not the only consideration important for policy change. Hacker (2004), links the 
concept of veto players to policy change, while also considering what he calls the ‘barriers to internal 
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policy conversion’, the most prevalent aspects of this concept being the discretion of policymakers to 
enact reforms (how visible the area is) and the strength of the supporting coalitions. With more veto 
players, policymakers change the policy mix through ‘drift’ (changing the objectives of policy) or 
‘conversion’ (altering or changing policy mix instruments) in situations of high and low barriers 
(respectively). Hacker (2004) also proposes that in situations with few veto players but strong 
supporting coalitions for the status quo, policy reforms are layered on top of the existing ones, but 
without strong coalitions reform or termination is possible. Linking this concept to the idea of policy 
feedback would therefore suggest that low numbers of veto players actually makes producing strong 
positive feedback and constituencies of support if even more important than for arrangements with 
more veto players.  
 
 
Figure 10 - Example of Government Structure in UK. 
 
 
7.3.2. Policymaking institutional arrangements  
 
Policymaking institutions significantly alter dynamics occurring within the policy subsystem, and 
relate to the organisation of government departments responsible for designing and implementing 
policy (Lockwood, Mitchell, Hoggetta, & Kuzemkob, 2017). 
While political veto players in the subsystem greatly influence the decision-making aspect of 
policymaking, they generally have less influence over design. More importantly, are the capabilities 
of governmental departments to effectively design and implement policy (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009). 
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This includes technical capabilities, and government’s ability to access information, which is 
important for assessing costs, making strategic choices and long-term agenda setting (Kuzemko, 
2016). If government lacks the technical expertise to design and implement policy, it may establish 
public-private networks to help design and steer policymaking, or it may choose to delegate 
policymaking responsibilities to non-governmental actors/organisations. In the case of delegation, this 
may also occur in order to shield it from political contestation, provide more certainty, and reduce risk 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017). Delegation has been argued to be a potential tactic to shield 
policymaking  from unstable political conditions caused by Majoritarian systems, by effectively 
creating new institutional veto players (Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017).   
In the UK, Policy-design is the responsibility of the Civil Service (bureaucracy) working within a 
government department, where senior civil servants oversee a large number of junior civil servants. 
There is a culture of high-turnover of staff within the civil service (particularly junior level), which is 
much higher than other countries (Sasse & Norris, 2019a). The Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government (formerly DCLG) lost almost a quarter of its staff in 2018 (Sasse & Norris, 
2019b). This is not a recent phenomenon. In 1968, Lord Fulton criticised excessive turnover in a 
report on the composition of the civil service:  
“It cannot make for the efficient despatch of public business when key men rarely stay in one job longer 
than two or three years before being moved to some other post, often in a very different area of 
government activity”.40  
The highest proportion of turnover occurs in London (Whitehall). With a total of 80,000 roles, 
employees are constantly looking for a promotion, and transfer to other departments is common 
practice. According to civil servants “you are always on the lookout for a move” and “I’d been in the 
department six months so it was time to start looking for something else” (cited in Sasse & Norris, 
2019: 11). This workforce model is expensive and inefficient. High turnover adds significant direct 
costs: recruitment is expensive and time-consuming; and departments invest significant resources in 
training staff, who then move on quickly. The indirect costs of high turnover are more significant. 
While some turnover is optimal41, excessively high turnover is associated with lower productivity, as 
staff have insufficient knowledge and expertise about how to do their jobs (Sasse & Norris 2019).  
This reduced government capacity has led to a tendency to delegate to non-government actors (for an 
account of government delegation in the UK energy sector see Kuzemko, 2016), which becomes self-
reinforcing as capabilities reduce further and as policy areas become less ‘visible’. Most technical 
 
40 Lord Fulton, The Civil Service Vol. 1 Report of the Committee 1966-68, HM Stationery Office, 1968, 
www.civilservant.org.uk/library/1968_fulton_report.html  
41 Low turnover has been associated with existing staff lacking new ideas or incentives to perform well (Sasse & 
Norris, 2019b).  
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energy expertise in the public sector was lost to private companies (Rutledge, 2010), making 
Government dependent on them for technical capacity, through secondments (Kuzemko, 2016). A 
similar situation can be observed with regards to buildings. Historically, the Building Research 
Establishment (BRE) was the UK government owned national laboratory for research in the built 
environment. However, in 1997, the conservative government privatised BRE. Since privatisation, 
BRE operates as a charitable organisation funded through commissioned research, its commercial 
products (such as building standards), and digital tools used in the construction sector [10]. This is 
what Kuzemko (2016) calls Marketised delegation, involving the privatisation of policymaking and/or 
regulatory processes to independent market based actors. Typically motivated by neo-liberal 
ideologies, this form of deregulation tends to lead to embedded corporate power in decision making. 
Another form of marketised delegation important for buildings/housing in the UK is, the delegated 
implementation of UK Building regulations. After the introduction of the Building Act in 1984, a 
body called the Construction Industry Council (CIC) was formed to allow the privatisation of 
Building Control. This central government organisation regulates Private Building Control and 
approves inspectors to carry out this role, as well as local councils who had been previously 
responsible. The first company to gain CIC approval was the National House Building Council 
(NHBC) in the 1990s. There are now more than 150 companies nationwide who offer Building 
Control services for residential or commercial properties. Housing developers now have a choice 
regarding if they choose local council inspectors42, or private sector actors. However, due to funding 
cuts and the option of private building control, capabilities within local authorities have decreased 
[2,7,8]. Moreover, an important consideration for energy is that (as discussed further in the following 
subsection) the method of compliance for the energy component is via the Standards Assessment 
Procedure (SAP) a certification designed by BRE. Consequently, the SAP rating of the building has to 
be approved by SAP assessor, trained and registered SAP under BRE. An important implication is 
that local building control officers are not SAP assessors [2], which means that the option for a non-
market based actor is not an option for assessment of energy.  
“Building control officers are not SAP assessors, they are separate. Some building control 
officers will become SAP assessors just out of interest, and some of them moonlight and do SAP 
assessments for others, but it is separate, and given all the other things that building control 
officers have to look out for, I guess many are happy that that’s taken out of their... and they 
say ‘yes, we had this SAP assessment, we looked at it, it seemed to meet all the requirements, 
and so we don’t need to check that anymore’.” 
Kuzemko (2016) also identifies two further forms of delegation, technocratic and non-deliberative. 
Technocratic delegation is often argued to be appropriate by government when it is simply not 
 
42 Collectively represented by Local Area Building Control.  
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qualified enough to make effective decisions on policymaking, but as argued by Kuzemko (2016) 
becomes self-fulling and self-reinforcing over time as capabilities are lost within government and 
certain policy areas become less visible. Finally, non-deliberate delegation is the outcome of unequal 
access to information and resources which leads to the exclusion of some groups while favouring 
others in decision making processes. All of these forms of delegation are closely related to the idea of 
capture of policymaking processes by incumbency (Johnstone, Stirling, & Sovacool, 2017), and in 
line with (Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017) this paper questions whether certain types of institutonal 
arrangments allow for higher degree of capture. The next section of the paper will look at the 
policymaking institutional arrangements specifically affecting ZCH, and if these allowed for capture.  
 
7.3.3. Institutional supports  
 
Policy, in and of itself, is a type of formal institution embedded in wider institutional environment. 
Policy mixes will interact with a number of other pre-existing institutions, including laws and 
informal rules (North 1994). This affects how the instruments which make up a policy mix are 
designed, implemented and enforced. These are the institutional supports which interact with the mix, 
which in general may include: existing laws or the legal system within which policy has to be 
designed; the interactions with other policy mixes in different domains (Peters, 2015); or what 
(Williamson, 2000) refers to as being ‘institutions governing transactions’. Failure to pay attention to, 
or reform, this wider institutional environment may mean that policy mixes are unable to achieve their 
objectives, or generate positive feedback (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2009).  
New policy is often layered on an existing institutional structure, as policymakers rarely start from a 
blank slate to implement new policy (Howlett, 2014), and some institutions have high internal barriers 
to change (Hacker, 2004). In the UK, national building regulations were first introduced in 1985, 
following the Building Act in 1984. This Act allowed subsequent changes to be made as secondary 
legislation by the relevant government department. Building regulations were first amended to include 
energy in 1990, introducing ‘Part L - conservation of fuel and power’. This was largely driven by the 
miner’s strikes in the early 1980s and the 1979 oil crisis, which had caused (macro-political) concerns 
in government over the scarcity of fuel [2]. In the early 2000s, increased attention to climate change 
mitigation led to the passing of the Sustainable and Secure Building Act (2004), which introduced 
sustainability and energy efficiency into the national building regulations for the first time [1,6]. This 
laid the foundations for how the zero carbon homes target was designed, which was to be 
implemented through updates to the energy efficiency standards contained in the national building 
regulations.   
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By being incorporated into the national regulations, updates to energy efficiency requirements were 
subject to the pre-existing procedural rules. The process of updating the building regulations in the 
UK is through consultation, in which draft proposals are released, allowing industry to respond before 
final publication [1]. The frequency at which these regulations are updated is roughly every three 
years [1]. Consequently, the zero carbon homes target was designed to be achieved through 
increments to the building regulations in 2006, 2010, 2013 and finally 2016.  
“The idea of the three years was first introduced maybe 15 years ago … the industry didn’t 
want changes every year. It was then agreed that, you’d accumulate any changes you wanted to 
make and do them, then there’d be 3 years before the next set. But the process of reviewing the 
regulations and bringing stuff forward isn’t a sudden thing, the deal is that you publish what 
you intend to do a year before. You, the ministry, the government, publishes what it intends to 
do and then 6 months later it takes a look at the representations and says we’ve taken a look 
and this is what we are going to do in a further 6 months.”[1] 
Institutional supports can also exist outside the policy domain and may originate from deeply rooted 
principles such as common law, and taxation (Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013). Given the difficulties in 
replacing or terminating these kind of existing institutions arrangements, new policy is typically is 
layered alongside them. Therefore, policymakers should design policy while considering potential 
interactions with these forms of institutional supports, including the influence of these kind of 
institutions on actor behaviour (Williamson 2000), and failure to do so may lead to suboptimal 
outputs.  
A key institutional support of this form interacting with building regulations, is the existing planning 
laws, which have two major implications for housebuilding in the UK. Planning restrictions have a 
significant impact on house and land prices, and the availability of housing development sites is a 
highly political issue [6]. Government intervention in the process can create very large distortions in 
the price of land. Land speculation occurs frequently and can cause major distortions to the price of 
land, therefore peaks and troughs of land prices have historically been greater than those of house 
prices [6]. Consequently, the business model of all the major house builders is to hold a land bank on 
which to build [6]. The relative size of the land bank of the top 5 builders increased from just over 3 
years of supply in the 1990s, to 4.4 years by 2006 (Sceptre 2007).  
Secondly, the existing planning laws in the UK allow developers to register a site by laying 
foundations [1,6]. Doing so, locks the requirements for houses built on the site to the regulatory 
standards at the time of registration [1,6,15]. This strategy is supported by the business model to bank 
land reserves. As a consequence, there is typically a 2-3 year lag between new regulation coming in 
and new developments building to those standards [1,6].  Importantly, SMEs do not have land bank 
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reserves and therefore bear the brunt of the new regulations before the major developers, despite their 
typically small profit margins. 
“If you’ve got you’re planning permission and Building Regulation approval before the [new] 
regulations come in then you only have to comply with what was in force when you started.” [1] 
However, not all institutional supports are so deeply embedded, and may be linked to rules and 
operating procedures about how policy is enforced. An example of this form of institutional support is 
the capabilities to effectively evaluate policy performance and compliance, and the ability to enforce 
these. Regulatory policy may be dependent on the measurement tools available for checking 
compliance. Low technical capabilities, may mean the design of these tools are outsourced, but 
without government capabilities to make changes, the design of regulatory policy is constrained to the 
parameters (what is measured) of the compliance procedure. With regards to ZCH, the Standard 
Assessment Procedure (SAP) was created by the BRE in 1992 as digital tool to assist the design of 
more efficient buildings. It has since been adopted by government as the method of assessing 
compliance with the energy component of building regulations in the UK.  
 
7.4. Institutional arrangements contributing to the failure of zero carbon homes  
 
In this section of the paper, the three heuristic frames are applied to policymaking processes leading 
up to the failure of the zero carbon homes to help understand their role in its eventual denouncement.  
The findings in this section were derived from the evaluation of both 
 
7.4.1. Political institutional arrangements   
 
The key consideration when evaluating political institutions is the role of veto players and their 
influence on policymaking. In that regard, the most significant impact of political institutions on ZCH 
is the period of Government under the Coalition government (2010-2015) formed between the 
Conservative Party (CP) and the Liberal Democrats (LD). Coalitions are rare in UK government, and 
its formation created a new partisan veto player, which in theory should move toward consensus 
based decision-making. However, the number of institutional veto players was low under this 
government. Core decision-making operated under ‘the Quad’, a group at the top of the government 
consisting of four representatives: the Prime Minister David Cameron (CP), Deputy Prime Minister 
Nick Clegg (LD), Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osbourne (CP), and Chief Secretary to the 
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Treasury Danny Alexander (LD). This meant that half of this group of key veto players were 
financial/treasury representatives (Forsyth 2012)43.  
The key objective of the new formed government was reducing the deficit, as stated in the coalition 
agreement:“[T]he most urgent task facing this coalition is to tackle our record debts, because without 
sound finances, none of our ambitions will be deliverable.” (Cabinet Office, 2010). The core 
ideologies accompanying this ambition was to reduce government spending (austerity) and to de-
regulate industries to assist economic recovery. Due to its high involvement within the Quad, 
Treasury took an active role in all areas of government [2,6]. As well as an aggressive deregulation 
agenda dubbed ‘cutting the red tape’, Treasury also placed restrictions of government departments 
introducing new regulation:   
 “What they introduced was a one-in, two-out policy. So that if you wanted to introduce new 
regulations, you had to take two out. Then that changed to one-in, three-out, which is the 
current policy. I think it’s one of the most stupid bits of government policy ever introduced. If 
there’s a good case for a new regulation, you should be able to introduce it without having to 
search the stature book for regulations which are three times the value of the cost you’re 
incurring on industry.” [2] 
 
Austerity measures were implanted through funding cuts enacted through the new CP ministers 
assigned to DCLG, Secretary of State Erik Pickles (CP), and Housing Minister Grant Shapps (CP). 
The most notable change was to cut the funding to the zero carbon hub, which will be explored in 
more depth in the following subsection. The other significant change for policymaking processes was 
to the terms of the Zero Carbon Task Force, a group established under Labour and chaired by the 
Housing Minister in order to consult with industry representatives and to help steer policymaking 
towards achieving ZCH. The change of terms was announced by the new Housing Minister at the first 
meeting under the new government (TF 62), after which he stopped attending (fig 11). Without 
representation from the Minister, the purpose of the Task Force was undermined and it was disbanded 
January 2014 [5,6]. 
Beyond these changes to the policymaking processes, the new secretary of state had little interest in 
sustainability, or even the building regulations [1]. Throughout the coalition Pickles remained in this 
senior role, and was widely regarded as an obstacle to achieving the ZCH strategy [1,2,9,15].  
 
43 Forsyth, (2012). Politics: Britain’s new gang of four. https://www.spectator.co.uk/2012/02/politics-britains-
new-gang-of-four/  
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“Secretary of State, Eric Pickles … suppressed any attempts to do anything innovative or 
technically challenging, and clearly had absolutely no interest in what we were trying to do. 
I’m not sure he had any idea what it was about…I think that in terms of removing carbon 
emissions from the UK buildings stock, Eric Pickles was the biggest disaster to ever hold 
office. I don’t think the man had the foggiest idea, I’m not even sure if he understood the 
implications of climate change.”[9] 
Responsibilities for the building regulations were delegated to LD junior minister Andrew Stunnell, 
who as a trained architect was interested in building sustainability and had technical capabilities that 
many other government ministers did not [5,6,9,15].   
“When I was appointed, the first day I went in and met Eric and he said ‘We need a 
discussion about areas of responsibility’ and I said, ‘Do you know who’s going to be doing 
Building Regulations?’ and he said ‘What are they?'” [1] 
However, as a junior minister his responsibilities were split among several areas, “maybe that was a 
day a week of what I was doing” [1], which combined with relatively low influence in decision 
making (despite a keen interest in achieving ZCH), meant his impact on policymaking was limited 
[2].  
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Figure 11 - Attendance of Housing Ministers to meetings of the Zero Carbon Task Force 
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“DECC was greener than DCLG most of the time because it had a Secretary of State wanting 
to deliver, whereas in my case I had one who was prepared to indulge me but for whom it was 
completely irrelevant.”[1] 
It soon became clear that while engagement with the LD ministers was good, getting the Secretary of 
State or Treasury to sign-off on decisions was difficult [6,15].  
“You had internal struggles within DCLG itself…  DECC was rather uninfluential… the 
treasury was somewhat anti-red tape… you [were] sort of picking and choosing allies within 
government, and it was clear from then that it was going to be more of a struggle.” [15]. 
The other, and perhaps most important change to policymaking processes that occurred was the 
increased influence of Treasury over decisions normally made within the department [1,2,6]. The 
construction sector was seen as a major contributor to economic recovery. In particular, housing 
supply/delivery was a main priority, in attempt to alleviate the ongoing housing crisis [1,2]. The 
housing industry was able to lobby treasury to revoke the target using the argument that increased 
costs associated with higher energy requirements of buildings would further reduce the rate of supply. 
 “[HBF] has regular meetings with the treasury, because delivery of houses is very high on 
the government agenda … Housing is very important, HBF is seen as (as indeed they are) the 
representatives of the major home builders. Since 2010, the HBF has become more powerful. 
Because of the change in government...Between 2010 and 2015, if the HBF had said to 
George Osborne that ‘we don’t want DCLG doing this’, they wouldn’t have done it.”[2] 
The changes occurring within the coalition government reflects the principles of policy ‘drift’ and 
‘conversion’, as argued by Hacker (2004). Environmental policy became a source of contention 
between the coalition members, with Cameron famously announcing to “cut all the green crap” 
(Carter & Clements, 2015). Clearly, the CP wanted to terminate the target, but due to the LD partisan 
veto player, for whom ZCH was a totemic policy, they had to employ other forms of retrenchment (E. 
M. Patashnik, 2008). In addition to the conversion of policymaking institutions (Task Force and Hub), 
CP also used drift through the re-definition of the requirements of the target. This was enabled by 
concentration of veto powers to treasury under grounds of deficit reduction.  
“So what happened is that the God within the coalition was treasury, so every decision that 
we [were] making in the Zero Carbon Hub, DCLG and DECC had to be fed into treasury for 
approval so that’s why [announcements] started coming through there”. [6] 
By 2014, government proposed an exemption from the ZCH standard for ‘small sites’. This was 
contested in the House of Lords, who highlighted that government’s the term ‘small sites’ was 
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undefined and could act as a loophole, where phased development of larger sites could avoid 
regulation (Parliament 2014)44. Irrespectively, in March 2015 the government published its response 
to the consultation, confirming that sites of 10 units or less would be exempt. 
Based on the extent of retrenchment occurring within the coalition, it is unsurprising that just one 
month after the 2015 general election, and CP gained a 12 seat majority, the target was denounced. 
HM treasury released “Fixing the foundations: creating a more prosperous nation”, which included 
plans to abandon the ZCH target and the energy efficiency standards in the 2016 building regulations. 
This came direct from Treasury, without having consulted with any other department [2,3,6,15]. This 
highlights how the decision-making processes become concentrated to a key veto player (treasury), 
and without the partisan veto player they could terminate the policy. The more radical reforms made 
in the later stages, including government’s proposals introduce a small sites exception, and then to 
remove the target in the Housing and Planning Bill 2015, were opposed in the House of Lords. 
However, without veto powers, government were able to defeated these amendment 
 
7.4.2. Policymaking institutional arrangements  
 
As already explained while developing the heuristic in the previous section, the UK has low 
government capacities, and outsources the design and enforcement of building regulations. This 
section will explain how these aspects acted as significant barriers to achieving ZCH. In addition, it 
will consider the formation of two additional groups the ‘Zero Carbon Task Force’ and the ‘Zero 
Carbon Hub’, specifically intended to assist in the delivery of ZCH and how the changes made to 
these groups contributed to the eventual failure of ZCH. The interaction of different organisations 
involved in the policymaking processes of ZCH is represented in fig 13.  
 
7.4.2.1.Enforcement/compliance of regulation  
 
The marketised delegation of both: i) designing and updating the tools for compliance (SAP), and ii) 
the enforcement of building regulations has, together, had significant implications for the prospects of 
achieving serious transformative change in the building sector in the UK. Privatisation of building 
control has led to a situation where the inspected party is also the client. Consequently, inspectors 
who have a reputation for being strict do not get repeat work [10]. As it is a competitive market, there 
 
44 Infrastructure Bill [Lords]. 08 December 2014. Volume 589. https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2014-
12-08/debates/14120810000001/InfrastructureBill(Lords)#contribution-14120836000033  
128 
 
Chapter 7. The demise of the UK Zero Carbon Homes policy mix: the role of institutional 
arrangements - Institutional arrangements contributing to the failure of zero carbon homes 
is now a situation where inspectors need to look for ‘creative solutions’, ways of interpreting 
regulations to make them easier to attain for the client [10]. As a consequence, even if buildings have 
a specific SAP or CSH rating, the evaluation method has commonly been manipulated to achieve 
compliance while doing as little as possible [10].   
“Running a team of Code Assessors, you start to see… if you’re a developer and you come to 
me and appoint me to be your Code Assessor… if I’m the most strict Code Assessor who’s 
really committed to sustainability and really committed to doing it right, I won’t get any more 
work from you. Whether it’s the Code or Building Regulations, an inspector who’s being paid 
by the person he’s inspecting, if he wants more work, needs to find ways to interpret the 
requirement to make it easier for the developer. I’m not saying everyone just turns a blind eye, 
but it makes it a hell of a lot easier for the contractor or the developer to do what they want if 
they’ve got someone who’s creatively thinking ‘oh, if you look at it from that angle then it 
actually could comply’. It takes the spirit of the requirement and it dilutes it… you end up with 
lots of different parties involved, [and] no-one with overall responsibility [and] no-one really 
checking the checkers even though they are being paid by the client… We need to have a 
really robust independent inspection regime otherwise contractors who are driven purely by 
profit will do the least they can do to get past the requirement… it’s a race to the 
bottom.”[10] 
 
7.4.2.2.Task force  
 
The previous section has already discussed how toward the eventual abandonment of ZCH, the role of 
the task force was downplayed as decision making became more concentrated to fewer and fewer veto 
players, and how after the change in government the lack of involvement of the housing minister 
practically made the group obsolete. What is of interest here is prior to the coalition government, 
when the group was more influential, and its influence in the policymaking process.  
Evaluating the participants at these meetings, reveals the participation of different stakeholders in 
proportion to the number of representatives for each respective organisation. The number of 
representatives by organisation for all the meetings of the task force are represented visually in fig 14. 
From this, we can see that there is relatively small representation of the renewables industry. 
Importantly, despite the target having a significant portion of on-site abatement (micro-renewables), 
representation from the micro-renewables industry is very low. Moreover, the Renewable Energy 
Association, the trade body representing this sector, wrote a letter to the task force requesting 
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representation at the meetings (fig 12). However, reviewing the participants at later meetings (fig xx), 
despite this request, they remained excluded.  
 
Figure 12 - Letter from the Renewable Energy Association to the Zero Carbon Task Force. (Emphasis added) 
One group that was well represented at these meetings was the UK Business Council for Sustainable 
Energy (UKBCSE). Importantly, this (now dissolved) trade body represented large-scale renewable 
energy (such as offshore wind) and natural gas, and its members were made up of the major energy 
utilities in the UK. Given the high involvement of this sector, and practically no representation from 
the micro-renewables industry. Somewhat unsurprisingly, at the early meetings of the task force, 
members lobbied for the incorporation of ‘off-site solutions’ (TF 21). This was later included in a 
redefined version of the target, called ‘allowable solutions’, and was originally framed as an option 
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for if it was unfeasible to achieve carbon abatement on-site, for issues such as ‘shading’ (poor sunlight 
conditions making on-site solar PV difficult/expensive).  
 
Figure 13 – Arrangement of key actors in policymaking process of ZCH. 
 
 
By itself this may seem a fairly inconsequential change to ZCH, but has more significant implications 
later, and contributed towards its eventual denouncement. Under the coalition, the treasury used 
‘allowable solutions’ as a means to become more influential over decision-making regarding the 
implementation of the building regulations.  
“In the arcane workings of the treasury’s mind and rules is that anything that’s off-site is 
something that you’re paying somebody else to do because the government requires it, and 
therefore it’s a tax, it’s not a service. So right from the start once you’re talking about 
Allowable Solutions, the treasury said ‘DCLG that is not your job, you can only have 
Allowable Solutions if we the Treasury authorize it’, so they had a grip, a deadlock, on that. 
Changing the regulations was our job….but we couldn’t do Allowable Solutions, the Treasury 
had to sign off and that was always the case”[1]. 
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By labelling the allowable solutions component as a tax they were able to effectively remove 
autonomy from DCLG to make changes to the 2013 update to the regulations, which were ultimately 
delayed and then significantly watered-down.  
“When I left office, which was September 2012, we had [the draft 2013 regulations] ready to 
go for [consultation] October and it didn’t happen” [1] 
 
Moreover, at the same time as introducing the small sites exemption, the target was redefined again, 
making allowable solutions method of achieving carbon abatement for electricity generation, 
excluding the use of micro-renewables altogether. Interestingly, the use of allowable solutions was 
actually given as a reason for the denouncement of the target, claiming it did not incentivise 
innovation in a select committee enquiry into the treasury’s actions in 2016.   
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Figure 14 - Attendees of all meetings of the Zero Carbon Task Force 
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7.4.2.3.Zero Carbon Hub  
 
Another important aspect of the policymaking process was the role of the Zero Carbon Hub, as a 
means of assisting with the delivery of the target. When first launched it was public-private 
partnership, co-funded by government and industry. Various aspects of the industry were represented, 
and it was generally considered as a positive step forward towards achieving the target [2,3,4,5,6,7,8, 
15]. Given the low capabilities of government, this can be considered as a form of expansion of state 
capacities. The Hub reported directly to the task force, but did have the autonomy to spend its funding 
(total £1.6 million) on research projects [7,8]. The Hub ran a series of working groups inviting 
participation from across industry and had representatives from DCLG and DECC. While “the input 
from government wasn’t brilliant because it didn’t actually have the technical expertise to get 
involved in all the consultations.” [15], engagement with government was good [7]. Through 
participation in the working groups “they were able to hear to the discussions about pros and cons” 
[8] and in addition, Hub members would present reports directly to DCLG officials [7,8]. However, 
the two most senior positions within the Hub were appointed to actors from the housebuilding 
industry and NHBC, the major/main insurance provider in the housing sector, which indicates a 
degree of capture from incumbency in another aspect of the policymaking process.   
The withdrawal of funding for the ZC Hub, was announced by the Housing Minister in 2010 [6]. This 
action sent a signal of intent (or rather lack of) for the delivery of ZCH [3].  
“Okay, so government… you no longer have a vehicle to help you deliver this policy? All 
that’s going to happen is we’re going to treat you as undesirable [because], you’re not going 
to be working with us. So they lost the whole vehicle to potentially take this forward.”[6].  
Funding for the continued operation of the Hub was picked up by NHBC, but that did not cover the 
costs of research projects. 
“NHBC were major funders of the organization but not much of that money ever went into a 
project. That was just the running costs of the Hub, mostly my salary. About half a million 
pounds a year they put in typically.”[6] 
Some funding was later made available from government, but these were commissioned for specific 
areas, such as overheating and the performance gap [6,7,8]. This marked a change in the operating 
procedures of the Hub, which no longer had the autonomy to launch its own research programs [8].   
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7.4.3. Institutional arrangements  
 
 
In section 7.3.3., the institutional supports in the UK housebuilding sector were introduced, primarily 
i) the interaction of the planning laws with the implementation of the building regulations, and ii) the 
procedure for updating regulations (consultations). This section will explain how these institutional 
supports acted as barriers towards achieving more radical change in the building industry.  
7.4.3.1.Planning laws  
 
Combined with the intervals at which the building regulations were planned to be updated, the 2-3 
year lag it takes for new development to be built to new standards meant that by the time of consulting 
for the next round of updates, there was no evidence of the previous regulations working or of the 
costs incurred by building to them [1,2]. While this had was always the situation, it became more 
significant as the level of lobbying against the target increased from the house builders, in part due to 
recession. The overall lack of evidence made it easier for influential house-builders to exaggerate the 
costs of meeting the target, even though they had not actually started to build to these regulations, 
making their arguments about costs unsubstantiated. 
“Of course, it’s true there was practically no evidence of any cost or anything else from 2010 
being available when you’re deciding what happens in 2013.” [1] 
This issue was highlighted by industry actors to DCLG, acknowledging it to be a barrier to both 
quicker progress and more importantly, evidence-based policymaking [1,4,5,6]. However, efforts to 
reform this constraining institutional support was unsuccessful, due to its highly embedded nature 
within UK common law [1]. 
“There were people, including in the Green industry, saying we should make it so that if you 
had got permission already was irrelevant, and when the [new] regulation came in you should 
[have to comply with it], but that would be a completely new legal principle in UK law… So 
people were asking for something which was fundamentally undeliverable, certainly not 
something for [DCLG].  You’d need the Department of Justice, I expect the Human Rights Act 
would come into it, it would be a nightmare. I don’t think that point got through to people, the 
way it works.”[1] 
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7.4.3.2. SAP / design of building regulations 
 
The other main institutional support which was, and remains to be, a significant barrier towards 
transition in the building sector, is the use of SAP as the main compliance method, and the 
implications its use has for the design of the energy component (Part L1A) of building regulations. 
The most significant of which, is that Part L1A is based off the ‘as-designed’ performance of 
buildings, not the ‘as-built’ performance. What this means is that in order to meet Part L1A 
requirements, it is only a necessary attain a SAP rating based on the architect’s design for the building 
[2,6,7,8,].  It essentially means that there is no testing or enforcement of regulations based on how the 
actual building is constructed. This has led to a tendency for buildings to be value-engineered in the 
build phase, with the replacement of parts with cheaper, lower-quality ones, meaning the final 
building quality does not meet its design specification [4,5,6,11]. To compound this matter, there are 
no practical testing procedures in place45 to assess the final performance of buildings [2]. Perhaps 
most detrimental, is that there is in fact no legal obligations to do so [2]. The responsibility of building 
control ends with the construction of the building, meaning that even in cases of non-compliance with 
the regulations, they have no powers to intervene [2]. Consequently, to date, there has never been any 
prosecutions or legal repercussions for issues of known non-compliance with energy regulations [2].  
“Building control’s job ends when the building is complete. And you may not discover that 
your building is using twice the amount of energy than is expected until it has been running 
for some time. So legally, building control has no responsibility, and indeed no powers to 
intervene after that. And it may be a defect of the system, that there’s no-one responsible.” 
The Zero Carbon Hub made recommendations to reform the building regulations in the consultation 
phase of the 2013 update to the building regulations [7]. This was supported by a project they had 
conducted on the ‘performance gap’ of buildings, relating to the difference of what the design 
specifications were, and the actual performance. These proposals were strongly opposed by the house-
builders, and were subsequently excluded when the 2013 update was published [8].  
“In the Performance Gap group that we were running, there were lots of conversations about 
the need for end of line tests, but obviously the developers were extremely pushing back on 
that, so we never explicitly really made the recommendations because they would not buy into 
that part of it.” [8] 
 
 
45 The co-heating test is the most accurate way of measuring energy performance in buildings but even in cases 
where this has been used it has been found that results was been tampered with by builder by, for instance 
putting masking tape around window frames to feign better air tightness (Love et al., 2017).  
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7.4.4. Overall assessment  
 
While each of the forms of institutional arrangement revealed issues which acted as constraining 
factors in the delivery of ZCH, the procedural rules related to the enforcement of energy performance 
of buildings in the UK is perhaps the biggest issue of all other institutional factors identified in this 
paper. This contributes to an overall lack of credibility for Part L1A, and raises serious questions 
regarding the actual impact that the ZCH target would have had on the housebuilding sector, even if it 
had been implemented in full in 2016. This calls for serious reform of the way in which regulations 
are designed, implemented and enforced.  
I will end this assessment with a several statements from interview participants which corroborate this 
point.  
“I certainly think that the Building Control side of things is failing at the moment, in terms of 
[energy efficiency].  They are more interested in if it going to fall down, is there a fire risk 
that sort of thing. The energy side is really, really low on their agenda. Non-compliance with 
Part L type issues, are much less likely to be pointed out and are much less likely to be 
amended on site. And there’s no end of line test seeing ‘how have you done’. There’s no 
mechanism for the builder to be caught out in that respect.”[8] 
“Nothing’s going to change until they change the system and make the housebuilder 
accountable for performance. You can’t rely on what that product manufacturers said about 
their product as it operated in the book under standard conditions, etc., etc., and assume by 
putting all those components together in a muddy field it’s going to perform as you expected it 
to. Only if you shift accountability to performance to the people who are handing over those 
homes would you change that system.” [5] 
It’s hardly surprising that people either deliberately or un-deliberately don’t adhere to the 
regulations to the letter of the law, because they know they are not going to be policed. They 
know they are not going to lose their job, they know they are not going to be taken to court 
over certainly the energy regulations and therefore they are just not interpreted very well or 
implemented very well as a result of all of those things.’[17] 
 
“No prosecutions, so the enforcement has been, I would think, a disappointment in that 
respect. I think it reflects how important building control officers view the various elements of 
building regulations.  They know it’s far more serious, in terms of hitting headlines, if a 
housing development starts shifting because of subsidence or because the foundations have 
not been deep enough. There is a concern there that in the working day of the building control 
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officer which he or she is under a lot of pressure anyway, it takes quite a courageous one to 
actually say stop work if you’ve not got you SAP rating. They can probably find agreement 
with the site manager if the foundations aren’t right but the SAP ratings? ‘You’ve got to be 
joking’. [3] 
 
“There was always a point in this debate which was about, it’s all very well you know, 
ramping up the level of ]regulations] but actually if no-one’s delivering on them and nobody’s 
checking, you know… who are we kidding?” [5].  
 
 
7.5. Discussion  
 
The claim of institutional literatures is that institutions matter. This paper demonstrated institutional 
arrangements affecting the policymaking processes of ZCH, ultimately contributing to its failure. This 
section discussed the wider implications of these findings with regards to three aspects. First, by 
discussing the influence of institutional arrangement on policy mix credibility. Second, it considers 
how certain institutional arrangements may lead to a higher susceptibility of capture of policymaking 
processes from incumbents. Finally, the discussion considerers how institutional arrangements may 
link to policy feedback.  
7.5.1. How did Institutional arrangements affect policy mix credibility? 
 
Policy mix literature normally considers credibility as the extent to which the mix is believable and 
reliable (Rogge & Reichardt, 2016), however, in this part of the discussion I argue that credibility is 
not only related to the mix itself, but the institutional arrangements that produce it and interact with it.  
The link between macro-political institutions and credibility is already established (see Lockwood et 
al., 2017). To summarise this argument, less stability at the political level makes long-term credible 
commitments more difficult to achieve. This means that systems with fewer numbers of veto players 
have more difficulty in creating credible commitment, as there is an expectation that a change in 
government may change/overturn these. Therefore, certain constitutional arrangements make 
credibility harder, but one strategy to overcome this involves delegating decision-making to a non-
political actor/organisation (Kuzemko, 2016), which is a strategy of creating more veto players 
(Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 2017).  
In the case, decision-making was never delegated, just the design of the policy mix, in terms of 
(re)defining the target and the design of the CSH. This meant the role of veto players was always 
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prevalent and consequently, the credibility of the ZCH policy mix was always questionable. This was 
reinforced, as right from the time of the announcement of ZCH there was tensions between the Labour 
Party, accompanied by a general loss of public support for the party. However, support from the other 
political parties helped maintain credibility for the target, along with the establishment of the climate 
change act and the CCC. However, it soon became apparent after the 2010 election that the new 
government were not committed to the target, as demonstrated by a number of changes to the policy 
mix and the policy subsystem shortly after the 2010 general election.  
This raises another consideration, in that the actions and placement of veto players within the 
subsystem will have implications for policy mix credibility. It became apparent that the (CP) 
Secretary of State and Housing Minister assigned to DCLG had little interest in achieving the target, 
which was interpreted this as a negative signal regarding credibility. A related consideration is the 
capabilities of government, the extent to which roles are delegated, and access to information to make 
informed strategic decisions. All of these aspects are related to the idea of capture of policymaking 
processes from incumbent actors, which will be elaborated in the following subsection. For now, it 
will suffice to say that higher levels of capture from incumbents will negatively affect perceptions of 
credibility of the policy mix.  
The final consideration from the case linked to credibility, is that of the compliance and enforcement 
procedures in the UK for energy efficiency. As explained in the case study above, the institutional 
supports means that there is no requirement to test the performance of the building for energy 
efficiency, and even in cases of know non-compliance there has been no legal repercussions. This 
undermines the credibility of the national building regulations with regards to energy efficiency, as a 
whole which is arguably a serious barrier to achieving a transition in the UK housing sector.  
7.5.2. How did the institutional arrangements facilitate capture from incumbents?  
 
Transitions can be considered as period of instability within a socio-technical system. Capture from 
incumbents is important in policymaking processes because it relates to the stability of the policy 
subsystem, and its ability to maintain the status quo. Transitional policy mixes intend to change the 
status quo, effectively destabilising the policy subsystem. Therefore, in circumstances of high degrees 
of capture from incumbent actors, there is a greater ability to resist change by re-stabilising the policy 
subsystem. In this sub-section, drawing on insights from the case, I suggest ways in which the 
institutional arrangements of the policy making process allow for greater degrees of capture from 
incumbents. To do so, the discussion draws on and adapts strategies which incumbents use in order to 
maintain the status quo developed by Johnstone et al. (2017) and links these to institutional 
arrangements.  
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The analysis found that all three forms of institutional arrangements led to a greater degree of capture. 
The most straightforward and direct strategy capture is the ability of incumbents to dominate 
processes within the policy subsystem by placement of actors in key strategic positions. This link is 
already captured by Lockwood et al. (2017), and put simply, is that low capabilities within 
government leads to delegation, making it easier for incumbent actors to influence policy design and 
decision making. We can see evidence of this within the case through the high involvement of 
housebuilders in the Task Force, compared to the relatively low involvement of the renewables 
industry. Another example is the placement of incumbent actors in the most senior roles within the 
Zero Carbon Hub, which was amplified when funding was taken up by NHBC.  
The case also highlights two additional forms of capture. These are linked to the direct influence 
incumbent actors have in policymaking processes (above), but can be considered as indirect methods 
of capture, which importantly, may allow incumbent actors to override formal policymaking 
procedures altogether by appealing to the interests of key veto players through informal lobbying.  
One strategy that incumbents can use to re-stabilise the status quo is to link the policy discourse to a 
salient political issue (Johnstone et al., 2017). In this case, housebuilders were able to link increasing 
regulation to reduced rates of housing delivery, which conflicted with the macro-political objective of 
economic recovery (volume of supply and the housing crisis). This argument was very influential with 
the financial ministry, who had significant influence over the policymaking process at the time due to 
the macro-political institutions (primarily a small number of concentrated veto players), and was able 
to significantly intervene in policymaking processes, leading to the eventual abandonment of the ZCH 
policy mix. 
In this case we can see that this was also combined with another strategy of incumbency, to mask the 
costs of achieving the aims of the sustainability transition (Johnstone et al., 2017). This was enabled 
by the lack of evidence regarding the costs of achieving the target, due to several institutional 
arrangements. The first is that the low state capacities means that government does not have the 
technical capabilities to assess the costs, leading to delegation to the private sector, in and of itself 
allowing a higher degree of capture. It also is to do with the fact that industry do not have to disclose 
sensitive information in the UK about costs, third that the design of the updates does not allow enough 
time for evidence to be collected, there is no effective measurement techniques in order to collect this 
data, and (even if there were) no requirements to collect the data. This asymmetry of information 
allowed incumbent actors to mask the true costs of building to these standards, exaggerate them, and 
ultimately link these to the national macro-political issue of the housing crisis and the apparent 
negative effects that the new regulations would have on housing delivery.  
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7.5.3. How do institutional arrangements link to policy feedback mechanisms?  
 
Building on the ideas in the previous subsections, the final part of the discussion considers the role of 
institutional supports in the ability of policy mixes to generate feedback, and impact that policy 
feedback may have on the subsystem and policymaking processes. I suggest four considerations 
which relate to policy feedback.  
The first is that lower credibility creates interpretive effects to actors in the socio-technical system, 
which makes it less likely that they will make sunk investments and will ultimately make it harder to 
create a strong constituency of support, and produce positive feedback mechanisms.  
The second is that the institutional supports outlined above make it hard to produce evidence about 
how well the policy is performing or not, making it difficult to produce positive feedback, and making 
it easier for opponents of the policy mix (incumbents) to create negative feedback.  
The third is that capture from incumbents affects the influence of feedback mechanisms on the 
subsystem. Feedback can be considered as a stabilising or de-stabilising force on the policy 
subsystem, and therefore the ability of the subsystem to withstand destabilisation will affect the 
influence that feedback mechanisms can have. Therefore for positive feedback to be effective, 
requires undercutting the institutional basis of support for the status quo (E. Patashnik & Zelizer, 
2009). Otherwise it will continue to resist change will likely kill any ability of the new policy 
direction to de-stabilise and the replace the existing policy monopoly, and reform the policy 
subsystem in a way which is reinforcing of the transition.  
The final consideration from the case is that policy feedback can be used to alter macro-political 
objectives, and can have major consequences for the decisions made in the policy subsystem. This 
appears to have more influence in situations with fewer veto players, and if the issues resonate with 
their interests. Admittedly, this can be both good and bad, and in the case, we see that incumbents 
were able to use negative feedback to appeal to the interests of key veto players and re-stabilise the 
system, which had detrimental effects for ZCH. But equally, this suggests that it may be possible for 
feedback to increase the salience of certain issues on the macro-political agenda, which may result in 
actions which reinforce transitions and overcome resistance from the status quo. For example, mass 
civil protests regarding climate change mitigation may force decision makers to take such action.  
 
7.6. Conclusion 
 
The role of politics and policymaking processes remains a (fundamental) challenge in the literature on 
sustainability transitions (Köhler et al., 2019). In particular, the role of policy-mix-making processes 
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and the institutional arrangements in which these occur, is under-conceptualised and underexplored.  
This paper follows recent contributions from Andrews-Speed (2016) and Lockwood et al. (2017), by 
drawing on Historical Institutionalism to help develop a heuristic which links institutions to 
policymaking processes occurring within the ‘policy subsystem’ - a network of actors who interact to 
shape policy outputs based on their interests.  
The development of the heuristic makes three main claims. The first is that policy mixes are affected 
by existing institutional arrangements (and changes) occurring at the macro-political level. These exist 
outside of the subsystem but have significant influence over the processes occurring within it, 
especially when decision making is the role of political actors within the subsystem (for example 
Ministers). Second, is that policymaking institutional arrangements within the policy subsystem (such 
as government capacities and delegation) have significant influence over policy-mix-making outputs. 
Finally, the framework draws attention to the wider institutional supports in which the policy mix is 
enacted, and the interactions of these arrangements with the processes of design and implementation 
of policy mixes. The heuristic argues that often policy mixes are designed to fit with these existing 
arrangements or are layered on top of them, which may limit the ability of the mix to achieve its 
objectives or produce positive feedback.  
The paper then tests the analytical heuristic to help explain the apparent failure of the Zero Carbon 
Homes policy mix in the UK. This makes it not only the first application of the analytical heuristic, 
but also the first empirical application of Historical Institutionalism within the transitions literature. 
The analysis generates novel insights about how institutional arrangements may render policy-mix-
making processes more susceptible to capture from incumbency. The analysis found that all three 
forms of institutional arrangements led to a greater degree of capture. The first issues is that The 
existing institutional supports of the policy mix meant that it was not possible to produce evidence of 
the effects of the policy mix on the rate and direction of socio-technical change, in particular the 
technology costs of achieving the increasing efficiency standards contained in the building 
regulations. This asymmetry of information allowed incumbent actors to ‘mask’ the true costs of 
building to these standards, exaggerate them, and ultimately link these to a national macro-political 
issue of the housing crisis and the apparent negative effects that the new regulations would have on 
housing delivery. This made the argument a persuasive one for the financial ministry, who due to the 
macro-political institutions (low number of concentrated veto players) was able to significantly 
intervene and (wind-down) the policy mix.  
A related point to capture is the ability of the policy mix to produce positive feedback mechanisms. 
The aforementioned lack of evidence of whether the policy was working, or the costs of achieving the 
increasing standards in the building regulations meant that feedback based on facts was absent. 
Instead, there was significant negative feedback coming from the incumbent actors who opposed the 
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policy mix due to the incurred costs on them. This increases with the degree of capture of these actors 
over the policymaking process outlined above, where the increased amount of influence that 
incumbent actors have make it increasingly difficult to generate positive feedback, at least in the 
absence of attention and support from mass publics, who have the potential to bring issues onto the 
macro-political agenda and subsequently, affect processes occurring within the subsystem.  
The paper also generates novel insights about the links between institutional arrangements and policy 
mix credibility. While links between credible commitment and institutions have already been 
established (see Lockwood et al. 2017 and Kuzemko et al. 2016), the analysis suggests that existing 
institutional supports are highly influential in creating credibility. In the case a combination of 
institutional supports including the frequency of the updates to regulations, existing planning laws 
postponing implementation of the new regulations, a lack of a robust measurement and enforcement 
of regulations contributed to a situation in which there was very little evidence of energy performance 
of the building stock, and even in instances of non-compliance, there had been no prosecutions or 
legal repercussions. This undermined the credibility of the whole policy mix, as well as contributing 
to capture and limiting the ability of the mix to produce positive feedback.  
A limitation of this paper is that it does not draw on the existing literature on policy implementation. 
While it was beyond the scope of this paper to integrate insights more explicitly, I suggest that the 
definition and conceptualisation of institutional supports could be further developed/complemented in 
further work by integrating insights from this literature. Another avenue for further work would be to 
apply and test the framework is a contrasting institutional setting. The single case study of this paper 
provided interesting insights for the UK and the ZCH policy mix, but is based on several context-
specific institutional arrangements which are not applicable in other geographical settings. Therefore, 
future comparative work could build on the insights here to help produce a more generalisable 
conceptualisation of such institutional arrangements. Finally, the links between institutional 
arrangements and policy feedback could be further developed in further work. The paper suggests in a 
general sense how institutional arrangements may affect if policy mixes produce feedback, and if so 
the polarity (positive or negative) of the feedback that is produced. However, while this is an 
interesting observation, the discussion of feedback is somewhat superficial, and a potential avenue for 
further work would be to more explicitly link institutional arrangements to specific types of feedback 
mechanisms (for example drawing on the categories established in Edmondson et al. 2018). 
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Chapter 8. Discussion of findings and contributions  
 
In this chapter of the thesis the main findings are summarised, with respect to answering the research 
questions established in PART I (section 1.4). The second section of the chapter (8.2.) then states the 
main contributions of the thesis, both in terms of its conceptual contributions and the empirical 
contribution it makes.  
 
8.1. Summary of findings/answers to research questions 
 
This section discusses how this thesis has answered the overall research question: 
How can conceptualising the role and influence of policy-mix-making processes in 
sustainability transitions help explain the failure of Zero Carbon Homes? 
To do so, the remainder of the section explores a five more nuanced questions which collectively 
answer the overarching question.  
 
1. How do policy mixes stimulate changes in socio-technical systems through policy effects? 
 
The thesis conceptually developed and the tested empirically mechanisms though which policy-mix-
change alters the behaviour of actors in the socio-technical system which stimulates its 
reconfiguration. These mechanisms occur through the creation of policy effects, which have three 
forms.  
The first of the effects (resources) is essentially the amount and duration of resources provided to 
beneficiaries, or conversely, if resources are withdrawn. There is already considerable literature on the 
effects of these forms of policies, which bestow resources to certain actor groups. For example, these 
may be in the form of direct subsidy or tax relief, to shield and nurture emerging innovations, or 
through policy interventions empowering novel innovations through changing mainstream selection 
environment to be more favourable to the new innovation (Smith & Raven, 2012). The analysis 
showed that resources were allocated through funding for research (AimC4) and for subsidised 
development of ‘eco-villages’. This stimulated innovation, which improved the building fabric 
efficiency of housing, and resulted the largest house building in the UK (Barratt Homes) building 
Hanham Hall, a medium sized zero-carbon development.  
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The second of these effects (interpretive) relates the information that policy mix change produces and 
how this changes the cognition of actors. This relates to transition concepts such as creating 
expectations and shared visions (Kemp et al., 2007), and also credibility of political commitment 
based on observations of the direction of travel and market signals (Rogge & Reichardt, 2016). These 
were significant in the analysis, and also linked to the first kind of effect (resources) for example 
allocation of resources shows a strong signal of intent and helps create credible commitment, which 
was seen through the government’s original plans to subsidise the development of large ‘eco-towns’ 
which helped solicit support from some of the large house builders. These funds were later cut, along 
with the funding for the Zero Carbon Hub (a public-private partnership to help deliver the target). 
These changes signalled a loss of credibility which negatively affected stakeholders in the socio-
technical system, leading to a weakening of the supporting coalition for ZCH.  
The final form of effect (institutional) is rules which affect how the other policy effects affect actor 
behaviour and may structure their behaviour. An example of an institutional effect from the analysis is 
that rules within the planning laws in the UK allow developers to pre-register land before building 
regulations increase, even though they have no intention to start building on that site for several years. 
By pre-registering the land they only have to build to the building regulations at the time of 
registration, which means there is a lag between new regulations coming in and when the first housing 
developments are actually built to these standards.   
2. How can these changes subsequently generate feedback mechanisms influencing the evolution 
of the policy mix? 
Policy effects affect actor behaviour and their interests and can provide incentives to participate in 
policymaking (for example to protect resource flows). Feedbacks to not affect the policy subsystem 
directly and require the actions of actors participating in the subsystem to shape the discourse in 
favour of their interests to achieve favourable outcomes. Feedback mechanism come in three main 
forms.  
The first (socio-political) affects regards perceptions of how well (or not) policy is performing, the 
formation of constituencies in support or opposition of policy, and whether these groups advocate 
incremental fixes or more radical reforms. The analysis of ZCH showed how an initial coalition 
supporting the agenda helped, maintain resource flows, and led to more stable policy conditions 
consisting or incremental fixes. It also showed that as the supportive coalition weakened, and the 
opposing coalition dominated the policy subsystem more radical reforms started to occur, leading to 
retrenchment and eventual denouncement of the policy mix.  
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The second form (fiscal) concerns the role of the financial ministry and whether the costs (current, 
perceived or anticipated) raises concerns about the costs of supporting the policy mix. A novel insight 
from the application of this concept was that with regards to ZCH it was not the actual (current) costs 
of supporting the policy mix that became opposed by the financial ministry, it was the potential risk 
that the policy mix could have reduced the rate of housing delivery, and the repercussions this would 
have had for the overall national economy that became opposed. From this empirical finding an 
extended definition of what is considered as fiscal feedback, and how it is defined it suggested.  
The final form of feedback is administrative, which relates to opinions about the departments tasked 
with policy design and implementation. These feedbacks affect the behaviours of actors in the 
subsystem and can contribute to policy mix stability or change. We found that the aggressive austerity 
measures, retraction of resources and incoherence of policymaking processes contributed to negative 
administrative feedback in the development of ZCH. However, again based on the findings in the 
empirics, redefinition of the concept is suggested. This was mainly due to the operation of the policy 
subsystem and decision making responsibilities. Because the financial ministry took such an active 
role in policymaking process, far beyond simply controlling resource flows, the administrative 
feedback was attributed to it, not just the department allegedly responsible for designing and 
implementing the policy mix (DCLG).  
3. How did policy effects and feedback mechanisms influence the coevolution of the zero carbon 
homes policy mix and the socio-technical system? 
The analysis found that a potential virtuous cycle started to emerge in the early phases due to support 
from some major house-builders, along with the manufacturing and micro renewables sectors.  
Resource allocation for demonstration projects, combined with the interpretive effects of strong 
political commitment, expectation of future resource allocation, and potential competitive advantage, 
attracted support from some large incumbent house-builders. In essence, we find a similar 
phenomenon to Markard et al. (2016) where incumbents are not homogenous in their beliefs and if 
such actors view transitions as an opportunity, they are more likely to be supportive.  
However, the potential for a virtuous cycle to emerge was partly offset due to adverse effects of the 
recession on the housebuilding socio-technical system. The market conditions led to large scale job 
losses and a decline in investment and innovation, and the first medium-scale demonstration project 
was delayed. The anticipated costs of meeting the target, while in difficult financial conditions, started 
to generate negative feedback from house-builders. However, resource allocation, perceptions of 
strong political support, and the sustained expectation of future resources, retained the support of 
some house-builders, meaning the rising opposition to the target was offset. 
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A vicious cycle started when resources supporting the mix were removed after the 2010 general 
election. Innovation declined and very few demonstration projects were built, making the prospects of 
meeting the target progressively harder. There was little incentive for the previously supportive 
house-builders to continue to engage in innovation, and there were no resources available to help 
create positive feedback. Moreover, these changes signalled weakening political commitment, making 
investments higher risk and undermining perceptions of potential competitive advantage, giving no 
incentive for further investment.  
4. How does this help explain why the zero carbon homes target got abandoned? 
A key finding was that credibility is closely related to the occurrence of virtuous or vicious cycles. 
Progress was initially made when the mix was considered credible, but for various reasons the mix 
became considered less credible, which only intensified after the vicious cycle started leading to the 
eventual denouncement. Consequently, by better understanding the ways in which feedback 
mechanisms link to credibility can help explain why in this case, credibility was lost leading to the 
abandonment of ZCH.  
Feedback mechanisms can influence the credibility of the mix in four ways. First, through the 
respective strength of the supportive/opposing coalitions. If incumbents are supportive of the mix, it 
makes the prospects of achieving its goal more credible, which may influence other actors to also 
support the agenda. Conversely, as we saw in this case, as powerful actors stopped supporting the 
policy mix this undermined credibility, and resulted in a further weakening of the supporting 
coalition. Second, cognitive feedback is directly related to credibility of the mix. If specific 
instruments or the mix as a whole are considered to be ineffective or poorly performing, and these are 
unaddressed by policy makers, the mix may be considered less credible. Another contributor to the 
mix’s reduced credibility was policy subsystem change and fiscal feedback. Following the election 
the treasury dominated the subsystem, who then considered the cost of supporting the policy mix as 
an unnecessary expense. Treasury cut all resources and reduced autonomy of other actors. As it 
became apparent to actors that the treasury opposed the target, this undermined the credibility of the 
mix as a whole. Finally, we consider administrative feedback to influence the credibility of the mix. If 
widespread perceptions are that the government lacks the capabilities to properly design and 
implement the mix, it may reduce credibility of the mix and dis-incentivise investment and support.  
 
5. How did the institutional arrangements in which policymaking processes occur contribute to 
the failure of the zero carbon homes policy mix? 
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In explaining the failure of ZCH I will focus on the policymaking institutional arrangements affecting 
the design, and the institutional supports affecting the implementation and enforcement. While 
political institutions are significant in explaining the failure if ZCH, these are less generalisable 
focussing on the political conditions at a very specific time (coalition government).    
Policymaking institutional barriers were observed in regard to the actors involved in policymaking 
processes and the capabilities. An overall lack of technical capabilities of government has led to a 
high degree of capture of incumbents in policymaking and regulatory processes, and amplified the 
asymmetry of information between government officials and the private sector. This general lack of 
information of decision makers regarding the actual costs of supporting the mix allowed the (already 
influential) incumbent actors to lobby government by linking the (exaggerated) costs of meeting target 
to lower rates of housing supply, which linked to a bigger macro-political issue of the ongoing 
housing crisis in the UK, and high housing inflation. Policymaking institutional arrangements also 
significantly affected who was allowed to participate and therefore the interests that were represented. 
The sector which stood to benefit most from the target’s implementation was the micro-renewables 
industry, as the original requirement for all carbon abatement to be achieved on-site, placed emphasis 
on micro-renewables. However, this industry was not represented in Task Force, despite requesting to 
be so. Their exclusion from the policymaking process meant that their interests were not considered in 
the subsequent development of the policy mix. Unsurprisingly, over the development of the mix, it 
was re-defined and in the later stages, any requirement for on-site carbon abatement for energy 
generation was removed.  
A significant issue barrier related to the institutional supports of the policy mix regards how building 
regulations in the UK are measured and enforced. There are no requirements to evaluate buildings 
post-construction, and the regulations are based on an ‘as-designed’ specification. The difference 
between the as-designed and as-built performance of buildings can vary significantly, for various 
reasons, including components being ‘value-engineered’ during the build-phase, replacing 
components with cheaper ones which may not perform as well. More importantly, even in instances 
where the performance of buildings has been found to not meet the required regulations, there has 
never been a prosecution, fine or any other form of legal consequence for non-compliance with 
energy efficiency regulations. The lack of a robust enforcement mechanism meant that the regulations 
carried no consequence, which undermined the credibility of the policy mix as a whole and effectively 
allowed developers to opt-out of making their product more efficient (Pan & Garmston, 2012). 
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8.2. Contributions of the thesis  
 
This section summarises the main conceptual and empirical contributions that the thesis. 
Conceptually, it primarily contributes to the literature on policy mixes for sustainability transitions, 
but also contributes to the literature on policy feedback.  
8.2.1. Conceptual contributions  
This thesis contributes to several challenges within the transitions literature. Primarily it develops a 
co-evolutionary framework, linking the policymaking processes which underpin policy mix 
development, and links this to processes of socio-technical change. It does so by focussing on policy 
feedback to provide conceptual insights about this co-evolutionary dynamic, which links policy 
design choices to societal reconfigurations, which then affect subsequent policy making processes 
through feedback mechanism. The thesis then builds upon this policy-oriented explanation of change 
and stability, by focussing on the institutional conditions in which policy-mix-making processes 
occur.  It suggest that doing so can help determine if policy design choices are the cause of change or 
stability, or if the institutional setting in which design choices are made affect a policy mix’s ability to 
generate feedback, or limit or amplify the impact on policymaking of feedback which may be 
generated.  
The thesis also contributes to the literature on public policy, more specifically policy feedback. While 
not, by any means, the only method of knowledge creation (see for example Latour and Woolgar, 
1979) one approach is the establishment of clearly defined and falsifiable propositions, which allows 
for advancement of theory, as scholars apply and refine these concepts (Sabatier & Weible, 2014). In 
this regard the thesis makes a contribution by establishing a more nuanced concept of what is meant 
by ‘policy feedback’. It does so by following the suggestion of Campbell (2012), making a distinction 
between the forward and backward dimensions of feedback. The thesis defines these two dimensions 
as being, ‘policy effects’ (forward dimension) and ‘feedback mechanisms’ (backwards dimension), 
and defines the mechanisms of their interactions, with societal change and policy change, 
respectively. 
In defining these mechanisms, the thesis also contributes a novel form of policy effect, the 
institutional effects of policy mix change. Originally derived from existing links between institutions 
and the formation of policy feedback within literature (E. M. Patashnik & Zelizer, 2013), the concept 
was developed further through empirical application and conceptual refinement, and drawing insights 
from institutionalist literatures (Andrews-Speed, 2016; Hacker, 2004; Lockwood, Kuzemko, et al., 
2017; Tsebelis, 2002). Indeed, I believe the concept can be developed further by application to more 
diverse empirical settings and comparative work, as will be further discussed in the limitations and 
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recommendations for further work. The other main contribution that emerged while developing this 
concept is that it makes a first step towards linking the interactions of institutional arrangements, and 
the role of policy feedback in policymaking processes, suggesting further integration with the 
literature on punctuated equilibrium as an avenue for further research.  
 
8.2.2. Empirical contributions  
 
The empirical work, by applying the novel co-evolutionary framework generated insights about how 
virtuous and viscous cycles are created, and the roles of producing and maintaining constituencies of 
support, and gaining the support of powerful actors in transition processes. In doing so, the thesis 
makes a contribution to the empirical strand of research concerned with the strategies of incumbent 
actors, and their ability to absorb novel technologies and maintain the structure of the socio-technical 
system (F. W. Geels, 2014). In addition, by studying an example of a failed transition, and the 
contested nature of ZCH across three different Government arrangements, it also makes a contribution 
to the strand of research within the literature on the politics of transitions concerned with how 
conflicts between incumbents and transition coalitions can become aggravated by conflicts between 
political parties in governments. The thesis found that in the UK context, house builders  successfully 
lobbied government purporting that the delivery of ZCH would reduce the volume of housing supply, 
which conflicted with the conservative’s core ideology of economic recovery (due to the contribution 
of the building sector to the economy and the housing inflation incurred by lower rates of housing 
supply). However, while ZCH was contested by Conservative party within the coalition they were 
unable to terminate ZCH, due to the partisan veto player in the coalition (Liberal Democrats). Instead 
they used a number of alternate forms of retrenchment (E. M. Patashnik, 2008), including the removal 
of funding and delayed implementation of key policy instruments.  
The thesis also contributes to the growing literature on sustainability transitions in the housing sector. 
A major contribution of the thesis is that it develops a novel heuristic to help analyse intuitional 
arrangements affecting policymaking processes in the UK housebuilding sector. By applying this 
heuristic generated insights about the barriers affecting the demise of ZCH and implications more 
generally that this has for subsequent attempts to stimulate transition. These insights are related to the 
political and policymaking institutions which structure the responsibilities of the actors in the policy 
subsystem. The main findings are that the three heuristics combined contributed to high degrees of 
capture of policymaking processes from incumbents, and overall low credibility of ZCH. While these 
insights are specific to the UK setting for policymaking affecting housebuilding, recent growing 
attention to climate change and the environmental performance may soon lead to another attempt to 
stimulate transition through policy intervention, and consequently, this heuristic and the insights 
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regarding why ZCH was unsuccessful could help policymakers design a policy mix which is 
ultimately more successful.  
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Chapter 9. Conclusion 
 
This final chapter of the thesis, first reflects on the limitations of the research design and then suggests 
promising avenues of further work, before making overall policy recommendations for policymaking 
processes in sustainability transitions, by drawing on the main findings of the thesis. 
 
9.1. Limitations and avenues for further work  
 
The research design and methodology used in this thesis, while appropriate, had limitations, which 
will be reflected upon here, followed by the most promising avenues for further research.  
The first limitation involves the use of expert interviews as a primary source of data, and important 
considerations the analyst should be aware of when drawing on interviewees. The first is the 
(selective) memory of participants when asking historical-based questions, which is more significant 
in instances where the participants have changed job or roles (sometimes several times). Another 
consideration with historical research especially, is when soliciting what views and perceptions of the 
participants were at the time (for instance concepts like credibility and interpretive effects of 
policymaking outcomes). Almost inevitably, the participant’s memory of these aspects will be 
distorted by events that came afterwards, rather than a truly accurate account of their perceptions 
when the event actually occurred. However, despite these limitations, interviews were still the most 
appropriate form of primary data collection for the thesis, mainly due to the relatively ‘hidden’ and 
informal nature of political decision-making and policymaking processes, meaning that some 
information is only obtainable by speaking to actors in key roles related to policymaking. Secondly, 
the aforementioned issues associated with cognitive bias, can be minimised through triangulation with 
other data sources. In this theses the amount of archival data was extensive, and was also supported by 
additional primary data obtained through a freedom of information request, which helps validate the 
interviews.  
Another consideration is the availability and willingness of important actors to participate. One such 
case-specific limitation in this research was the willingness of (active) civil servants to participate in 
the research. This relates to the timing of the research, as the period of data collection occurred shortly 
after the Grenfall Tower disaster, in which a block of flats caught fire and burnt-down, killing 72 
people. It was found the fire was caused due to the building not being built to the correct standards of 
fire safety, and is another, much more visible, example of the failure to properly enforce building 
regulations in the UK. Consequently, despite significant effort to solicit participation, sensitivities 
regarding building regulations in general meant that several civil servants responded that it was 
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‘inappropriate’ for them to participate. However, this limitation was alleviated by speaking to a total 
of 10 actors directly involved in the policymaking process of ZCH (two of which were former civil 
servants and a former minister within DCLG), in addition to the triangulation methods mentioned in 
the previous paragraph.  
Another limitation of the research regards the selection of case for the full utility of the framework. 
While the development and demise of ZCH has proved a rich empirical case, allowing for the testing 
of the theoretical propositions of the thesis, it highlighted one key area of the framework which was 
under-utilised. This regards the role of policy feedback occurring through the attention of mass 
publics and the electoral pressures this can place on policymaker to enact reforms, otherwise risk 
detrimental electoral outcomes (not being re-elected). With regards to ZCH this mechanism was 
completely absent, which was due a combination of factors. The first being that as a proportion of the 
total housing market, new build make up a low proportion. Consequently, the amount of people 
affected by ZCH (at least in the short term) is relatively low. The second aspect is that the benefits of 
energy efficiency are much less visible than for types of policy intervention, for example subsidising 
electric vehicles. A third consideration is that media attention to ZCH was low (Cherry, Hopfe, 
MacGillivray, & Pidgeon, 2015).  
With this in mind, a key avenue for further work would be to test the conceptual framework on a form 
of policy which has high public attention, and where socio-political policy feedback, (driven by the 
visible impacts that policymaking has on mass publics) would render insights and dynamics that were 
not observed here. While there is considerable focus to dynamics of mass publics in the literature on 
policy feedback, it would be interesting to see how these dynamics play out in the context of 
sustainability transitions. This could be a particularly interesting insight given the current high profile 
public attention to climate change. 
Another limitation linked to the selection of the case is regarding the fact that ultimately ZCH was a 
failure, which did not generate sufficient positive feedback to become stable and locked-in, and was 
subsequently terminated. This has been a very useful case to test the interplay of both positive and 
negative feedback, making it a good utilisation of the framework, and its explanatory capabilities. 
However, as this is ultimately a failed case the empirical application helps us explain why an 
emergent virtuous cycle may lose support, but it does not offer much insight into how support can be 
maintained. Accordingly a promising avenue for further work would be to apply the co-evolutionary 
framework to a case of a successful transition.  
A final limitation linked to, but not caused by, the case selection is to do with the analytical heuristic 
developed for institutional arrangements in UK housing policymaking processes. The limitation here 
is that while a useful contribution for understanding the processes of policymaking within this very 
specific setting, the findings are not particularly generalisable to other settings. This is primarily 
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because institutional settings are highly context specific and while there may be similarities to other 
settings it cannot be assumed the arrangements play out the same way. More importantly, when 
considering the interactions of the heuristic forms in the case, it is improbable that these findings will 
be generalise at all outside of the empirical context. However, what would be a promising avenue for 
further work would be to apply the same basic concepts underlying the heuristic to housing policy in 
other country, which could lead to comparative work and potential theory building.  
 
9.2. Policy implications  
 
Policymakers seeking to stimulate transitions need to establish credible commitment, through a well-
defined strategy. In the case it was found that when first announced, the strategy was ill-defined, and 
stakeholders (and indeed government) were not entirely sure of what the target and their objective 
was. This led to a period of inertia, where government and stakeholders in the policy subsystem 
worked to establish a target that was credible. Arguably, had the target been more established when 
announced, the response from industry may have been more receptive to the overall strategy and more 
progress would have been made in the early phases, before changing conditions (namely the economic 
recession) made maintaining support more difficult. Another repercussion of this was that it 
highlighted the lack of technical capabilities of the government allowing for higher degrees of capture 
from incumbent actors.  
Related to this consideration is the key role of policymakers in establishing an even playing field, and 
inclusion of both insiders and outsiders in policymaking processes. This reinforces policy monopolies 
where certain sources of information are favoured over others. To help alleviate these affects 
policymakers should seek to utilise information from various different sources, not just established 
relationships with key stakeholders. From the case we can see that there was a disproportionate 
representation of incumbents in influential positions, as opposed to outsiders such as small scale 
renewable industries. Interestingly, by the eventual denouncement of the target, the re-defined target 
had completely excluded the use of small scale renewables. This is related to involvement of energy 
utilities in the policymaking process, who had lobbied for ‘off-site’ solutions which align with a 
centralised model of energy supply, and supports their interests. Indeed while some progress was 
actually stimulated by the target with regards to energy efficiency due to improvements in the design 
of new buildings, it is the energy supply aspect of the overall strategy that was ultimately the most 
significant failure.  
Another key recommendation for policymaker is having access to information in order to make 
decisions and the technical capabilities to make informed choices. This was found to be a significant 
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barrier in the case. In order to make such evaluations, a general recommendation for the UK context 
would be to increase the technical capabilities of the state, either internally by upskilling and reducing 
turnover in the civil service, or by creating independent public bodies to do so. The tendency to 
privatise and marketised key policymaking and regulatory processes in the UK housebuilding sector 
had led to high levels of capture from incumbent actors, which poses a sever barrier to change within 
this sector.  
Policymakers should also make sure policy support (for example resource allocation) is available to a 
wide range of actors. In this case the beneficiaries of resources were primarily the incumbent firms, 
and emphasis was on the large-scale builders to drive innovation. There is logic to this. Due to the 
large market share of volume builders, these are the only actors capable of achieving transition at 
scale. However, since they already have market-share, these actor’s incentives to innovate are only 
driven by regulation and any resources offered by government. After the recession and resources were 
withdrawn, the lack of credible enforcement of regulations provided them little incentive to do so.  
Policymakers also need to establish effective and credible means of assessing compliance with 
regulations and have the means to enforce it. In the case the lack of a robust measurement and 
compliance regime, had the immediate effect of lowering credibility and dis-incentivising incumbents 
to innovate. Even had the zero carbon target remained in place and been enacted through the 2016 
building regulations, the general consensus is that buildings are not being built to current regulations, 
and without the means to effectively enforce these, industry has adopted a laissez faire attitude 
towards compliance. This is also related to access to information and the ability to make evidence 
based decisions, as without information reporting back how well new buildings were performing with 
regards to the new standards it was not possible to base subsequent decision making on this.  
Another recommendation is to realise the specific types of policy mixes needed for specific contexts. 
Each challenge will have elements which are specific to it in relation to other areas of policy. While 
there are general policy mix designs which can be helpful, paying attention to the particular context, 
and the needs of the transition is needed. Following a more bottom-up style approach to policymaking 
would be needed. Similarly, a bottom up approach could be applied to the intuitional context, 
particularly the institutional support which interact with the policy mix. In doing so policymakers 
should aim to make sure institutional supports are consistent with the logic and objectives of the 
policy mix, and do not conflict or act as a barrier to change.  
An overall final recommendation is for policy makers to establish and maintain credibility in order to 
reduce risk, increase investment and drive sustainability transitions.  Many of the aforementioned 
recommendations relate to particular issues that not only acted as a barrier to change in their own right 
within the case, but contributed to an overall lack of credibility of the policy mix. While not an easy 
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task policy makers should endeavour to create the right conditions for emergent transitions, and are 
well advised to enhance the credibility of the policy mix by providing sufficient and sustained 
resources, resolving any limitations or constraining institutions, and through synergistic and 
systematic policymaking and implementation processes to help improve investor confidence.  
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Appendix  
 
Appendix A 
Time  Event Mechanism 
2006   
September  Yvette Cooper announces ambition to exceed Scandinavian standards for energy efficiency in 10 
years  
[PMC]->[IntE] 
December  Gordon Brown makes statement that in 10 years all new homes will be built o zero carbon 
standards  
[PMC]->[IntE] 
Tax stamp duty exemption also announced  [PMC]->[IntE] 
Code for sustainable homes officially introduced by government  [PMC]->[IntE] 
Yvette Cooper (DCLG) establishes the 2016 Task Force with Stuart Baseley (HBF)  [PMC]->[InstE] 
Having HBF involved in the process helped reduce resistance to target  [InstE] ->[SPF] 
Callcutt review commissioned  [PMC]->[RE] 
Consultation on the delivery of the target through building regulations, code and planning policy.  [PMC]->[IntE] 
2007   
January  Task Force first meets [InstE] 
February  UK-GBC launched, including founding member Barratt Homes [IntE]->[S-TC] 
March  Eco-towns announced by Gordon Brown (Chancellor of the Exchequer – Treasury)  [PMC]->[IntE] 
April  Code for sustainable homes launched  [PMC]->[RE & IntE] 
June “Building a greener future” policy statement formally introduced the target   
Gordon Brown announces ambition to build 3 million new homes by 2020; and that 1 million 
will be zero carbon.  
[IntE] 
First code demonstrations at BRE’s OFFSITE event. Kingspan lighthouse first to reach level 6, 
Stewart Milne build to level 5 
[IntE]->[S-TC] 
Gordon Brown succeeds Tony Blair as  Prime Minister  [ExC]->[PSC] 
July  Gordon Brown increases the ambition for Eco-towns to 10 sites  [PMC]->[IntE] 
Savills estimate costs of meeting target will add £36,000 to construction.  [STC] 
October Budget Introduces tax stamp duty exemption  [PMC]->[RE] 
Tax stamp duty exemption contains a different definition of the zero carbon target than proposed 
by DCLG 
[PMC]->[IntE] 
Callcutt review makes recommendation of establishing a delivery body due to slow starting 
period  
[S-TC]->[SPF & AF] 
December  Barratt Homes wins bid for Hanham Hall site through Carbon Challenge run by English 
Partnerships  
[PMC]->[RE] 
2008   
April  “Eco-towns: Living a green future” consultation launched by DCLG [PMC] 
Requirement for all publicly funded housing to achieve a minimum of level 3 of code for 
sustainable homes  
[RE & InstE]-> [S-
TC] 
May UKGBC produces report saying that the original definition of zero carbon unachievable on 10-
80% of sites 
[S-TC]->[SPF] 
Low Impact Building Innovation Platform (LIBIP) launched  [RE & InstE] 
Barratt Homes reveal ‘Green House’, the first zero carbon house build by a major house builder  [S-TC] 
All homes required to have a sustainability certificate through introduction of Home Information 
Packs, making code for sustainable homes mandatory.  
[InstE] 
Housing Minister Yvette Cooper is replaced by Caroline Flint [ExC]->[PSC] 
June  Task Force creates report on definition of zero carbon which is presented to Housing Minister 
Caroline Flint. Report makes recommendation to adopt heretical structure, Caroline flint says 
consultation documents will be released in June. 
[SPF]->[PMC] -
>[IntE] 
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Appendix B  
Time  Event Mechanism 
2008   
June  Zero Carbon Hub established with matched funding from Government by NHBC [SPF&AF]->[PMC]-
>[RE&InstE] 
Recession starts in the UK [ExC] 
Eco-towns policy generates local NIMBY opposition and protests against 9 of the 
15 proposed sites 
[PMC]->[IntE]->[SPF] 
Shadow Housing Minister Grant Shapps (CP) voices opposition to the Eco-towns 
policy  
[SPF] 
October  Eco-towns ambition questioned, DCLG suggest only one or two sites feasible  [ExC]->[PMC]->[IntE] 
November Climate Change Act (2008) passed  [ExC]->[IntE] 
Housing and Planning Bill receives Royal Assent. The bill allows local councils to 
set building requirements using the code which exceed the national building 
regulations. 
[P-MC]->[InstE]->[RE]->[S-
TC] 
Margret Beckett  replaces Caroline Flint as Housing Minister   [ExC]->[PSC] 
December  Homes Communities Agency (HCA) launched [InstE] 
House prices dropped by 15.9%. Pre-tax profits of the largest developers drops 
from £2.5 billion to -£3 billion, job losses of 25% in construction industry. 
[ExC]->[STC] 
Consultation for definition of target released after delay  [PMC] 
2009   
January  
  
AIMC4 project launched by LIBIP. £3.4 million funding. [RE] 
March-May Work starts on Hanham Hall, clearing the site and preparing for construction.  [S-TC] 
May John Healey replaced Margret Beckett as Housing Minister  [ExC]->[PSC] 
July  4 of the original Eco-towns proposed get approved [PMC]->[IntE] 
October Conservative party pledge to reduce regulations at Party Conference. This is well 
received by the HBF. 
[ExC]->[IntE] 
November Planning granted on Hanham Hall site  [InstE]->[STC] 
2010   
February  £60 million is dedicated to their delivery by government to supporting the first 4 
Eco-towns. 
[PMC]->[RE] 
March  HCA propose new standards for publicly funded housing at code level 4 [PMC] 
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Time  Event Mechanism 
2010   
May   General election won by coalition of Conservative Party (CP) and the Liberal Democrats (LD). 
Responsibilities are split between the parties. Eric Pickles (CP) is Secretary of State for DCLG, 
Grant Shapps (CP) is housing minister and Andrew Stunnell (LD) is minister for building 
regulations. 
[ExC]->[PSC] 
Test units constructed on Hanham Hall site by Barratts through ‘Carbon Challenge’  [RE]->[S-TC] 
July  Housing Minster (CP) announces Eco-Towns funding to be cut by 50% [PMC]->[RE] 
Housing Minster (CP) reaffirms commitment to target and confirms that funding allocated for the 
Zero Carbon Hub under Labour (£600,000) will continue. 
[IntE] 
DCLG launch consultation on how to cut red tape.  
October  2010 updates to building regulations implemented as planned based on the Zero Carbon Hub’s 
recommendations. 
[InstE]->[PMC]-
>[RE] 
HCA awards £7.8 million for second site of carbon challenge programme.  [RE]->[STC] 
Autumn spending review re-iterates government’s commitment to reducing regulation. [IntE] 
November  Housing Minister drops HCA’s proposals for publicly funded buildings to have to meet code level 
4 
[PMC]->[RE] 
Zero Carbon Hub’s funding cut by 20%, and would end completely in March 2011. This changed 
the model of the Hub as funding from NHBC was secured for running costs. Research money had 
to be bid for on specific projects.  
[PMC]->[RE]-> 
[InstE]->[S-TC] 
Terms of the 2016 Task Force were reviewed, after which the Housing Minister stopped attending 
meetings. 
[InstE]->[PSC] 
2011   
January  Treasury introduce “1 in 1” out on regulations  [InstE] 
February  Consultation on 2013 building regulations released by DCLG [PMC] 
Test units completed on Hanham Hall site  [STC] 
Housing minister commissions zero carbon hub to create a workable framework for allowable 
solutions  
[RE] 
March  Treasury announce that target would no longer include un-regulated energy use. This lowered the 
amount of carbo to be abated (150% -> 100%), and would reduce costs. 
[PMC]->[RE] 
WWF walk away from 2016 Task Force in protest after announcement. [IntE]->[S-TC] 
April  Announcement that only one the proposed Eco-Towns will be built to the original (zero carbon) 
standards.  
[PMC]->[RE] 
2012   
September  Andrew Stunnell (LD) loses his post as minster for being intransigent. Replaced by Don Foster 
(LD).  
[SPF]->[PSC] 
2013   
March  Budget reaffirms government commitment to target  [IntE] 
George Osbourne announces the ‘help to buy’ scheme in order to boost the housing market, and 
dedicated £3.5 billion pound. No carbon requirements are included.   
 
May SAP 2012 update for use with 2013 building regulations released [PMC]->[RE] 
Response to 2013 building regulations consultations postponed.  [PMC]->[IntE] 
June Government announces plans to amend 2013 regulations to “strike a balance regulatory burden and 
Government’s zero carbon home commitments”.    
 
August  Consultation for Allowable solutions released by DCLG [PMC] 
Housing Standards review propose abandoning Code for Sustainable Homes. It also proposes 
removing the powers granted to local councils through the Planning Act 2008. This is strongly 
supported by the HBF.  
[SPF]->[PMC]-
>[SPF] 
October   2013 building regulation delayed, seen a signal of wavering commitment to target.  [PMC]->[IntE] 
Don Foster (LD) replaced by Stephen Williams (LD) [PSC] 
2013 building regulations released to come into force April 2014. Part L delayed.  [PMC]->[IntE] 
November Part L released. Energy savings 6% higher than 2010 regulations. Lower than the least ambitious 
scenario considered in consultation. Zero Carbon Hub’s recommendations not included.  
[PMC]->[RE & 
IntE] 
Environmental Audit Committee (EAC) warn against abandoning of the Planning Act 2008, and 
against having a single set of building regulations.  
[PMC]->[SPF] 
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Time  Event Mechanism 
2014   
January  2016 Task Force stops meeting  [PMC]->[InstE]->[IntE] 
March    Government proposes to include requirements in the Code for Sustainable 
Homes into the building regulations as voluntary measures.  
[SPF]->[PMC]->[RE & IntE] 
April  2013 building regulations come into force after  6 month delay  
June Infrastructure Bill published by the Department for Transport proposes definition 
of target at Level 5, permitting developers to build to Level 4 and use allowable 
solutions to achieve Level 5. More controversially, it also proposed an exemption 
for small sites.  
[PMC]->[IntE] 
September  Paul king, CEO of UK-GBC announces leaving  [IntE]->[S-TC] 
November Consultation on small sites exemption issued  [PMC] 
December  Small sites exemption contested in the house of lords  [PMC]->[IntE]->[SPF] 
2015   
March Government releases response to small sites consultation. Confirms sites of 10 
units or less would be exempt from target.  
 [PMC]->[RE & IntE] 
The same day the CEO of Barratt Homes Mark Clare steps down after leading 
the company for 9 years.   
[PMC]->[RE & IntE]->[S-TC] 
May Conservative party (CP) gain majority after the general election  [ExC] -> [PSC] 
July Treasury denounces 2016 target   [PMC]->[IntE] 
UK-GBC organises a letter to Chancellor to appeal decision, but has no impact  [PMC]->[IntE]->[STC]->[SPF] 
October  Government includes its proposals to remove the target in Housing and Planning 
Bill  
[P-MC]->[IntE] 
December  Environmental Audit Committee calls for evidence on an inquiry of the treasury 
on its actions regarding sustainability  
[PMC]->[IntE] ->[SPF & AF] 
2016   
March Zero Carbon Hub disbanded after NHBC withdrew funding  [PMC]->[IntE]->[S-TC]->[PSC] 
April  Housing and planning Bill contested in the House of Lords including 
amendments to reintroduce the target.  
[PMC]->[IntE]->[SPF]->[PMC] 
May  Amendment defeated by a margin of four votes, officially ending the target  [P-MC] -> [RE] 
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Appendix F 
Reference Date    -    Title Reference Date    -    Title 
TF1 070131 - Minutes TF59 100127 - Task Force Jan 10 mtg Item 4 - Hub Timeline 
TF2 070328 - 2016 Concordat TF60 100127 - Task Force Jan 10 mtg Item 7 - Hub Progress Report 
TF3 070328 - Agenda TF61 101102 - Agenda 
TF4 070515 - Agenda TF62 101102 - Minutes 
TF5 070515 - 2016 Concordat vs4 TF63 101102 - Hub Timeline Report - Taskforce - 2 Nov 2010 
TF6 070328 - Zero Carbon definition paper1 TF64 101102 - Hub Progress Report - Taskforce - 2 Nov 2010 
TF7 070515 - Minutes TF65 101102 - 2016 Task Force Draft revised Terms of Reference 
TF8 070613 - 2016 Commitment TF66 110316 - Minutes 
TF9 070613 - Agenda TF67 110316 - Agenda 
TF10 070613 - Minutes TF68 110316 - 2016 Taskforce TOR 
TF11 070613 - HBFTaskforce2 TF69 110316 - HBF Hub review 
TF12 071024 - Agenda TF70 110316 - Hub_-_Progress_Report_Taskforce_-_16_Mar_20101 
TF13 070613 - Opinion polling TF71 110316 - Programme_Delivery_Report_-_16_March_20111 
TF14 071218 - Agenda TF72 110606 - Agenda 
TF15 071024 - Minutes TF73 110606 - Hub - Progress Report Taskforce - 6 June 2011 
TF16 071218 - Minutes TF74 110606 - Hub - Programme Delivery Timeline - 6 June 2011 
TF17 080311 - Agenda TF75 110913 - Annex A 
TF18 080311 - Minutes TF76 110913 - Agenda 
TF19 080311 - Part  L SAP progress report March 08 Mar TF77 110606 - Minutes 
TF20 080311 - Appendices ZC Homes delivery hub scope 
long version 7 Mar 08 Paper A3 
TF78 110913 - Annex B 
TF21 080311 - Taskforce meeting CPA paper SAP 
Amendments and Additions Paper C 
TF79 110913 - Minutes 
TF22 080311 - ZC Homes delivery hub scope long version 7 TF80 110913 - Hub - Progress Report Taskforce - 13 September 2011 
TF23 080605 - Agenda TF81 110913 - Programme Delivery Report 6 September 2011 
TF24 080311 - Zero Carbon Homes delivery hub summary 
Final paper A1 
TF82 111115 - Agenda 
TF25 080605 - Minutes TF83 110913 - SAP brief for ZC Taskforce 
TF26 080605 - P NHBC Presentation Consumer Marketing TF84 111115 - Minutes 
TF27 080605 - Paper B 2016 Taskforce Delivery Hub TF85 111115 - 2016 Timeline update 
TF28 080605 - Paper C UK GBC  ZC Definition 
Presentation. 
TF86 111115 - SAP update 
TF29 081021 - Agenda TF87 111115 - Hub Progress Report 
TF30 080605 - Paper D - ZC and eco-towns TF88 111115 - Brief on the SAP Review for taskforce 
TF31 081021 - Item 4 ZC Hub progress report TF89 111115 - Allowable Solution Trials 2012-14 
TF32 081021 - Item 5 ZC Homes Programme delivery TF90 120214  - Part L 
TF33 090127 - Agenda TF91 120214 - Minutes 
TF34 081021 - Minutes TF92 120214 - Agenda 
TF35 090127 - Minutes TF93 120214 - SAP update 
TF36 090127 - Paper2-Initial reactions and next steps TF94 120214 - Hub update 
TF37 090127 - ZC Hub - Programme Delivery - 27 Jan 09 TF95 120214 - AS presentation 
TF38 090429 - Agenda TF96 120214 - Zero Carbon Timeline 
TF39 090127 - ZC Hub-Progress Report - 27 Jan 09 TF97 120529 - Agenda 
TF40 090429 - Minutes TF98 120529 - Hub Progress Report 29 May 2012 
TF41 090429-  Pres-Consultation analysis-item 3B TF99 120529 - Building Performance Modelling Stewardship Body v3 
TF42 090429 - P-LGA note on ZCH and HES-item 7 TF100 120529 -Minutes 
TF43 090429 - Pres-Have Your Say-item 3A TF101 120529 - Programme Delivery Report 29 May 2012 
TF44 090611 - Agenda TF102 120529 - ZCH Report on SAP2012 
TF45 090429 - Pres-Work programme-item 4 TF103 130625 - Agenda 
TF46 091021 - Agenda TF104 130625 -  Minutes 
TF47 090611 - Pres-Hub presentation TF105 130625 - Hub Progress Report 25 June 2013 
TF48 090611 - Minutes TF106 130905 - Agenda 
TF49 091021 - ZC Hub - Energy Efficiency Standard TF107 130625 - Programme Delivery Report 25 June 2013 
TF50 091021 - Minutes TF108 130905 - Minutes 
TF51 091021 - ZC Hub - Energy Efficiency Standard 
Briefing 
TF109 130905 - Hub Progress Report 
TF52 091021 - ZC Hub - Progress Report - 21 Oct 09 TF110 130905 - Allowable Solutions pres for Task Force 
TF53 091021 - ZCH Zero Carbon programme delivery 
review Oct 09 Final 
TF111 140114 - Agenda 
TF54 091021 - Pres-Allowable solutions for 2016 task force TF112 130905 - Timeline Report 
TF55 100127 - Minutes TF113 140114 - Allowable Solutions consultation response presentation 
TF56 100127 -Agenda TF114 140114 - Minutes 
TF57 100127 - Annie Hall’s presentation to 2016 Task Group 
27Jan10 
TF115 140114 - Timeline Report 
TF58 100127 - Marian Spain’s presentation to 2016 Task 
Force 27Jan10 
 
 
